Harrell v. Harder
| Citation | 369 F. Supp. 810 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1974 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 13800. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Gloria HARRELL, Individually, and on behalf of her minor dependent children and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. John F. HARDER, Commissioner of Welfare, State of Connecticut. |
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Mary R. Hennessey, Hartford, Conn., Elliot Taubman, Norwich, Conn., Francis X. Dineen, New Haven, Conn., Clarance Joseph Jones, New Haven, Conn., Roger E. Koontz, Stamford, Conn., Kevin T. Kane, Meriden, Conn., Allen Sims, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.
Francis J. MacGregor, Asst. Atty. Gen., East Hartford, Conn., for defendant.
RULING ON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM INJUNCTION
This case, which began several years ago as a straight-forward effort to implement the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), has proven as difficult to dispose of as the legendary Hydra, provoking new issues as fast as old ones are resolved.1
The defendant's successor in office, Nicholas Norton, has now moved for additional relief, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from the order dated September 17, 1971, and the ruling dated June 13, 1973, and filed June 14, 1973, because HEW has issued new regulations governing fair hearing procedures2 which purportedly are inconsistent with this Court's order and ruling. Full implementation of these new regulations would also require a modification of my order of April 30, 1970, entering a permanent injunction, and therefore I will assume the Motion for Relief to be directed at that order too.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER UNDER RULE 60(b)(5) and (6)
Plaintiff argues at the outset that relief under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6)3 is inappropriate in this case. It is clear beyond doubt that the Court has the power to modify its orders to adapt to changed conditions. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). The crucial inquiry is whether conditions which existed at the time the order was entered have changed sufficiently to justify the modification. The Court of Appeals for this circuit has construed the applicable provision of Rule 60(b)(5) as follows:
"The rule is not to be read without emphasis on the important words `no longer'; assuming that the propriety of the injunction as issued has passed beyond debate, it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable."
Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 1964). Rule 60(b)(6) requires more than "some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable"; relief is justified only in the case of "extraordinary circumstances." Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949).
Plaintiff argues that a change in the law applicable to a case is not sufficient to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6), Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952); Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 359 U.S. 989, 79 S.Ct. 1118, 3 L.Ed.2d 978 (1959), and that the change in conditions in the instant case — the issuance of the new regulations by HEW — merely constitutes alterations in administrative regulations, providing even less justification for modification of the previous orders. Plaintiff's contention in this regard is open to some question, see 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 60.27, at 359 (8th ed. 1971) and cases cited therein, but it is unnecessary to deal with the issue at length. Berryhill, Title and related cases involve changes in controlling decisional law occurring subsequent to entrance of the court's order. In the instant case, the decisional law upon which this Court's earlier orders are based, i. e., the Supreme Court's opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, has not changed. The changes in the HEW regulations are more akin to changes in the operative facts of the case: they set out new procedures to be used by the Connecticut State Welfare Department in deciding whether to terminate assistance to recipients, procedures which must ultimately be tested by the standards set out in Kelly. While these changes in departmental procedures may not constitute the "extraordinary circumstances" required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), they are "changes in conditions" which may make continued enforcement of my earlier orders inequitable in certain respects, Schildhaus v. Moe, supra, and thus may be sufficient to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(5).
As it has been from the beginning of this case, the central issue underlying these proceedings is the scope of the procedural protections which welfare recipients must be afforded prior to termination of assistance benefits under the Due Process Clause and the Supreme Court's ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly. In order to put the issues in the instant proceedings properly in perspective, it is first necessary to recall precisely what the Court said in Goldberg v. Kelly and what it did not say.
The welfare recipients in Kelly had brought suit to contest the termination or proposed termination of assistance without prior notice and hearing, in accordance with then-existing law. Subsequent to the recipients' original filing in the district court, the State of New York and New York City adopted procedures for providing notice and hearing, and the recipients then challenged the constitutionality of those procedures.4
Fundamental to the force of the recipients' claims was the acknowledged difficulty of resolving — without any hearing at all or through an abbreviated procedure — questions of eligibility involving complex and often subtle factual determinations.5 Thus the Court began by stating that the constitutional issue presented was "the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits." (First emphasis added, second emphasis in original).6 Of course, the opportunity to participate in an evidentiary hearing prior to termination is only significant when factual matters are contested; when there is no dispute as to the relevant facts, an evidentiary hearing serves no purpose.7
The Court noted that there was no contention that welfare benefits were not sufficiently important interests to warrant protection by the Due Process Clause,8 and the dispute was solely over the amount of process which was due. The Court stated that such a determination requires balancing the interests of the affected party, particularly the "extent to which he may be `condemned to suffer grievous loss,'"9 against the interests of the state in summary procedures. In the welfare context, however, the balance is tipped decidedly in favor of the recipient:
(footnotes omitted.)10
In conjunction with the state's own interest in avoiding arbitrary or erroneous eligibility determinations,11 these concerns were found to outweigh the state's interest in husbanding available fiscal and administrative resources:
12
Accordingly, the Court held that prior to termination of welfare assistance, recipients must have "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination,"13 an opportunity to present evidence at a hearing,14 and "an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department,"15 with retained counsel if desired;16 and the determination with respect to eligibility must be made by an impartial decisionmaker who must base his decision "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing."17
The opinion speaks in terms of general procedural requirements designed to protect basic constitutional rights: it does not purport to lay down specific requirements. Nowhere does it state that the pre-termination hearing must be held in any particular location, or that any particular number of days is the minimum "timely" advance notice constitutionally permissible. Indeed, in 42 U.S.C. § 1302 Congress has given the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare "broad rule-making powers," Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 277 n. 28, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); Connecticut State Department of Public Welfare v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, 448 F.2d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 1971). According HEW "the deference due the agency charged with the administration of the Act," Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970), courts...
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