Harper v. State
| Decision Date | 07 November 1946 |
| Docket Number | 31380. |
| Parties | HARPER v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The jury were authorized to find that the defendant made the attack upon the female with the intent to have carnal knowledge of her forcibly and against her will.
2. The special assignment of error does not require a reversal for the reasons set forth in the second division of this opinion.
The plaintiff in error, D. L. Harper, a negro boy about 15 years old, whom we shall call the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to rape a white married woman. He filed his amended motion for a new trial, which was overruled. He assigns error on this judgment. The material evidence briefly, shows that the lady alighted from a Walker-West View street car near West View Cemetery, in Fulton County Georgia, for the purpose of walking six or seven blocks to her home on Florida Avenue, late at night. She was overtaken and passed by the defendant, who walked ahead for several blocks to a negro store or restaurant. There were no people on the streets and no lights. The negro began walking beside the lady and engaged in a conversation with her with reference to whether or not she had missed the bus and if she knew some of the parties whose names he mentioned, whereupon the lady walked out into the street as far as she could without getting into the line of passing cars. Then it was that the defendant threw his arms around her and stated that he wanted to have intercourse with her. The lady unzipped her pocketbook while he still had his arms about her and while he was scuffling with her, and told him that if he did not leave her alone she would blow his brains out. She threatened him with policemen and threatened to call some one passing in cars. The negro then released her, and fled, going behind a florist shop, and disappeared. The lady immediately reported the incident to the peace officers. Dogs were summoned and put on the trail of the defendant. He was run down and caught in this home some 600 or 700 yards away.
When arrested the defendant told the officers 'I didn't use any weapons.' The officer replied: The defendant replied: 'I just wanted to have this woman.' The officer inquired of him what he meant by the statement 'Wanting to have her,' and he said those are just words that colored folks use. The defendant in his statement admitted that he passed the lady and that he looked around and contended that it was dark and he thought it was some one he knew. He also stated that there was a street light in front of the store. He relates a conversation which he had with the lady concerning where she had been and about her getting a license to carry a pistol. He further said: 'And I guess I cracked a joke and laughed. I said 'how about that." He also admitted that she told him he had better go on down the road before she blew his brains out. He further stated that she inquired of him what his name was and he told her 'Parker' and it was later found out that his name was Harper.
Hudson & LeCraw and John H. Hudson, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
E. E. Andrews, Sol. Gen., and Durwood T. Pye, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
1. As to the general grounds, the distinguished counsel argue enthusiastically that the evidence is insufficient to show that the defendant committed an assault and battery upon the lady with the purpose of having carnal knowledge of her forcibly and against her will. It is further contended that the evidence is equally as strong that he committed the assault and battery for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the lady or for some other purpose undisclosed. In support of this contention, counsel cite many cases, wherein this court and the Supreme Court have reversed convictions for assault with intent to rape because the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt what the intent of the defendant was in making the assault or attack upon the female. Those cases are:Gaines v. State, 7 Ga.App. 397, 66 S.E 1099; Dorsey v. State, 108 Ga. 477, 34 S.E. 135; Parker v. State, 72 Ga.App. 302, 33 S.E.2d 739; Scott v. State, 63 Ga.App. 353, 11 S.E.2d 64; Borders v. State, 61 Ga.App. 573, 6 S.E.2d 795; Little v. State, 42 Ga.App. 222, 155 S.E. 352; Pauldo v. State, 29 Ga.App. 389, 115 S.E. 668; Johnson v. State, 63 Ga. 355, 356. We have cited these cases in the order named in the brief of counsel for the defendant. We might say that the case of Dorsey v. State, supra, is a leading case and is more often quoted than any others so far as our information goes. In the first division of that opinion the Supreme Court lays down three elements of this offense: First, an assault; second, an intent to have carnal knowledge of the female; third, a purpose to carry into effect the intent to have carnal knowledge of the female with force and against her will. During the course of the opinion the Supreme Court said [108 Ga. 477, 34 S.E. 136]: In most all of the cases cited the defendant in making the attack did not express any intention to have carnal knowledge of the female. In all the cases cited the defendant did not express any purpose as to why he made the attack, whereas in the instant case the defendant not only told the female that it was his purpose and intent in attacking her to have carnal knowledge of her, but he also when arrested approximately an hour thereafter, stated to the officers that he 'wanted this woman' meaning that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. This leaves no doubt, of course, that he wanted to rob her or frighten or attack her for any other purpose than to have carnal knowledge of her. This then leaves but one question for the jury to determine, and that is whether he intended to effectuate this purpose forcibly and against her will. The jury were authorized in the determination of this question to consider the difference in the races, the customs, the scuffling, the time of night, the fact that there were no lights there and no one near, and that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial