Harper v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1976
• Docket Number: No. 56987,56987
• Citation: 244 N.W.2d 782
• Parties: Robert L. HARPER, Appellant, v. The CEDAR RAPIDS TELEVISION COMPANY, INC., a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 782

244 N.W.2d 782

Robert L. HARPER, Appellant, v. The CEDAR RAPIDS TELEVISION COMPANY, INC., a corporation, Appellee.

No. 56987.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Aug. 30, 1976.

Eugene J. Kopecky, of Ackley & Kopecky, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

This appeal by plaintiff, Robert L. Harper, is from the judgment entered in a law action tried to the court. Harper, an employee of The Cedar Rapids Television Company, Inc., a corporation, filed a petition in two divisions against that company as defendant claiming damages by reason of termination of his employment by defendant on September 19, 1972. The trial court found the contract of employment at the time of plaintiff's discharge 'was one of indefinite duration and terminable at will' and dismissed plaintiff's petition.

Following an interview, audition and negotiations the parties had entered into a written employment contract sometime in April 1970 covering plaintiff's employment as an anchor-man for the local news program of station KCRG in Cedar Rapids which was owned and operated by defendant. The terms of this contract were to become effective April 13, 1970, and terminate April 12, 1972.

Plaintiff's claim for relief is based on the theory the written contract of employment referred to was orally modified and extended from April 13, 1972, to April 12, 1973, and was in existence at the time of plaintiff's discharge. Plaintiff alleged that following an altercation with another employee of defendant on September 19, 1972, plaintiff was discharged without cause. The vital distinction between the causes of action set forth in the two divisions of the petition is the amount and elements of damages claimed.

Defendant in answer admitted existence of a written agreement of employment but originally asserted this contract was mutually rescinded and terminated in January 1972, and that thereafter plaintiff was an employee of defendant under an oral employment contract which was terminable at will by either party. In an amendment to its answer defendant struck the phrase 'was mutually rescinded and terminated in January 1972,' and substituted the phrase 'expired on April 12, 1972.'

Plaintiff's basic contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding there had been no renewal of the employment contract. This court is requested to reverse the trial court and find that a contract did exist on the date of the alleged breach and the terms thereof were those of the written agreement entered into by the parties which was allegedly renewed by the parties. Plaintiff further requests this court to award him damages commensurate with the terms of said agreement and requests remand for a determination of further damages.

As stated, plaintiff was hired by defendant, owner and operator of television station KCRG in Cedar Rapids, as an anchorman for the local news programs. Plaintiff responded to an ad placed in a broadcasting magazine by defendant and after negotiations the parties entered into a written employment contract. It is uncontradicted the written agreement was executed at the insistence of plaintiff and was contrary to the usual practice of defendant.

The following provisions of the employment agreement are most pertinent to the issues presented by the appeal:

'* * *

'Compensation

'For all services rendered by you under this agreement, the Company will pay you a salary of eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000) per annum through April 12, 1971. And a salary of eighteen thousand five hundred dollars ($18,500) beginning April 13, 1971, to the termination of this agreement on April 12, 1972.

'* * *

'Terms of Employment

'It is understood that the Company may terminate your services at any time during the term of this agreement by serving you thirteen weeks notice or paying you thirteen weeks base salary in lieu thereof, for the following reasons:

'1. Breach of this agreement by you.

'2. Commission by you of any act or involvement in any situation which will bring you into public disrepute or reflect unfavorably upon the reputation of KCRG.

'Agreement Not to Compete

'When the services with this Company are terminated either by breach or expiration of agreement, you further agree that you will not accept employment with any other broadcast facility in the Cedar Rapids-Waterloo market area for a period of twenty-six (26) weeks. Or, for any period of up to one (1) year that the Company chooses to pay you, based on the salary agreement in force under this agreement.'

