Harrington v. County of Ramsey
| Decision Date | 20 April 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 48093.,48093. |
| Citation | 279 NW 2d 791 |
| Parties | Mary Ellen HARRINGTON, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF RAMSEY, et al., Respondents, State of Minnesota, et al., Respondents, Dr. Thomas Comfort, M.D., Respondent, Richard Edwards, M.D., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Michael J. Healey, St. Paul, for appellant.
Jardine, Logan & O'Brien and Richard T. Dolezal, St. Paul, for Ramsey County.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Barbara Gill, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for State et al.
Geraghty, O'Loughlin & Kenney and David C. Hutchinson, St. Paul, for Dr. Thomas Comfort, M.D., et al.
Heard before KELLY, TODD, and WAHL, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
Mary Harrington fractured her right leg in 1970. She was treated by defendant Dr. Thomas Comfort at St. Paul Ramsey Hospital. Upon recovery, she was involuntarily committed to Hastings State Hospital. In 1971, she was taken to the Anoka State Hospital where her lower right leg was amputated. In 1974, she commenced this action for negligent medical treatment. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants, dismissing some because of governmental immunity, some because of the statute of limitations, and others because of failure to give the required statutory notice of claim. We reverse.
Mary Harrington is a person with a history of emotional problems complicated by addiction to drugs and alcohol. She was first committed by her parents at the age of 13. Thereafter, she apparently spent time in state institutions and halfway houses. On June 26, 1970, while residing at a halfway house, she sustained a fracture of her right leg. She was taken to St. Paul Ramsey Hospital where she was treated by Dr. Comfort and other doctors in the orthopedic ward. On August 31, 1970, she was released from the orthopedic ward and later transferred to the psychiatric ward. At this time a cast had been applied to the fracture. Mary contends the cast was applied over an open wound.
On September 8, 1970, she was involuntarily committed to Hastings State Hospital. She stated that almost immediately she began to complain of the pain in her right leg. She stated that the attending medical personnel advised her that the pain was all in her head. On September 25, 1970, she was transferred to Anoka State Hospital. At that time, the cast had been removed and Mary testified the wound on her right leg was black and odorous. She was soon returned to Hastings where medication was applied to the open wound. On April 22, 1971, she was returned to Anoka State Hospital and her lower right leg was amputated.
Thereafter, she returned to Hastings and was subsequently released provisionally. In the summer of 1972, she worked as an aide at a nursing home. She was married in the fall of 1972 but lived with her husband for only 11 days. In February 1973, her provisional release was revoked and she was returned to Hastings.
In March 1973, she participated in a class action in Federal court, challenging the procedures used in revoking provisional discharges. Ramsey County Legal Services was representing the plaintiffs. Mary spoke with one of the lawyers and discussed her leg amputation with him. He advised that Legal Services could not represent her but he would have a lawyer contact her.
In May 1973, Mary's husband obtained a divorce. About this time she was released from Hastings and obtained part-time, temporary employment in the summer of 1973. During this summer, she had an affair and became pregnant. She later gave birth to a boy whom she cared for on her own for the next 15 months. However, she continued to require hospitalization and halfway-house care on many occasions in subsequent years because of her drug and alcohol problems.
In the fall of 1973, she signed a retainer agreement with a private attorney to proceed on her claim for damages arising out of the amputation of her leg. A notice of claim against defendants County of Ramsey, city of St. Paul, and St. Paul Ramsey Hospital was served upon them on October 9, 1973. This action for negligent medical treatment was commenced in October 1974. In September 1976, Judge Harold Schultz granted the motion of all defendants for summary judgment, except Dr. Comfort, who had not joined in the motion. The State of Minnesota prevailed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Defendants County of Ramsey, city of St. Paul, and St. Paul Ramsey Hospital also prevailed upon failure of plaintiff to timely serve a notice of claim upon them as required by Minn.St. 466.05, subd. 1. The medical personnel prevailed by reason of the running of the 2-year statute of limitations under Minn.St. 541.07.
