Harrington v. Taft

• Decision Date: 03 March 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4754.
• Citation: 339 F. Supp. 670
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
• Parties: Jeffrey HARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. James TAFT, Defendant.

339 F. Supp. 670

Jeffrey HARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. James TAFT, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 4754.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

March 3, 1972.

David F. Sweeney, Jr., Warwick, R. I., for plaintiff.

Peter Palombo, Jr., City Sol., City of Cranston, Providence, R. I., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

On October 26, 1970, plaintiff Jeffrey Harrington was appointed a patrolman in the Police Department of the City of Cranston. Under the Cranston city charter, "original appointments" are made for a "probationary period" not to exceed one year. On October 21, 1971, toward the end of a year of service, plaintiff received a letter from the defendant James Taft, mayor of Cranston, informing him that he would not be appointed a permanent member of the Cranston police force, for the reason that he was "not suited for police work." Plaintiff was discharged from his employment the following day. At no time was plaintiff served with any charges or provided a detailed listing of the reasons for his termination, nor was he given any opportunity to oppose his dismissal at a hearing or other administrative proceeding.

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983,¹ asking that the Court order him reinstated to the Cranston police force until such time as he is served with charges or reasons for dismissal, and is provided a hearing at which to defend himself against any charges.² The jurisdiction of this court to sit in a § 1983 action is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1343.³

Section 1983 invests the federal courts with the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States against "those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). In the instant case, the plaintiff charges that the manner in which he was deprived of continued employment with the Cranston Police Department constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the clause which provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." "And it is well settled that municipal ordinances and the actions in office of municipal officials constitute state action and are within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1886, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220; Lovell v. Griffin, 1938, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949." McCoy v. Providence Journal Co. (1st Cir. 1951), 190 F.2d 760, 764, cert. denied 342 U.S. 894, 72 S.Ct. 200, 96 L.Ed. 669 (1951). Claims of denial of procedural due process arising out of dismissal from public employment are routinely accepted by federal courts as being within the contemplation of § 1983. See Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970) (Drown I). There is no question but that plaintiff's claim, as stated in his complaint, brings him properly before this court.

Plaintiff contends that the Court, in assessing the constitutionality of his dismissal, can recognize no distinction between plaintiff and a non-probationary or "permanent" police officer, as the creation of the classification of "probationary" policemen is not specifically authorized by Rhode Island law, and is therefore illegal as a matter of state law. The Court finds no merit in this position. The Cranston city charter, which provides that all city appointments shall be subject to a period of probation, was adopted by the City pursuant to the authority granted by Amendment 28, Constitution of Rhode Island, entitled "Home Rule For Cities and Towns." Section 2 of Amendment 28 gives every city and town in Rhode Island the power to adopt a charter at any time; this is authorization specific enough to "legitimize" any of the provisions of the Cranston charter, and this court will not disallow any such provision merely because there is no other specific statutory authority for it.⁴

The dismissal of plaintiff pursuant to procedures authorized by the Cranston city charter must be deemed facially legal under Rhode Island state law, constitutional questions aside. In other words, the question before the court is, "Can a probationary policeman be dismissed without a hearing or specification of the grounds for dismissal?", not merely "Can a policeman be so dismissed?" The court simply recognizes that Cranston was not barred by any provision of state law from classifying its new employees as "probationary" during their first year of employment.

There is no doubt that plaintiff has an interest in being rehired sufficient to prevent the City of Cranston from discharging him for constitutionally impermissible reasons. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir., 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1003, 87 S.Ct. 706, 17 L.Ed.2d 542 (1967); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F.Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1968). Plaintiff's only complaint, however, is with the procedure under which he was dismissed, and he has offered no proof of the reasons for the dismissal.

The Drown I case, supra, involved the somewhat similar situation of a non-tenured public school teacher whose contract was not renewed and whose sole claim was that the process by which the decision not to rehire her was made did not comport with the fundamental fairness guaranteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, never before having confronted the issue of the administrative procedural rights to which a non-tenured public school teacher is entitled when not rehired, first took notice of the divergence of opinion in other jurisdictions, and then announced, 435 F.2d at 1184, that "to determine what, if any, procedures are required when a school board decides not to rehire a non-tenured teacher, we are required to balance the competing interests of the individual and of the school board. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed.2d 287 (1970) . . .." The Court finds that a similar weighing of interests is called for in the instant case, the plaintiff and the City of Cranston — specifically, the Police Department — being the parties whose competing interests must be balanced.

Section 14.07 of the Cranston city charter provides in part:

"All original appointments shall be made for a probationary period the conditions of which shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the department, provided that no probationary period shall exceed one year."

Among the regulations pertaining to the probationary period is the following one, entitled "Objective":

"The probationary or working test shall be regarded as an integral part of the examination process and shall be utilized by supervisors and department heads for closely observing the employee's work, for securing the most effective adjustment of a new employee to his position, and for rejecting any employee whose performance does not meet the required work standards."

Defendant argues that this regulation, apparently applicable to all departments of Cranston city government, is especially vital to the workings of the Police Department. Defendant contends that because "the policeman occupies a sensitive position in the law enforcement process . . . the appointing authority must be free to eliminate those candidates for appointment who have not met the standards during the probationary period." The Police Department appears to be primarily interested in its ability to insure the quality of the police force by employing members for a probationary period. During the probationary period the department makes judgments about various factors which are relevant to the decision whether to employ a policeman permanently, but not susceptible of complete evaluation prior to the initial hiring.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, is in the position of having invested a substantial amount of time in the commencement of a career which depends on the willingness of a municipal government to employ him. After a year of apparently satisfactory performance on the Cranston police force, he has been informed that he will not be rehired, but has been offered no detailed explanation of the reasons for the decision. Without the benefit of the knowledge of such reasons, he has no opportunity to attempt self-improvement, vindicate false charges, explain false rumors, or correct mistaken impressions. Furthermore, he will be unable to minimize or otherwise overcome the reasons for the dismissal in his discussions with future employers. See Drown I, supra, 435 F.2d at 1184.

Against this background of competing interests, the court will assess the benefits and burdens of the procedural rights claimed by the plaintiff, to wit, the right to be presented with charges or reasons for dismissal, and the right to...