Harrigan v. Dodge

• Decision Date: 05 January 1909
• Citation: 200 Mass. 357,86 N.E. 780
• Parties: HARRIGAN v. DODGE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

200 Mass. 357

86 N.E. 780

HARRIGAN v. DODGE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

January 5, 1909

Jan. 5 1909.

COUNSEL

Daniel N. Crowley, for appellant.

F. L Evans and J. F. Quinn, for appellee.

OPINION

RUGG J.

This is a bill in equity brought to compel the defendant to convey a certain tract of land in Danvers. It alleges that the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant, through his agents, Allen & Tebbets, to buy certain land described at length in the bill, and that a memorandum thereof in writing was signed as follows: 'Received from one William Harrigan one hundred dollars on account of sale of the three houses belonging to the Frances Dodge estate in Danvers. $100. Allen & Tebbets'--and another memorandum of the tenor following: 'Received of A. G. Allen twenty-five dollars ($25.00) on acct. of sale of the three houses and land that rightfully belongs thereto, in Danvers, belonging to the Dodge estate. Eben Dodge, Agent.' There are further sufficient averments as to the precise price to be paid and the plaintiff's readiness to pay and refusal of defendant to deliver a deed. The defendant demurs on the grounds, first, that the bill sets forth no sufficient memorandum signed by him to satisfy the statute of frauds; and, second, that the bill does not allege that the defendant is the owner of the premises.

The second ground of demurrer may be briefly disposed of, for the reason that such an allegation is unnecessary. The defendant may have made a contract, by which he became liable to this suit, without having been the owner of the real estate. It is matter of defense to the prayer for specific performance, if he is unable to perform his contract on account of lack of ownership, and not a fatal defect apparent upon the statement of the plaintiff's claim.

The first ground of demurrer raises chiefly a question of pleading. The descriptions contained in the two memoranda may or may not turn out to be sufficient to point to any particular houses. Standing alone, without further allegations, they are equivocal. The purpose of the statute of frauds in this regard requires the memorandum to contain a description of the land sufficient for purposes of identification, when read in the light of all the circumstances of ownership of the property by the vendor. These memoranda might be sufficient if three houses and the land within their several curtelages was the only real estate owned by the Frances Dodge estate in Danvers. If,...