Harrild v. Spokane School Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 August 1920
• Docket Number: 15836.
• Citation: 112 Wash. 266,192 P. 1
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: HARRILD v. SPOKANE SCHOOL DIST.

192 P. 1

112 Wash. 266

HARRILD v. SPOKANE SCHOOL DIST.

No. 15836.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 23, 1920

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Wm. A. Huneke, Judge.

Action by C. R. Harrild against Spokane School District. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Joseph B. Lindsley and Fred J. Cunningham, both of Spokane, for appellant.

Plummer & Lavin, of Spokane, for respondent.

BRIDGES J.

The respondent entered into a contract with the appellant whereby he agreed to manufacture and deliver 24 drawing tables and 24 drawing desks, which the appellant desired to use in the fine arts and mechanial drawing department of one of the schools in the city of Spokane. The contract price for the tables was $253, and for the desks $628. The contract provided that the respondent should manufacture these articles in accordance with certain plans and specifications furnished to him. In due course the articles were delivered to the appellant which refused to accept or pay for them on the ground that they were defective and were not constructed in accordance with the contract. Thereupon the respondent sued for the contract price, and the appellant defended on the grounds above indicated. There was a verdict for the respondent, and judgment was entered thereupon, from which this appeal is taken. The appellant's motions for nonsuit, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial were denied.

Appellant first contends that its demand that the case be tried by the court without a jury, or, if tried by a jury, that its verdict be considered advisory only, should have been granted. It seems to us that the case is strictly one of law and not one of equity. The purpose of the action was to recover a sum of money; the defense was, in substance, that there was no indebtedness to the respondent because the latter had not complied with the contract. We are satisfied the court was right in ruling that the case was one triable by a jury.

One of the chief questions involved was whether or not the manufactured articles were constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications and were of good workmanship. During the trial the appellant asked permission to display before the jury not only the articles in question, but also other manufactured desks to be used as models for comparison purposes. The court permitted only the articles in dispute to be shown to the jury, and refused the remainder of appellant's request. We do not find any reversible error in this. The appellant did not indicate the kind of model desks he desired for comparison purposes. It was not shown whether they were finished or unfinished, whereas those involved in this action were not painted nor varnished. It was not shown that the model desks were to be of the same kind, quality and character as those involved in this action. In any event, it was entirely discretionary with the trial court whether it would permit these comparisons.

The chief argument presented to this court for the reversal of the case is based on the instructions to the jury. The court in substance, instructed that if the respondent had honestly and faithfully tried to follow and comply with the plans and specifications, and that the tables and desks were substantially as required by the contract, then the respondent would be entitled to maintain his action. In other words, the theory of the trial court was that a substantial compliance was all that the law required. The appellant seems to admit that in building contracts a substantial compliance is sufficient, but contends that the rule does not apply to articles manufactured for a special purpose, as in this case. In other words, it takes the position that there must be a strict compliance of a contract for the manufacture of a chattel for a specific use.

The common law required a strict compliance with the terms of all contracts. Later, however, it was realized that this strict rule was liable to, and often did, work a great injustice, and at a somewhat early period the equity courts began to work a relaxation of the common-law rule. Following the lead of equity, the law courts soon began to recognize the justness of the substantial compliance rule and first applied it to building contracts, and at the present time it is almost universally held that a substantial compliance is sufficient in such contracts. This court has long since adopted and followed this rule. Mortimer v. Dirks, 57 Wash. 402, 107 P. 184; Windham v. Ind. Tel. Co., 35 Wash. 166, 76 P. 936; Schmidt v. North Yakima, 12 Wash. 121, 40 P. 790. But the question in this case is whether the substantial compliance doctrine should apply to a contract such as is involved here. It must be admitted that the decisions of the courts are not altogether harmonious on this question.

It is argued that the strict compliance rule of the common law has been relaxed by the courts in building contracts because in those instances the construction is upon the land of another, and cannot be removed, and that it would be unjust, under those circumstances, to require one who has substantially, but not strictly, complied with the contract, to lose all of his work and material. But this same reason would equally apply to contracts for the manufacture of chattels for special use, for, while the manufacturer may carry away the article, it is of but little, if any, use or value to him. He will have lost his material and work in the one instance almost to the same extent as in the other. In equity the substantial compliance rule is applied to almost all contracts, and the party is permitted to recover as for a completed performance, less such damages as the other party may have been put to by reason of the matters not performed. 13 C.J. 691; 9 Cyc. 601. If justice requires the doctrine of substantial performance to be applied to building contracts, we see no good or logical reason why it should not, on the same grounds, be made applicable to contracts of the character here involved. At page 966, vol. 6, R. C. L., it is said:

'By the common law a party to a contract was compelled to show a literal performance of the stipulations of it before he could claim damages for a nonperformance against the other. Expressions in some of the more recent cases seem to indicate a tendency to relax the rigor of this rule. Thus, it is said that the law looks to the spirit of a contract, and not the letter of it, and that the question, therefore, is not whether a party has literally complied with it, but whether he has substantially done so. Other courts have said that substantial, and not exact, performance, accompanied by good faith, in all the law requires in the case of any contract to entitle a party to recover on it. Although a plaintiff is not absolutely free from fault or omission in every particular, the court will not turn him away if he has in good faith made substantial performance, but will enforce his rights on the one hand, and preserve the rights of the defendant on the other, by permitting a recoupment.

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