Harrelson v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-661,95-661 |
| Citation | 662 So.2d 400 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2478 Jonathan G. HARRELSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Raymond Dix, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Thomas Falkinburg, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
This is a petition for writ of common law certiorari to review an order of the circuit court acting in its appellate capacity. The circuit court order affirmed a county court ruling which denied the petitioner's motion to suppress evidence. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(2)(b). We grant the petition, and quash the order of the circuit court.
This case is concerned with the restriction of petitioner's liberty in the context of an investigatory stop. On December 19, 1993, at 1:08 a.m., a highway patrol trooper issued petitioner a Florida DUI Uniform Traffic Citation. The probable cause affidavit filed by the trooper states in part:
I observed a vehicle in a driveway just off State Road 12. The vehicle had its interior light on. This area has a lot of home robberies. I approached the vehicle on the driver side white male seated behind the wheel keys in the ignition and listening to the radio. The white male had a plastic cup half full of liquid. It smelled of an unknown alcoholic beverage. He told me later it was rum and coke. His green eyes were bloodshot, the unknown alcoholic beverage was strong. He handed me a Florida ID card with his photo.
The affidavit also indicates that, at the trooper's request, the petitioner performed various road skills. When the tests were concluded, the trooper arrested the petitioner and charged him with being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Petitioner filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the traffic stop. Among other things, the motion stated:
1. On December 19, 1993, at approximately 1:08 a.m., Defendant was observed in a vehicle parked in a driveway with its interior light on.
2. Trooper R.A. Boucher of the Florida Highway Patrol approached the vehicle because he had heard that there were a lot of home burglaries in this area.
3. Trooper Boucher saw the Defendant behind the wheel of the vehicle with the key in the ignition, listening to the radio, and the trooper smelled Defendant's beverage, which had the odor of a strong alcoholic beverage.
....
8. Trooper Boucher had no reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed when he first approached Defendant, and Trooper Boucher did not witness Defendant committing any crimes prior to initiating contact with Defendant.
The trooper was not present at the suppression hearing. The petitioner testified that he had been watching drag races on the night of his arrest. When the trooper approached, the petitioner was seated in the driver's seat of his car with the window closed. Another person was seated in the front passenger seat. The vehicle was not moving. The trooper walked up to the driver's door and asked petitioner to step out of the car. Petitioner opened the door, stepped out of the car, and at the trooper's instruction, handed the cup he was holding to the trooper. The trooper smelled the cup, then ascertained from the petitioner that it contained rum and Coca-Cola. At that point, the trooper asked the petitioner to perform some field sobriety tests. Another officer was standing at the rear of the petitioner's car. The trooper's vehicle was parked directly behind the petitioner's vehicle.
At the conclusion of the petitioner's testimony and the arguments of respective counsel, the county court judge observed that the trooper never questioned petitioner about the home burglaries. Surmising that the trooper was distracted when he smelled alcohol, the judge stated:
We haven't heard the Trooper's side of this. We have the facts set forth in the motion to suppress and the defendant's testimony and that's all I've got. That's what I've got to decide this case on. I don't know that Boucher would add anything to it.
....
Did this officer unduly intrude on this young man's liberty or did this officer do a super duper job of law enforcement whatever the reason? I'm going to deny the motion. It's not an easy decision.
The petitioner pled no contest to the DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The circuit court judge affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding "the presumption of correctness of the court's order of judgment and sentence in the lower court has not been overcome and the conviction is therefore AFFIRMED."
The standard for a district court's discretionary review of a circuit court's order on review of a criminal case which originated in county court, is whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in rendering its decision. Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95-96 (Fla.1983). In other words, the district court should determine whether there has been "a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 529 (Fla.1995), quoting Combs. See also Davis v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 660 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In making the determination, "the errors in question must be viewed in the context of the individual case." Haines City, 658 So.2d at 531. The district courts are accorded a large degree of discretion in granting petitions for writs of common-law certiorari. Combs, 436 So.2d at 95-96.
In the context of a traffic violation, an investigatory stop must be "predicated on a founded or reasonable suspicion requiring further investigation to determine whether the vehicle's occupants committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime." Sec. 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1993); McCreary v. State, 538 So.2d 1377, 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The safeguards provided by the Fourth Amendment prohibit investigatory stops, unless there exists a Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). A person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she was not free to end the encounter and depart. Id. at 187-188.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a founded suspicion at the time of the stop, the reviewing court should consider all the facts known to the officer prior to the stop. It is well settled that mere presence in a high crime...
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State v. Taylor, 3D01-398.
...So.2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)(suppression order affirmed where officers ordered defendant out of legally parked car); Harrelson v. State, 662 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(quashing affirmance of order denying suppression motion where trooper ordered defendant out of legally parked car); Sec......
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Ippolito v. State
...on whether appellant was stopped and detained as soon as Officer Seltzer pulled in behind his parked car. See Harrelson v. State, 662 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (the driver's liberty was improperly restrained before the officer asked him to get out of the car and before he ascertained th......
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Graham v. State
...of illegal dumping at dusk does not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify stop); Harrelson v. State, 662 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (observing defendant and another in car parked in driveway at 1:08 a.m. with interior light on in area where there had prev......
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State v. Wilson, 96-03613
...of a parked car at 1:08 a.m. when both courts overlooked the fact that the trooper parked behind the defendant's car. Harrelson v. State, 662 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). While the First District apparently reviews the factual specifics of every police encounter on certiorari, the Second ......