The motion for summary judgment was accompanied by an affidavit of Dr. Ardell Diessner, one of the defendants. He stated that he was a board certified psychiatrist at Hastings Hospital from 1966 to 1976. During this time he treated Mary Harrington on 9 separate occasions. He diagnosed her illness as schizophrenia, paranoid type, and multiple drug dependence. He further stated except for short periods of exacerbation which could be controlled by medication, Mary enjoyed long periods of stability and was capable of controlling her life. He further stated that she could make rational decisions and was capable of understanding her legal rights and assisting an attorney in representing her interests. No contrary affidavit was offered at this time. The court granted the summary judgment based on the deposition of Mary and the affidavits on file.
Thereafter, Dr. Comfort made a motion for summary judgment which was heard by Judge Otis Godfrey. On May 17, 1977, the motion of Dr. Comfort was granted based upon the running of the statute of limitations. The trial court in its memorandum accompanying its order observed that although Mary had undergone periods of mental instability off and on over an extended period of time, her contrasting periods of capacity would cause the statute of limitations to run.
A motion was subsequently made to vacate the order for summary judgment entered on September 30, 1976. This motion was heard by Judge Schultz who considered the oral arguments of counsel, the order of Judge Godfrey on May 17, 1977, the affidavit of Dr. Randall LaKosky, numerous medical records of all the hospitals involved, and all briefs and memoranda submitted. Judge Schultz denied the motion to vacate. In his memorandum accompanying his order, he considered the affidavit of Dr. LaKosky. Dr. LaKosky is a board certified psychiatrist who was then treating Mary. Dr. LaKosky first saw Mary shortly before the commencement of this litigation in October 1974. He stated he had examined her medical records dating back to the early 1960's. He stated that in his opinion Mary was incompetent from 1970 to 1974 and unable to comprehend her rights or assist her lawyer in presenting a claim. Judge Schultz found that Dr. LaKosky's conclusions as to the competency of Mary were not specific enough to convince the court that a showing of incompetence could and would be made so as to toll the statute of limitations. He concluded that Mary was capable both from the standpoint of her own intelligence and of her other activities to have exercised sufficient judgment to have brought her lawsuit within the appropriate time.
Appeal was taken from the order for summary judgment of Judge Schultz and the judgment entered pursuant thereto and from the order for summary judgment of Judge Godfrey. Appellant made a motion before this court for summary reversal and defendants made motions for summary affirmance, and we granted an oral argument on these motions. The issues before this court are:
(1) Did the plaintiff fail to perfect her appeal against Dr. Comfort by appealing from the order for summary judgment rather than the entry of summary judgment?
(2) Does the evidence of plaintiff's mental problems create a genuine issue that she was sufficiently "insane" to toll the statute of limitations?
(3) Does the state have sovereign immunity from claims based on allegedly negligent medical treatment at Hastings and Anoka State Hospitals?
(4) Is the notice of claim requirement under the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act tolled under the facts of this case, and does it deprive an insane plaintiff of procedural due process or otherwise violate the constitution?
1. Defendant Dr. Comfort argues that the appeal against him should be dismissed because of a procedural infirmity. This infirmity arose when plaintiff appealed from the "order" granting summary judgment to Dr. Comfort rather than the actual entry of summary judgment.
The appeal against Dr. Comfort is technically improper. However, the technical defect does not preclude review, and therefore we decline to dismiss the appeal against Dr. Comfort.1
2. Minnesota has a 2-year limitation on commencement of actions for personal injury against physicians, surgeons, and hospitals, and all malpractice claims, whether based on contract or tort. Minn.St. 541.07(1). See, generally, 1 Hamline L.Rev. 155 (). Minn.St. 541.15(2) suspends the period of limitation in case of insanity. Plaintiff's claim is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations unless it was tolled by reason of insanity.
The trial court found there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the tolling of the statute of limitations, and therefore it ordered summary judgment against plaintiff. In determining whether the trial court erred, this court must answer two questions: (1) What is the meaning of "insanity" as used in § 541.15(2), and (2) is there a genuine issue of material fact concerning plaintiff's alleged insanity.
Turning to the first question, § 541.15(2) provides that the statute of limitations is tolled during the "insanity" of the plaintiff. This court has never given a detailed definition of insanity in this context, although it has briefly...
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