During the term of the employment agreement defendant provided plaintiff with various increases in compensation which were not provided for in the agreement. These salary increases appear to have been rewards for plaintiff's role in greatly increasing the ratings of defendant's local news programs. At the same time, however, it appears plaintiff was involved in a number of clashes with various other employees of defendant. Mr. Edwin Lasko, general manager of the KCRG station, testified there were 'fairly frequent' personnel difficulties involving plaintiff. These difficulties led to plaintiff's submittal of a letter or resignation to Lasko in December 1971. It is not clear whether plaintiff subsequently withdrew the letter or defendant did not accept it, but in any event, no action was taken on it.

Lasko further testified that after plaintiff withdrew his letter of resignation plaintiff said 'he would be then finished in April.' Shortly thereafter, Lasko, after consultation with the executive committee of the station, decided plaintiff's written contract would not be renewed. At no time was this decision communicated to plaintiff. Plaintiff denied ever having indicated he would leave defendant's employ after expiration of the written agreement, unless 'we couldn't come to contractual agreement.'

Plaintiff testified he 'had a meeting with Mr. Lasko in February (1972) about renegotiation.' They discussed changes in plaintiff's duties, a change of title and a salary increase. As a result of this meeting plaintiff received a $2500 per annum raise in salary which was to start with the expiration of the contract, but which actually became effective March 1, 1972.

Lasko's testimony concerning the February meeting differed from plaintiff's. He testified plaintiff 'came in and asked for a raise.' To the best of Lasko's knowledge the conversations he had with plaintiff at that time 'concerned only money.' He further testified his company did not 'believe in written employment contracts,' and no employee outside of the sales department had a contract at that time. However, he, like plaintiff, had had a two-year contract when he first came to work for defendant.

Although the contractual relationship between the parties terminated on April 12, 1972, their employer-employee relationship did not and proceeded according to the terms of the now expired written contract as modified by the salary increases. Plaintiff testified he approached Lasko sometime after April 12 and inquired about another copy of the contract to which Lasko responded, 'Well, I'm not worried about that.' Plaintiff then asked if he was 'worried about my going off to another competitive station' and Lasko responded, 'No, I'm not worried.' Plaintiff concluded the conversation with 'Neither am I.'

Lasko concurred in plaintiff's recollection of the conversation and explained he was not worried about the noncompetition clause because he was willing to forego it in exchange for the freedom to terminate plaintiff when it was deemed necessary. According to Lasko the employment arrangement between the parties subsequent to the expiration of the written agreement was simply that plaintiff was working for defendant 'for $21,500 a year producing and doing the news' without a written contractual agreement.

On September 19, 1972, plaintiff was involved in an altercation in the KCRG studios with Walter Alliss, chief engineer for KCRG radio and television. It is undisputed plaintiff struck the first blow in the scuffle which plaintiff testified was precipitated by words between the two men concerning what plaintiff felt were unjustified complaints about the previous evening's taped news program. Following the scuffle, which resulted in Mr. Alliss' face requiring 24 stitches, plaintiff left the station allegedly to change clothes. Within 45 minutes Lasko telephoned plaintiff at his home and informed him he was fired.

On the date of trial, immediately prior to the presentation of evidence, defendant requested the court's permission to file the amendment to the answer previously mentioned 'which pretty much simply conforms to what I think the proof will be as far as the evidence is concerned * * *.' Plaintiff objected to that portion of the amendment, set out earlier, on the ground 'it changes the defense in this case from that of rescission to that of expiration and that is a primary matter in this case * * *.' As to the contested portion of the amendment the court stated, '* * * I am not making any ruling at this point on that matter and as to what the proof would be under the pleadings without amending them.' The court at no time made a final ruling on this portion of the proposed amendment, nor was there a subsequent request by either party for the court to do so.

This appeal presents the following issues for review:

1. Did trial court's failure to rule on defendant's request to amend his answer result in prejudice to plaintiff and thus constitute reversible error?

2. Was the trial court's finding that there had been no renewal of the expired written agreement supported by substantial evidence in the record?

3. Was the law erroneously applied to the facts in the finding the contract was not renewed?

4. Did the trial court's denial of damages to plaintiff constitute error?

5. Even...