Harper v. City of Keswick
| Docket Number | 22-1191 |
| Decision Date | 07 June 2023 |
| Parties | JAYSON HARPER and ANDREW HARPER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF KESWICK, IOWA, Defendant-Appellee. ALBERT LEER and LEROY LEER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF KESWICK, IOWA, JAYSON HARPER and ANDREW HARPER, Defendants. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Keokuk County, Lucy J Gamon, Judge.
Appellants appeal the district court ruling granting summary judgment to the City of Keswick on their claims of equitable estoppel.
Samuel E. Jones and Jackson B. Blais of Shuttleworth &Ingersoll Cedar Rapids, for appellants Jayson Harper and Andrew Harper.
Patrick J. O'Connell and Shawna M. Schamberger of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee City of Keswick Iowa.
Gregg Geerdes, Iowa City, for appellees Albert Leer and Leroy Leer.
Heard by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
Andrew Harper and Jayson Harper, father and son, appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Keswick on the Harpers' claims of equitable estoppel concerning ownership of property originally platted as a street. The City has not shown there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the elements necessary to establish a claim of equitable estoppel-abandonment, adverse possession, and unfair damage. We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. And because we are reversing for further proceedings, we do not address the Harpers' claim of the need for additional discovery before the summary judgment hearing.
The plat for the City of Keswick includes Cameron Street. A portion of this platted area, however, was neither developed nor used as a street. The parties have conflicting claims concerning ownership of the undeveloped property. The Harpers alleged equitable estoppel and sought to quiet title to the disputed area.[1] On April 8, 2022, the City moved for summary judgment against the Harpers. It asserted there was a lack of factual and legal basis for the Harpers' claims against the City. The Harpers resisted the motion for summary judgment.
From the petitions, affidavits, and depositions presented by the parties in relation to the City's motion for summary judgment, we can glean the following information. In 1979, Andrew purchased the property to the north of the disputed area. At the time of Andrew's purchase, there was no access to water. Andrew arranged with the City to repair an underground water pit in the disputed area so he could receive water on his property. According to Andrew, he provided the materials for the City to make the repairs. There is a manhole cover over the water pit. Andrew stated the water pit is close to ground level and believed that if a road was built over the disputed area the water pit would need to be removed.
Andrew stated that when he purchased the property it was uneven and vehicles could not be driven on it. He purchased gravel and leveled the property so he could park his semi-truck on it. Andrew also used the disputed area to keep a fertilizer tank and other equipment. And a family friend parked a flatbed trailer on the property. Andrew stated that in about 2019, the Leers began using the area to park a semi-truck with a flatbed. He stated the City never put any property in the disputed area or asked him to remove his property.
Jayson purchased the property to the south of the disputed area from Nutrien Ag Solutions in 2019. A previous owner of the property installed concrete pads that were partially on the disputed area and partially on Jayson's property. [2] Some of the equipment owned by Jayson and his father was parked on these concrete pads. The concrete pads are above ground level and this makes it difficult for vehicles to drive through the disputed area. In a deposition, Jayson testified, "I assumed I owned up to my dad's property, that we owned to the middle of all this, because this has never been used, ever, so I just assumed this was already my property, had concrete poured on it."
Jayson stated that when he found out the property had been an alleyway, he went to the city council for a determination of whether he or the City owned the property. He asked to purchase the property if the City owned it. The City voted in February 2020 and again in December 2020 against vacating the disputed area. Jayson stated his intent was to build a shop on the property and connect the shop to his father's shed.
Both Andrew and Jayson testified that they believed they were paying taxes on the disputed property. They mowed grass, removed weeds, and cut some trees on the property.
Following a hearing,[3] the district court found, "There is a strong weight of evidence in this case that the City did not intend to abandon the Disputed Street," and noted the City's decisions to not vacate the property. The court stated that while a city may be deemed to have abandoned property when it permitted parties to occupy the property and pay taxes for it, "[t]he Harpers assert that they 'may' have paid taxes on the Disputed Street, but have produced no evidence in support of this assertion." The court also found the Harpers were unable to show adverse possession because they did not show they exclusively used the disputed area for a period of ten years. The court determined the City used the disputed area for its water distribution system and stated the Leers used the area "to park their semitruck since at least 1995." Additionally, the court found the Harpers did not show they would suffer unfair damage if the City owned the property. It found the Harpers were "unable to prove that they had a good faith belief that they owned the Disputed Street." The court concluded the Harpers were "unable to establish their claim to the Disputed Street as a matter of law." The Harpers appeal the district court's decision.
We review a district court's decision granting summary judgment for the correction of errors of law. Jones v. Univ. of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d 127, 139 (Iowa 2013). Summary judgment may be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981 (3). The record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Deeds v. City of Marion, 914 N.W.2d 330, 339 (Iowa 2018).
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to establish there are no genuine issues of material fact. Morris v. Steffes Group, Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 2019). There is a genuine issue of material fact "if reasonable minds can differ on how an issue should be resolved." Banwart v. 50th St. Sports, L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Iowa 2018). A fact is material if a determination of the matter might affect the outcome of the action. Est. of Gottschalk v. Pomeroy Dev., Inc., 893 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Iowa 2017). "Even if the facts are undisputed, summary judgment is not proper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences from them and thereby reach different conclusions." Morris, 924 N.W.2d at 496 (citation omitted).
The facts are viewed in "the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion for summary judgment." Buboltz v. Birusingh, 962 N.W.2d 747, 754 (Iowa 2021). "We draw all legitimate inferences the evidence bears that will establish a genuine issue of material fact." Andersen v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 535 (Iowa 2018). "Inferences may be drawn in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment only if they are rational, reasonable, and otherwise permissible under the governing substantive law." Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
"[A] court deciding a motion for summary judgment must not weigh the evidence, but rather simply inquire whether a reasonable jury faced with the evidence presented could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 697 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Iowa 2005). Additionally, the court does not make credibility determinations, as this is a matter reserved for the fact finder. Newell v. JDS Holdings, L.L.C., 834 N.W.2d 463, 473-74 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013).
"[T]o successfully resist a motion for summary judgment, the resisting party must set forth specific evidentiary facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Est. of Henrich, 389 N.W.2d 78, 80 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). A party cannot rest on mere allegations or a denial of the pleadings. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). "Although our rules of procedure allow a nonmoving party to resist summary judgment, the burden is still on the moving party 'to show the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted).
The sole function of a motion for summary judgment is to decide if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 105 (Iowa 1981); Anita Valley, Inc. v. Bingley, 279 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Iowa 1979). If there is, the case must stand for trial. Brubaker v. Barlow, 326 N.W.2d 314, 315 (Iowa 1982).
A person may obtain an interest in a city street through the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Stecklein v. City of Cascade, 693 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Iowa 2005).
The species of equitable estoppel required to establish title to property claimed adversely to a governmental entity includes three elements: (1) "conduct on the part of the city indicating an abandonment of its interest," including actual nonuse for more than ten years; (2) "a claim of ownership through...
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