Harper v. C.R. England, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:08-CV-110-PRC |
| Parties | KENNETH HARPER, Plaintiff, v. C.R. ENGLAND, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 34], filed by the Defendant, C.R. England, Inc., on December 15, 2010. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff Kenneth Harper filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Defendant C.R. England, Inc., alleging racial discrimination. On January 4, 2008, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, after conducting its own independent investigation.
On March 6, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Porter County Superior Court against Defendant, alleging racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §1981, and retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim in violation of Indiana law. On April 10, 2008, Defendant removed the case to this Court, and filed an answer on April 17, 2008. On December 15, 2010, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed his response on March 10, 2011, and Defendant filed its reply on March 24, 2011.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proofat trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe allfacts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Plaintiff Kenneth Harper was an employee of Defendant C.R. England, Inc., a corporation operating a truck driving school in Burns Harbor, Indiana. Harper, an African-American, worked as a driving instructor for Defendant from June 2005 until his termination on August 3, 2007.
Lead Instructor Eric Metzler, also an African-American, was the immediate supervisor of Plaintiff and other instructors at the driving school. Metzler conducted daily meetings with the instructors in the mornings. Before each meeting the instructors, while waiting for the meeting to start, would talk and joke around with each other.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 9, 2007, another instructor, Darnell Humphry, an African-American, called Plaintiff a "mark ass nigger" during the time when instructors were waiting on the daily morning meeting to start. Metzler was not in the room when the incident occurred, but came into the room shortly afterward and said something like "cut it out" or "you guys quit it."
A few days after the incident, Plaintiff complained about it to another of his supervisors, school director Chris Kelsey. On April 18, 2007, Plaintiff emailed Carrie Johansen, the Assistant Director of Human Resources for Defendant, with a formal statement regarding the March 9 incident.
Kelsey met with Metzler, who denied hearing Humphrey's insult, and ordered Metzler to investigate the incident. Metzler interviewed several people who were present at the time of the exchange between Plaintiff and Humphrey, and reported to Kelsey that he was unable to determine what, if anything, Humphrey had actually said to Plaintiff. There was no record put in Humphrey's file concerning the allegations against him. Kelsey told Metzler, Humphrey, and Plaintiff that any future uses of a racial epithet would constitute a firing offense and publicly warned all the instructors that making a racial slur would lead to termination. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Metzler told him nothing would come of his complaint advised him to grow a thicker skin.
On approximately four or five occasions after March 9, 2007, Plaintiff says he heard other instructors use the slur "nigger" in conversations amongst themselves. The remarks were not directed at him, and Metzler was not part of the conversations.
Plaintiff alleged that the word "asshole" was written on his time card at some point after March 9, 2007. Plaintiff complained to Kelsey, who said he would talk to Metzler about it. Metzler moved the time clock and time cards into his office.
On June 25, 2007, Metzler gave three written warnings to Plaintiff. The most serious warning was for Plaintiff’s poor attendance. Metzler told Plaintiff that he had taken too much time off, and warned him not to take any more days off or leave work early for the remainder of the year. Plaintiff understood that he was being placed on probation, and that if there was no improvement he could be terminated. Harper took several days off after being placed on probation. On July 10, 2007, Plaintiff emailed Johansen indicating that he believed the written warnings were unwarranted.
On or around July 13, 2007, Plaintiff initiated a "First Report of Injury or Illness," prepared by the Manager of Workers Compensation. However, Plaintiff never filed a worker's compensationclaim.
On August 3, 2007, Plaintiff was terminated. Before terminating Plaintiff, Kelsey consulted with Johansen regarding Plaintiff’s attendance records. Johansen verified that Plaintiff had exceeded his leave and agreed that termination based on attendance was warranted. On August 3, 2007, Kelsey met with Plaintiff and told him he was being terminated for poor attendance. Kelsey prepared a written Termination Evaluation Form that indicated as the explanation of termination: "has not been able to do job full time."
First, Defendant argues that the Court should grant summary judgment on Counts I and...
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