Harrell v. Cain

Decision Date05 June 2019
Docket NumberNo. 18-0214,18-0214
Citation242 W.Va. 194,832 S.E.2d 120
Parties James H. HARRELL, Jr. and Betsy J. Harrell, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. Gwendolyn CAIN, Executrix of the Estate of Arthur E. Lewis, deceased; Paul Alford, individually; and Ambria Alford, an infant by and through her guardian, Gwendolyn Cain, Plaintiffs Below, Respondents
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

William J. Leon, Esq., William J. Leon, LC, Morgantown, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioners

Thomas J. Decapio, Esq., Kevin M. Pearl, Esq., Frankovitch, Anetakis, Simon, Decapio & Pearl, LLP, Weirton, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondents

HUTCHISON, Justice:

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County, we review the circuit court’s January 26, 2018, declaratory judgment order issued after a bench trial. The circuit court’s order interpreted a 1977 quitclaim deed whereby the grantor gave the grantee a parcel of land. However, the grantor imprecisely defined the parcel’s southern border in the deed, leaving two questions: whether the grantee received a 93.15-acre parcel or only a 33-acre parcel; and if the grantee received only a 33-acre parcel, then who owned the remaining 60.15 acres. The parties are successors of the grantor and grantee.

After finding the 1977 deed was ambiguous, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Substantial evidence was produced that, in the decades after 1977, the grantor, the grantee, their spouses, their families and their heirs conducted themselves as though the grantee owned the entire 93.15-acre parcel. Accordingly, the circuit court entered judgment for the grantee’s successors. The grantor’s successors now appeal.

As we discuss below, we find no error in the circuit court’s findings and affirm the circuit court’s declaratory judgment order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Raymond Lewis and Arthur Lewis were brothers. In 1966, Raymond and Arthur (and their respective spouses1 ) purchased a roughly 185-acre parcel in Hancock County. An east-west road crossed the parcel, the "old Lawrenceville Road" (now designated as West Virginia State Route 16/2). Raymond and Arthur owned the parcel as tenants in common, and over the years conveyed around 48 of the 185 acres in their parcel to others.

Eleven years later, Arthur informed Raymond that he wished to build a house on the parcel. In response, Raymond and Arthur (and their spouses) exchanged quitclaim deeds with one another to divide their remaining 137 acres. On November 29, 1977, Arthur delivered a quitclaim deed conveying to Raymond all the land north of the old Lawrenceville Road. Raymond’s tract was defined entirely by metes and bounds. However, the parties now agree that Raymond’s tract consisted of about 40 acres, leaving about 93.15 acres2 in the names of both brothers. The parties do not dispute Raymond’s tract.

This case centers on the November 29, 1977, quitclaim deed that Raymond gave to Arthur (the "Arthur Deed"). The quitclaim deed conveyed a parcel south of the old Lawrenceville Road. The Arthur Deed adequately describes the western, northern, and eastern boundaries of the parcel with metes and bounds. Problematically, it does not describe the southern boundary with sufficient specificity to determine whether Raymond intended to convey to Arthur all, or only part, of the parties’ acreage south of the old Lawrenceville Road. Arthur’s successors contend Raymond conveyed to Arthur all 93.15 acres south of the old Lawrenceville Road; Raymond’s successors contend that only about 33 acres of the land was conveyed, and that they own the remaining 60 acres as tenants in common with Arthur’s successors.

The parties’ arguments focus on the southern boundary of Arthur’s parcel. Although the property had an inverted "V"-shaped southern border, the Arthur Deed describes the southern boundary with a straight line. Moreover, the deed description fails to delineate where the southern boundary line begins or ends. Specifically, the deed description contains a call which reads: "beginning at a point on the Pennsylvania State Line, then North 68°, 54’ -11" West to the centerline of the dirt road[.]"3 There is nothing in the deed to suggest where this starting "point" on the state line was located. This boundary line had not been in any prior deed.

The circuit court found at the bench trial that, after Raymond and Arthur divided their lands in 1977, the brothers and their families acted as though Arthur was the sole owner of all of the land south of the old Lawrenceville Road (now a 93.15-acre parcel). It was not until 2005, when First Energy Corporation ("First Energy") approached Arthur seeking to buy a 4.446-acre lot, that Arthur and his family, as well as Raymond’s family, first learned of the flawed border description in the Arthur Deed. First Energy revealed that, in its title search, it found that the southern border of Arthur’s parcel did not close.4

The plaintiffs in this case are Arthur’s descendants in title. Arthur Lewis died testate in 2006 still owning his parcel south of the old Lawrenceville Road.5 By his will, Arthur left the parcel to his grandsons, Dexter Alford and plaintiff Paul Alford. When Dexter died in 2008, plaintiff Ambria Alford (then a minor) inherited Dexter’s one-half share of the parcel via intestate succession. Plaintiff Gwendolyn Cain was Arthur’s daughter, executor of Arthur’s estate, and the guardian of Ambria Alford.

