Harper Warehouse, Inc. v. Henry Chanin Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 September 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 38391,38391,2 |
| Citation | 116 S.E.2d 641,102 Ga.App. 489 |
| Parties | HARPER WAREHOUSE, INC. v. HENRY CHANIN CORPORATION |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The court did not err in any of the rulings contained in the defendant's motions asking for a reversal of this case.
Henry Chanin Corporation filed a suit against Harper Warehouse, Inc., praying recovery of alleged damages in the amount of $10,370.10 plus costs. The defendant filed demurrers, both general and special, to the petition as amended and filed an answer to the petition. The trial court overruled the demurrers to the petition as amended and the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount for which suit was brought. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the general grounds and twelve special grounds. He also filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which contained seven grounds. The court overruled the motion for a new trial on all grounds and overruled the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It is on these judgments that the case is here for review.
The petition, as finally amended, alleges in paragraph (1) that the defendant is a Georgia corporation; (2) that the defendant operates a bonded public warehouse for the storage of commodities; (3) that on February 4, 1958, the plaintiff had certain cotton waste in storage in the defendant's warehouse, the stored material being in good condition, the required storage fees having been paid, and that this created a bailee-bailor relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; that due to the negligence of the defendant the stored material was damaged to the plaintiff's loss; (4) that the stored material was covered by receipts which are set out in detail in the petition; (5) that on or about February 4, 1958, 422 bales of the 968 bales stored were damaged by water; (6) that the water damage occurred as a result of water leakage from the sprinkler system; (7) that the sprinkler system is of the type generally known as 'dry-pipe' sprinkler systems; (8) that a sprinkler system of this type requires sufficient air pressure in the pipes to force water from the pipes and to prevent water from standing therein; (9) that the defendant was negligent in failing to maintain the roof in a proper and safe state of repair and permitted the roof to sag so that the sprinkler system which was supported by the roof also sagged; (10) that the defendant failed to keep a sufficient amount of air pressure in the pipes; (11) that as a result of the pipes of the sprinkler system sagging, the force of gravity pulled the water to the location of the sag; (12) that the standing water froze in the sprinkler system causing the pipes to burst and resulting in great quantities of water pouring upon the stored commodities belonging to the plaintiff, thus greatly decreasing the market value of the commodities; (13) that the defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known, the condition of the sprinkler system; (14) that he knew or should have known that the air pressure in the system was insufficient. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 set out the difference between the value of the stored commodities before and after the water drainage. Paragraph 23 alleges that the failure of the defendant to exercise the ordinary care required of a bailee was the sole and proximate cause of the damage sustained by the plaintiff and specific acts of negligence are set forth in succeeding subparagraphs of this paragraph. Paragraph 24 describes the damage done as the proximate result of the defendant's negligence in allowing the water to leak on the commodities and prays recovery of damages in the amount of $10,370.10.
The defendant's answer is in the nature of a general denial.
Edgar C. Gentry, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Byrd & Quillian, J. Kelley Quillian, John Henry Crutchfield, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
1. We will first discuss the question as to whether or not the trial court erred in overruling the general demurrer to the petition. Counsel for the defendant contends that the petition did not set forth a cause of action because it did not allege that the defendant had actual knowledge of the defects in the warehouse. In support of this contention counsel cites Flynn v. Inman, 49 Ga.App. 186, 174 S.E. 551. That case concerned the duty owed by the owner of premises to a licensee. The court held that in a licensee case The case at bar is not a licensee case. In a licensee case the owner of a building must have actual knowledge of the defects which caused injuries. Such is not demanded in a bailor-bailee relationship. Counsel for the defendant also cites Cook v. Kroger Baking & Grocery Co., 65 Ga.App. 141, 143, 15 S.E.2d 531, in support of the contention that the case should be reversed. That case was a suit for damages seeking recovery from injuries allegedly received by a person in a Piggly-Wiggly Store. There the court said that there was nothing in the petition to show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the slippery substance on the floor. There is quite a difference between a defendant knowing that someone, perhaps a customer, has dropped a carrot top on the floor of a grocery store and the situation which is depicted in the case at bar where a beam on the roof was sagging thus causing the pipes to sag and water to accumulate in the sagging part of the pipes. The water in the pipes froze and then the frozen water melted. Surely during all this time a warehouse keeper would have known what was happening. The Kroger case is nothing like the case at bar and is not authority for reversal. The case at bar is more like the case of Parker Motor Co. v. Spiegal, 33 Ga.App. 795, 127 S.E. 797, where the court affirmed a case where a car had been entrusted to the custody of a bailee and had been wrecked. See also Stewart v. Greene, 124 Ga. 975, 53 S.E. 450. The petition was good as against the general demurrer and the court did not err in overruling the general demurrer and letting the case proceed to trial.
2. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant argues the special demurrers. Hence we will not consider the special demurrers specifically but we might state for the record that they are not meritorious.
3. Special ground 1 assigns error because it is alleged that the court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to strike the testimony of William B. Smythe. This witness testified on behalf of the plaintiff as to the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff. The objection to this testimony was that the testimony was hearsay and that the witness was without knowledge or experience to testify as he did. The witness was the treasurer of the plaintiff corporation. He testified that when the damage occurred he went to companies of a like nature and questioned them as to their method of evaluating grades of waste so that he could work out an evaluation of the loss sustained. From the knowledge thus gained the witness determined that the loss was $10,370.10. A cross-examination developed the information that the witness' primary duties were to maintain accounting records; that he did not buy or sell cotton waste; that he did not personally grade cotton waste; that he did not personally supervise the making of cotton waste; that he did not examine all of the 968 bales of waste nor in fact did he examine all of the 422 bales which were alleged to have been damaged. It is our opinion that the court did not err in refusing to have the testimony of this witness withdrawn from the consideration of the jury for the reason that the witness was testifying on behalf of the plaintiff and the testimony was not hurtful and prejudicial because it was relevant and material to determine the amount of damages because no other witness testified as to the value of the waste material. The testimony was material and not harmful, and after a careful reading of this witness' testimony it seems that he was sufficiently informed in the sphere of waste material to be able to testify as he did. Moreover, the defendant himself had admitted the amount of the damage. In Landrum v. Swann, 8 Ga.App. 209, 68 S.E. 862, this court said: 'But, in exception to the general rule, hearsay may be primary evidence of value. If this was hearsay evidence, under the record of the case at bar it was admissible and not harmful in view of the fact that the defendant had admitted the amount of the damage. This special ground is not meritorious.
4. Special ground 2 assigns error because it is alleged that the court illegally limited, circumscribed and denied the movant a right to thorough and sifting cross-examination of the treasurer of the company, the same witness who is discussed in special ground 1. This went to an objection by counsel of the plaintiff to certain testimony of the witness in regard to whether or not an insurance adjuster would be a better source of information as to the loss. After much discussion and colloquy the court properly instructed counsel and the witness as to the line of interrogation. These questions were asked out of the presence of the jury and it seems that the court instructed counsel and the witness not to use the word 'insurance' but that they could use the words 'Underwriter's Salvage Company' or even the name of the company. The trial court was absolutely correct in not allowing the issue of whether or not the defendant...
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