Harrell v. Lamar Co., LLC

• Decision Date: 20 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2004-CA-00870-COA.,2004-CA-00870-COA.
• Citation: 925 So.2d 870
• Parties: Wendall HARRELL, Appellant v. LAMAR COMPANY, LLC and Mae Frances Smith, Appellees.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

925 So.2d 870

Wendall HARRELL, Appellant v. LAMAR COMPANY, LLC and Mae Frances Smith, Appellees.

No. 2004-CA-00870-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

September 20, 2005.

Rehearing Denied December 13, 2005.

Certiorari Denied April 6, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

A.R. Wright, Carthage, attorney for appellant.

Mark D. Herbert, Lisa Anderson Reppeto, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.

Before BRIDGES, P.J., CHANDLER and ISHEE, JJ.

ISHEE, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Wendall Harrell appeals the decision of the Leake County Chancery Court holding him liable for $6,645 in damages for the intentional destruction of an outdoor advertising sign. Finding no error on appeal, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On May 1, 1965, Roger Smith, Jr. ("Mr. Smith") entered into a lease agreement with Lamar Advertising Company of Mississippi, Inc. ("Lamar"), in which Mr. Smith agreed to erect and maintain an outdoor advertising structure on his property along Highway 35 in Carthage, Mississippi. The lease was never recorded. On December 24, 1966, Mr. Smith married Mae Frances Smith ("Mrs. Smith") and shortly thereafter informed her of the lease agreement. Mrs. Smith knew of the lease agreement and did not object to Mr. Smith's leasing the property, which lease continued uninterrupted for nearly forty years.

¶ 3. The 1965 lease provided for a three-year term from May 1, 1965 to May 1, 1968, with a right to renew for one three-year term. On April 2, 1982, Mr. Smith entered into a three-year lease agreement with Lamar, the term to run from May 1, 1981 to April 30, 1984. Mrs. Smith did not sign the lease and the agreement was never recorded. In 1991, the Smiths sold the 2.6 acres of land upon which the Lamar sign had been erected to Mr. and Mrs. Burgess ("Burgess") and Mr. and Mrs. Thomas ("Thomas"). The warranty deed conveying the property stated that "[t]here is reserved from this conveyance the advertising `sign' which is leased to Lamar and that Smith retains all rentals and shall continue to receive rentals from Lamar as long as the sign shall continue to be rented." Both Mr. And Mrs. Smith signed the warranty deed, which was recorded with the Leake County Chancery Clerk.

¶ 4. Burgess and Thomas borrowed the money to purchase the property from the Carthage Bank, using the purchase property as security. The deed of trust to the Carthage Bank made no exception or reservation for an easement on land leased to Lamar. However, it did reserve the sign and rent therefrom. On May 1, 1993, Mr. Smith executed another lease to Lamar, in this instance for a term of ten years. Due to Mr. Smith's blindness at that time, Mrs. Smith signed the May 1993 lease on Mr. Smith's behalf, in his presence and with his permission. The lease was never recorded. Subsequently, Burgess and Thomas defaulted on their loan from the Bank of Carthage. On December 13, 1996, the 2.6 acres previously conveyed to Burgess and Thomas was sold in a foreclosure sale to Wendell Harrell ("Harrell"). The property was conveyed by a substitute trustee's quitclaim deed. Harrell had viewed the property and had seen the sign prior to purchasing the property. Neither the trustee's deed nor the certificate of title obtained by Harrell pursuant to the sale made special mention of any exception or reservation regarding the sign. While affirming that there were no taxes, enrolled judgments or liens against the property, the certificate of title did except any "reservations and/or conveyances, if any."

¶ 5. In June of 2001, some five years after he purchased the property, Harrell contacted Lamar seeking to obtain rent for the sign structure. Lamar officials scheduled a meeting with Harrell on June 19, 2001, to discuss the matter. Harold Smith and David Johnson, the Lamar representatives, obtained a copy of the warranty deed from the Chancery Clerk of Leake County. When Harold Smith attempted to show the deed to Harrell, Harrell slapped the deed out of his hand and told the men that if they did not get off his property he would "whip their a* *." Immediately after his encounter with the men from Lamar, Harrell bulldozed the Lamar sign to the ground. Mrs. Smith was at home working in her yard and heard the noises caused by the destruction of the sign. Shortly thereafter, Harrell knocked at her door and offered her $2,000 for her interest in the property, which she refused.

