Harper v. Summit County
| Decision Date | 23 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 961486-CA,961486-CA |
| Citation | 963 P.2d 768 |
| Parties | 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 Jane HARPER, Richard D. Harper, Frank Cattelan, and Richard Richins, Plaintiffs, Appellees, and Cross-appellants, v. SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic; Summit County Commission; Summit County Planning Commission; and Utelite Corporation, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-appellees. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.
Summit County, Summit County Commission, and Summit County Planning Commission, Eric C. Olson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant Utelite Corporation.
James L. Warlaumont, Jeffrey W. Appel, and Benjamin T. Wilson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before WILKINS, Associate P.J., and BENCH and JACKSON, JJ.
Defendants, the Summit County entities (Summit County) and Utelite Corporation (Utelite), jointly appeal from several trial court rulings. Defendants appeal from a partial summary judgment order entered by Judge Wilkinson in favor of Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper, Frank Cattelan, and Richard Richins (plaintiffs). Defendants also appeal from Judge Wilkinson's denial in the summary judgment order of their motions to dismiss based on nonjoinder of Union Pacific Railroad (the Railroad) and from Judge Noel's order granting plaintiffs attorney fees under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-9(2) (1998). Further, defendants appeal from Judge Noel's determination that Utelite is liable under a claim of nuisance per se based solely on its violation of the Summit County Development Code. We affirm in part and reverse in part Judge Wilkinson's summary judgment order, and we reverse Judge Noel's attorney fees order and nuisance per se determination.
Plaintiffs cross-appeal from Judge Brian's order denying plaintiffs' motion to file a third amended complaint; Judge Noel's denial of their motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1981); Judge Iwasaki's order granting Summit County's request for a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Judge Noel's decision to grant Utelite's Motion for Jury View; Judge Noel's adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by Utelite's counsel regarding equitable relief; and Judge Brian's order granting Utelite's Motion in Limine Regarding: Access. We affirm on all issues presented in the cross-appeal. 1
In the spring of 1989, after receiving approval and an electrical building permit from Summit County, Utelite built a railroad loading facility on a leased portion of the Railroad's right of way in Echo, Utah. On July 31, 1990, plaintiffs, who own homes near the right of way, filed suit against Summit County asserting the county had illegally approved and permitted Utelite's facility.
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Summit County had violated plaintiffs' due process rights, the Summit County Development Code (Development Code), and Utah's Open and Public Meetings Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -10 (1998). Based on these violations, plaintiffs asked the trial court to require Summit County to ensure that Utelite cease using its facility and to award plaintiffs their attorney fees.
Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to name Utelite as a defendant but did not add new theories or state any claims against Utelite. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment against Summit County, arguing the undisputed material facts showed as a matter of law that Summit County had violated plaintiffs' due process rights, the Development Code, and the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Summit County moved to dismiss the case under Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because plaintiffs had not joined the Railroad as a defendant. Although plaintiffs had not yet brought claims against Utelite during this period, Utelite also participated in these proceedings by filing motions and memoranda.
Judge Wilkinson held a hearing during which plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was "presented, argued and submitted." At the end of the hearing, Judge Wilkinson ruled from the bench, granting plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and denying Summit County's motion to dismiss. The record does not contain a transcript of this hearing, except for Judge Wilkinson's ruling.
Judge Wilkinson's ruling was reduced to writing in the form of an order for partial summary judgment and findings of fact and conclusions of law, both issued August 23, 1993. Based on his findings of undisputed fact and legal conclusions, Judge Wilkinson ordered that "Summit County shall be required to effectuate the removal of Utelite from their currently occupied site." See The Development Code of Summit County § 1.16 (July 1989) (). However, Judge Wilkinson stayed this order for sixty days pending interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, which summarily denied the appeal.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for an order to show cause why Summit County "should not be required to abide by the Order entered against them to ... [e]ffectuate the immediate removal of the Utelite facility." Utelite moved to set aside Judge Wilkinson's partial summary judgment and submitted new affidavits. After a hearing--for which we also have no transcript--Judge Young denied plaintiffs' motion and stayed removal of Utelite's facility "pending a final resolution of all remaining claims against all parties and the entry of a final order and appropriate form of judgment adjudicating the merits of all remaining claims against all parties." Judge Young further denied Utelite's motion to set aside the partial summary judgment.
In March 1994, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint claiming, among other things, that Utelite's facility is a nuisance per se. Further, the second amended complaint specified 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as a basis for recovering attorney fees from Summit County regarding plaintiffs' due process claim.
The flurry of motions, memoranda, orders, and discovery endeavors continued through the first day of trial. Before opening statements, plaintiffs successfully moved that Judge Noel rule as a matter of law that the facility was a nuisance per se based on Judge Wilkinson's conclusion on partial summary judgment that Utelite's facility was built in violation of the Development Code. Having established Utelite's liability under that theory, plaintiffs dropped their other claims without prejudice, and the jury trial proceeded primarily to determine the amount of damages, if any, arising from the nuisance per se claim. Meanwhile, Judge Noel "also heard the evidence with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief supplementary to any such relief already awarded in th[e] action." The jury then awarded plaintiffs damages under nuisance per se, and Judge Noel declined to award plaintiffs "any further equitable relief ... other than the equitable relief previously granted by Judge Wilkinson."
On May 1, 1996, Judge Noel granted plaintiffs' motion against Summit County for attorney fees under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Law, see Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-9(2), but denied plaintiffs' motion against Summit County for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Judge Noel also stayed "implementation of the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment entered on August 23, 1993 by Judge Wilkinson which requires the removal of the facility of Utelite from its currently occupied site at Echo, Utah ... during the pendency of the appeal in this action."
Defendants Summit County and Utelite appeal and plaintiffs cross-appeal, presenting myriad issues for our consideration. We first address the issues defendants raise on appeal.
Defendants jointly appeal Judge Wilkinson's summary judgment orders. They also jointly appeal Judge Noel's attorney fees order and nuisance per se determination. We begin our analysis of their appeal by addressing their challenge to Judge Wilkinson's order granting partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor.
In challenging Judge Wilkinson's grant of partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor, defendants argue Judge Wilkinson incorrectly concluded that Summit County violated (1) the Development Code; (2) the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -10 (1998); and (3) plaintiffs' due process rights. Defendants also argue Judge Wilkinson erroneously ordered Summit County to ensure the removal of Utelite's facility.
Summary judgment may be granted only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994). Because an appeal from summary judgment involves only legal issues, "we do not defer to the trial court's rulings." Ron Shepherd, 882 P.2d at 654. Instead, we determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly determined that no disputed issues of material fact existed. See id.
We first address the correctness of Judge Wilkinson's determination on summary judgment that Summit County violated the Development Code. In his findings, conclusions, and order, Judge Wilkinson did not specify how Summit County violated the Development Code. However, our inability to understand the basis of the trial court's decision does not hurt plaintiffs' claim in this instance because " '[w]e may ... "affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." ' " Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
In both their summary judgment memoranda...
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