Harrington v. Valley Sav. Bank

• Citation: 119 Iowa 312,93 N.W. 347
• Parties: HARRINGTON v. VALLEY SAV. BANK.
• Decision Date: 30 January 1903
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

119 Iowa 312

93 N.W. 347

HARRINGTON

v.VALLEY SAV. BANK.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 30, 1903.

Appeal from district court, Polk county; C. P. Holmes, Judge.

Certain lots in the city of Des Moines were sold in December, 1896, for the ordinary taxes of 1895, and in November, 1900, a tax deed was made to the plaintiff. In April, 1895, street improvements were regularly ordered in front of these lots, which were completed later, and the costs thereof assessed upon the lots in September, 1897, for which assessment certificates issued, which are now held by the appellant. This action is to enjoin the enforcement of this special assessment against the lots. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and the bank appeals. Affirmed.Woodin, Nichols & Ayres, for appellant.

Baily & Stipp, for appellee.

SHERWIN, J.

Section 1347 of McClain's Code provided that all taxes upon real property should become a “perpetual lien thereon against all persons except the United States and this state.” The street improvement for which the special assessment was made was commenced in 1897, and the assessment was under section 12, c. 7, Acts 25th Gen. Assem., the material part of which reads as follows: “Said assessment * * * shall be a lien upon * * * the entire property upon which said tax is levied, from the commencement of the work, and shall remain a lien until fully paid and shall have precedence over all other liens except ordinary taxes.” Under this act the special assessment became a lien upon the property from the commencement of the work, and not before; so that when the lien for the ordinary taxes of 1895 attached, and when the property was sold therefor, it was not liable for the special assessment, and no lien then existed on the property on account thereof. The sale for the ordinary taxes transferred to the purchaser the lien provided by the statute. Eldridge v. Kuehle, 27 Iowa, 160;Mallory v. French, 38 Iowa, 431.

It is claimed by the appellant that because of the provision in section 12 above noted, making the special assessment a lien upon the property taking precedence over “all other liens except ordinary taxes,” the lien for such assessment is equal to the lien for the ordinary taxes, and this without reference to the time when the respective liens should attach. Whatever may be the rights of parties holding liens for special taxes which have attached when a sale for ordinary taxes is made, or for taxes which become a lien concurrently with that...