Harper v. Grammer, CV83-L-786.
Decision Date | 24 February 1987 |
Docket Number | No. CV83-L-786.,CV83-L-786. |
Citation | 654 F. Supp. 515 |
Parties | Steven Roy HARPER, Petitioner, v. Gary GRAMMER, Warden, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
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Vincent M. Powers, Lincoln, Neb., for petitioner.
Robert Spire, Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., for respondent.
Steven Roy Harper was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and three counts of poisoning with intent to kill, based upon evidence of a poisoning incident. He was sentenced to death by electrocution. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is before this court now. The United States Magistrate David L. Piester's recommendation on each of the issues has been received and considered, as well as the entire record in the case, as it was made at the time of the trial in the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, the post-conviction proceeding in that court, and two appeals to the Supreme Court of Nebraska. I shall consider the individual claims in the order in which they were stated in the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, using the same paragraph numbers that the amended petition used.
No issue of exhaustion of state remedies has been raised as to any claim, unless it is hereafter discussed with respect to the particular claim.
The magistrate's report and recommendation accurately describes the factual situation at page 9:
The magistrate's report and recommendation continues:
Whatever standard was used by the state trial judge and the Supreme Court of Nebraska, the standard which must be applied now in this court is stated in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978):
The Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Fenton, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) specifically held that the voluntariness of a confession is not an issue of fact entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption, but is a legal question meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
Quite aside from the finding by the state courts, therefore, I must review the record to determine whether Harper's statements of October 13, 1978, and January 8, 1979, were the product of a rational intellect and a free will. If they were, they were properly usable as possible impeachment of Harper, were he to take the stand. He did not take the stand and the claim is that he was deterred in doing so because of the trial judge's holding that the statements of October 13, 1978, and January 8, 1979, could be used as impeachment.
Although I have thoroughly reviewed the record as it now exists, the petitioner has asked for a hearing at which he may submit other evidence. It is proper that he have such a hearing, if he has additional evidence to present.
As to that portion of Claim 13A that the identity of the chemical poison used was the "fruit" of a tainted statement or statements, and therefore inadmissible at the trial, that determination may also be a matter for me to find, rather than depending upon findings by the state courts. The court in Hamilton v. Nix, 781 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.1985), in a two-to-one decision said, in footnote 8, page 625:
Accordingly, the petitioner, as well as the state, should be given the opportunity to present any additional evidence on the subject of whether the identity of the chemical poison was the fruit of the statements of the petitioner on October 13, 1978, or January 8, 1979, or, on the other hand, was attenuated, had an independent source, or would inevitably have been discovered.
During the closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor recounted in great detail the evidence of the defendant's guilt in entering the home of his former girlfriend and her husband and children, inserting a carcinogenic drug into a lemonade pitcher in the icebox. He then said:
'
(Bill of Exceptions, VII, 1331:15-19).
The defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial and the judge denied the motion but instructed the jury to disregard the statements.
Darden v. Wainwright, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) set the standard for determining whether a prosecutor's remarks amount to a denial of due process. The court said at ___, 106 S.Ct. at ___:
The petitioner has objected to the magistrate's report and recommendation in this respect, arguing that the magistrate has confused two different lines of authority regarding improper prosecutorial comments in closing arguments. He argues that Darden v. Wainwright and Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.1985) deal with inflammatory, not inaccurate, prosecutorial statements, whereas the statement involved in the present case is an inaccurate one and should be governed by the due process principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). I find no such confusion. Brooks v. Kemp dealt with some comments that were inflammatory and some that were not supported by the evidence. Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Agurs do not deal with closing argument, but with evidence that the prosecution did not disclose. In any event, the standard used in Brady and Agurs would not be helpful to the defense here. The court in Agurs defined the standard of undisclosed evidence as follows:
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