Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17844.,17844.
• Citation: 942 A.2d 396,286 Conn. 102
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: David HARPAZ v. LAIDLAW TRANSIT, INC., et al.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

942 A.2d 396

286 Conn. 102

David HARPAZ v. LAIDLAW TRANSIT, INC., et al.¹

No. 17844.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 28, 2007.

Decided March 18, 2008.

Philip F. Spillane, New Milford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Erik S. Bartlett, for the appellees (defendants).

NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and SCHALLER, Js.

KATZ, J.

The dispositive issue in this workers' compensation appeal is whether an employer that is deemed "conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury" under General Statutes § 31-294c (b)² because of its failure to contest liability or commence payment of compensation within the time period prescribed is permitted to contest the extent of the claimant's disability from that alleged injury. The plaintiff, David Harpaz, appeals from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the seventh district (commissioner) that dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the named defendant, Laidlaw Transit, Inc.³ The plaintiff contends that the board improperly concluded that, although the defendant was barred from contesting the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged back injury, the defendant was not barred from contesting the compensability of the plaintiff's back surgeries because the conclusive presumption under § 31-294c (b) does not bar challenges to the extent of a claimant's disability. We conclude that the conclusive presumption of compensability under § 31-294c (b) bars challenges to the extent of the disability. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the board.

The commissioner's decision reflects the following findings of fact and procedural history. On November 7, 2001, the plaintiff, who then was employed by the defendant as a bus driver, was involved in a motor vehicle accident while fulfilling the responsibilities of his job. The plaintiff did not seek medical treatment for the November, 2001 accident until June, 2002. On July 24, 2002, the plaintiff underwent the first of two surgeries on his lumbar spine. On October 31, 2002, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim alleging a back injury as a result of the November, 2001 accident. On March 15, 2003, the defendant filed a notice contesting the extent of the plaintiff's disability and his need for surgery. On May 15, 2003, the defendant filed another notice contesting the compensability of the alleged injuries. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to preclude the defendant from contesting compensability, pursuant to § 31-294c (b), which the commissioner granted on the ground that the defendant had filed its notices contesting liability more than twenty-eight days after the plaintiff filed his notice of claim. On March 23, 2004, the plaintiff underwent a second lumbar spine surgery.

Thereafter, at the hearing before the commissioner, the plaintiff contended that the conclusive presumption barring the defendant from contesting compensability under § 31-294c (b) extended to all sequelae of his injury, whereas the defendant contended that the presumption did not prevent it from contesting the extent of the plaintiff's disability or need for surgery.⁴ The commissioner concluded that the plaintiff "must establish a direct causal connection between his compensable injury and his need for surgery, notwithstanding [the defendant's] preclusion from contesting liability." The commissioner concluded that, issues of preclusion aside, the plaintiff had failed to establish this connection, crediting the opinion of Glenn Taylor, an orthopedic surgeon who had performed an independent examination of the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant. Accordingly, the commissioner dismissed the plaintiff's claim seeking to have his surgeries found compensable.⁵

The plaintiff appealed from the commissioner's decision to the board, which affirmed the decision. The board found the present case indistinguishable from its decision in Tucker v. Connecticut Winpump, Inc., No. 4492, CRB-5-02-2 (February 21, 2003), wherein it had determined that an employer's failure to file a timely denial of liability for an employee's claim of lung injury for workplace exposure to chemicals did not preclude the employer from contesting whether the employee's chronic pulmonary obstructive disease had been caused by the exposure to chemicals. The board noted that, in Tucker, the case had "turned on whether the preclusion related to the inhalation of workplace chemicals served to bar evaluation of whatever ailments he claimed were sequelae of the compensable injury." The board explained that it had rejected that claim because of the distinction recognized in the statute and case law between the right to contest liability and the right to contest the extent of disability. The board further explained that its holding in Tucker had relied on the fact that "[§ 31-294c] was amended in 1993, removing language [that] limited the ability of [employers] to contest the extent of disability." See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-228, § 8. It rejected the plaintiff's contention that Tucker was inconsistent with the Appellate Court's decision in DeAlmeida v. M.C.M. Stamping Corp., 29 Conn App. 441, 615 A.2d 1066 (1992), noting that DeAlmeida had predated the substantial revisions to § 31-294c in 1993. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the 1993 amendment to § 31-294c (b) did not change the effect of the conclusive presumption, under which an employer is barred from contesting a claimant's right to compensation and the extent of his or her disability.⁶ He points to the fact that the statute as amended in 1993 retained language referring to the extent of disability. In response, the defendant acknowledges that, under § 31-294c prior to the 1993 amendment, "an employer who did not timely contest compensability may have been precluded from contesting both liability and the extent of the claimant's disability." The defendant contends, however, that, under the 1993 amendment to § 31-294c, "it is clear that the legislature intentionally omitted the language from [the statute], which included the reference to contesting the extent of an employee's disability." We agree with the plaintiff.

Under our well established standard of review, "[w]e have recognized that [a]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... We have determined, therefore, that ... deference ... to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's timetested interpretation. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pasquariello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 281 Conn. 656, 663, 916 A.2d 803 (2007).

Our appellate courts have not examined the conclusive presumption under § 31-294c (b) in relation to challenges to the extent of disability since the 1993 amendment that the board concluded was dispositive of the issue in the present case. Moreover, the board did not indicate that it had applied a time-tested interpretation of the statute since the 1993 amendment. "Accordingly, we do not defer to the board's construction and exercise plenary review in accordance with our well established rules of statutory construction." Id.

"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 663-64, 916 A.2d 803.

We begin with the text of § 31-294c (b). See footnote 2 of this opinion for the full text of the statute. Although the parties rely on either the inclusion or omission of the phrase "extent of his disability" in different parts of the statute, it is useful first to view these parts within their context of the statute as a whole. See Maritime Ventures, LLC v. Norwalk, 277 Conn. 800, 826-27, 894 A.2d 946 (2006). The first two sentences of § 31-294c (b) address the procedure that an employer must follow if it wants to contest "liability to pay compensation. . . ." The statute prescribes therein that, within twenty-eight days of receiving a notice of claim, the employer must file a notice stating that it contests the claimant's right to compensation and setting forth the specific ground on which compensation is contested. The third sentence: (1) provides that an employer who fails to file a timely notice contesting liability must commence payment of compensation for the alleged injury within that same twenty-eight day period; and (2) grants the employer who timely commences payment a one year period in which to "contest the employee's right to receive compensation on any grounds or the...