The defendants are Raymond’s descendants in title. Raymond died in 1994, and his wife died in 1996. Their son and daughter-in-law, Thomas and Vicki Lewis,6 inherited ownership of Raymond’s 40-acre parcel. However, in June 2008, Thomas and Vicki Lewis gave a quitclaim deed to the defendants and petitioners in this appeal, James and Betsy Harrell. The description in the quitclaim deed to the Harrells is not limited to the 40-acre parcel, but rather purports to convey all of Raymond’s interest in the 185-acre tract (less several conveyances) that he owned as tenant in common with Arthur between 1966 and 1977.

The plaintiffs contend that the 1977 Arthur Deed conveyed to Arthur all of the remaining acreage owned by the brothers south of the old Lawrenceville Road, a parcel the parties say is 93.15 acres in size. However, once the defendants received their quitclaim deed from Raymond’s heirs in 2008, disputes began between the defendants and the plaintiffs. The defendants claimed the Arthur Deed only conveyed a parcel south of the old Lawrenceville Road about 33 acres in size. Therefore, the defendants asserted their right to enter the remaining 60 acres south of that parcel, as tenants in common with the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed the instant case against the defendants for a declaratory judgment to quiet title in 2010. The plaintiffs asked for a judgment declaring that the defendants owned no interest in the 93.15-acre parcel south of the old Lawrenceville Road, and declaring that plaintiffs Paul Alford and Ambria Alford owned the parcel in equal undivided one-half shares.

In April 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that the 1977 Arthur Deed was ambiguous, but that Raymond and Arthur’s conduct after 1977 established that Raymond and Arthur believed and acted as though Arthur owned all of the 93.15 acres south of the old Lawrenceville Road. The defendants argued that while the Arthur Deed "appears to be ambiguous," Raymond’s and Arthur’s constructive knowledge of property boundaries revealed by a title examination back to the 1850s removes that ambiguity and shows Raymond intended to convey to Arthur only about 33 acres.

In an order dated May 2, 2017, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court examined the language of the 1977 Arthur Deed and found that "the metes and bounds within the description [of Arthur’s parcel] are inaccurate and fail[ ] to close the southern border of the property purported to be conveyed." Because of this, the circuit court could not determine whether the intent of Raymond was to convey to Arthur a mere 33 acres, or the entire 93.15 acres, south of the old Lawrenceville Road. The circuit court therefore declared that the Arthur Deed was ambiguous, and granted judgment to the plaintiffs on this legal question alone.

The circuit court then cited the common-law rule that "[d]eeds are subject to the principles of interpretation and construction that govern contracts generally." Syl. Pt. 3, Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan , 231 W.Va. 423, 745 S.E.2d 461 (2013). To construe an inconsistent or ambiguous writing, the court recognized that it needed to weigh extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties to the writing. To do this, the circuit court understood it needed to evaluate the evidence regarding Raymond and Arthur’s conduct before and after their exchange of quitclaim deeds in 1977.

On August 8, 2017, the circuit court conducted a bench trial and allowed the plaintiffs and defendants to present evidence regarding Raymond and Arthur’s intent behind the ambiguous 1977 Arthur Deed. The plaintiffs’ evidence was that, during their lifetimes and after 1977, Arthur and Raymond agreed and acted as though Arthur owned the entire 93.15-acre parcel south of the old Lawrenceville Road. As Arthur’s daughter testified, Raymond "took the nice 40 acres, the nice level ground" north of the old Lawrenceville Road while her "dad took the other side [of the road], the hills." Arthur made numerous improvements to the 93.15-acre parcel, all at his own expense. For instance, Arthur built a house that he and his wife lived in. He also built a lake that he then stocked with fish, cut and maintained trails with a bulldozer, and allowed his grandsons and their friends to build a cabin on the disputed portion of the 93.15-acre parcel. He also built fences. Conversely, Raymond made no improvements to the acreage south of the old Lawrenceville Road.

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