¶ 6. After learning of the destruction of the sign, Lamar filed suit against Harrell in Leake County Chancery Court for damages to the sign. An injunction was issued against Harrell on July 5, 2001, in order to prevent him from impairing Lamar in its attempts to restore the sign. Harrell filed an answer and counterclaim asserting that Smith and Lamar had violated his property rights and encroached upon his land, and additionally asking the court to adjudicate the lease contracts as void and dissolve the injunction.

¶ 7. After an evidentiary hearing on March 3, 2004, the chancery court entered its final judgment finding that Harrell had committed tortious acts by destroying the sign and that Lamar had a valid right to the property. The court ordered Harrell to pay Lamar $6,645 for replacement of the sign and $20,392.86 in attorney's fees. Harrell was also permanently enjoined from taking any action to interfere with Lamar or the sign. Aggrieved by the decision, Harrell asserts the following errors on appeal: (1) whether the chancery court erred in failing to find the various leases and deeds defective; (2) whether Harrell is a subsequent innocent purchaser without notice; (3) whether Smith and Lamar committed acts of conspiracy, collusion and fraud; (4) whether the chancery court erred by failing to sustain Harrell's motion to strike Mrs. Smith's affidavit; (5) whether the sign is a trade fixture or real property; and (6) whether the chancery court's validation of the leases and reservation of land gives liberal interpretation to favor Lamar and creates uncertainty.

ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

I. Whether the chancery court erred in failing to find the various leases and deeds defective.

¶ 8. Harrell first asserts that the chancery court erred for multiple reasons in failing to find the various deeds and leases to be defective. Among Harrell's arguments to void the 1965, 1982, and 1993 leases are the following: the leases were printed on forms prepared by Lamar and filled in by Lamar; the leases are unacknowledged; the leases are unrecorded; Lamar prevented public notice of the leases; Lamar and Smith did not survey the proposed location of the sign to be erected; the leases do not contain adequate legal descriptions of the leaseholds or easements; Harrell did not have notice of the lease contracts; the sign erected in 1965 was on land in which Smith did not have a vested interest; the 1965 lease fails to provide Lamar with an easement for access to Smith's property; the 1965 lease expired on April 30, 1971; Mrs. Smith did not sign the lease of homestead property; Mr. Smith did not sign the 1993 lease; the 1993 lease attempted to renew a void lease; the 1965 and 1982 leases are not signed by an officer of Lamar; and the leases are vague and ambiguous.

¶ 9. Before examining Harrell's assignments of error, we first note our guiding standard of review. This Court employs a limited standard of review in reviewing the decisions of a chancellor. Reddell v. Reddell, 696 So.2d 287, 288 (Miss.1997). The findings of a chancellor will not be disturbed unless this Court finds the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong or applied an erroneous legal standard. Bank of Miss. v. Hollingsworth, 609 So.2d 422, 424 (Miss. 1992). As for questions of law, the standard of review is de novo. Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So.2d 798, 802 (¶12) (Miss. 2001).

¶ 10. In determining whether a lease is void for vagueness or ambiguity, this Court will look to the intent of the parties to determine the meaning of any disputed provision and the validity of the contract. See Stampley v. Gilbert, 332 So.2d 61, 63-4 (Miss.1976). Furthermore, "[t]here is also the universal rule of construction that when the terms of a contract are vague and ambiguous, they are always construed more strongly against the party preparing it." Id. at 63. The intent of the parties to the lease in the case sub judice is readily apparent. Lamar was to lease a site for a sign from the Smiths, an understanding that lasted for thirty-nine years. There is no need to construe the leases against Lamar as the drafter.

¶ 11. Harrell also argues that the description of the land upon which the sign was placed was inadequate, thereby voiding the leases. Harrell cites Overby v. Cavanaugh, 434 So.2d 1365, 1366 (Miss.1983), for the proposition that the description sub judice is void for vagueness as "[t]here are several different configurations or shapes that may be drawn from the subject description, and thus, the description is not valid and reversal is required. . . ." Harrell's reliance on Overby is misplaced, as the Mississippi Supreme Court has unequivocally recognized that there is a material difference between the construction to be given a tax deed as opposed to a voluntary conveyance. Neil v. Jones, 497 So.2d 797, 799 (Miss.1986). Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that the intent of the parties is controlling when construing the description in a voluntary conveyance, but may be irrelevant in a tax deed, since the owner conveys nothing and intends to convey nothings. Id. at 799-800. According to the leases before this Court, the property to be leased is easy to ascertain, and no confusion is caused by the description as to what property is described. Furthermore, no doubt exists as to the intent of the parties to the leases.

¶ 12. Harrell next challenges the acknowledgment and recording of the leases. Harrell argues that the signatures of the individuals representing Lamar are insufficient as it is unclear whether they signed the documents on their on...