Harris County v. Dillard

• Decision Date: 05 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. D-3293,D-3293
• Citation: 883 S.W.2d 166
• Parties: HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, Petitioner, v. Michael Curtis DILLARD et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 166

883 S.W.2d 166

HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, Petitioner, v. Michael Curtis DILLARD et al., Respondents.

No. D-3293.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 5, 1994.

Frank E. Sanders and Mike Driscoll, Houston, for petitioner.

Merry Miller, Houston, for respondents.

HECHT, Justice.

The Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity for certain actions of governmental employees. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.021(1). The Act defines an employee as "a person, including an officer or agent, who is in the paid service of a governmental unit". Id. § 101.001(1). The sole issue in this case is whether a governmental unit is liable for the actions of a person who acts in its behalf but is not a paid employee. We hold that it is not and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 841 S.W.2d 552.

James Earl Skeen, a Harris County reserve deputy sheriff, and a female companion spent several hours drinking beer at a bar one Saturday night. While they were driving home very early Sunday morning, a car passed Skeen at what he considered to be an unsafe speed. He pursued the car to get its license plate number, and at the same time, reached down to turn on his radio to alert other law enforcement officials. When he looked back up, he saw another car stopped in front of him and swerved to avoid a collision. As a result, Skeen's vehicle spun out of control, crossed four lanes of traffic, and hit an oncoming car head-on. The driver of that car, Stephanie Hunold, was severely injured, and a passenger, Lila Jean Dillard, was killed. Skeen was found to have been legally intoxicated and was later convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

Dillard's statutory beneficiaries, and Hunold, sued Harris County, alleging that it was liable for Skeen's conduct. Over the County's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that the term "employee" included a volunteer. Based upon a verdict that Skeen was negligent, the trial court rendered judgment against the County. The court of appeals affirmed.

There is no dispute that Skeen was not in the paid service of Harris County at the time of the accident. He was a volunteer reserve deputy subject to being called into service. Skeen was therefore not an "employee", within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act, for whose conduct Harris County was liable. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.001. To reach the contrary conclusion, the court of appeals relied upon two cases. In one, El Paso Laundry Co. v. Gonzales, 36 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1931, writ dism'd), a volunteer worker in a private business was found not to be an employee. El Paso Laundry does not involve the statutory definition which governs here. ¹ In the second case cited by the court of appeals, Smith v. University of Texas, 664 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.App.--Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), liability was predicated on the actions of a paid university employee who supervised volunteers, and not on the actions of the volunteers themselves. Neither Smith nor any other authority permits the plain language of the Tort Claims Act to be disregarded. ² Plaintiffs argue that governmental units should be liable for the actions of people like Skeen, even if they do not come within the statutory definition of "employee". They also cite the definition of "employee" set out in § 102.001 of the TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE. That provision, however, is not part of the Texas Tort Claims Act, Chapter 101, but of Chapter 102. Chapter 102 grants local governments limited permission to pay actual damages awarded, not against itself, but against one of its employees. The definition of employees for purposes of the waiver of immunity in the Tort Claims Act, however, is set out in section 101.001(1).

We have repeatedly held that the extent of waiver of governmental immunity is a matter for the Legislature to determine. Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 820, 114 S.Ct. 75, 126 L.Ed.2d 43 (1993); State Dept. of Highways & Public Transp. v. Dopyera, 834 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014, 113 S.Ct. 636, 121 L.Ed.2d 567 (1992); LeLeaux v. Hamshire--Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.1992); Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976). To accept plaintiff's argument would extend the waiver further than the Act provides, something which we will not do. ³

We hold that plaintiffs' action against Harris County is barred by governmental immunity. ⁴ Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and court of appeals are reversed, and judgment is rendered that plaintiffs take nothing against Harris County.

PHILLIPS, C.J., and GONZALEZ, HIGHTOWER, CORNYN and ENOCH, JJ., join.

GAMMAGE, J., issued a dissenting opinion, in which DOGGETT, J., joins.

SPECTOR, J., issued a dissenting opinion.

Justice GAMMAGE, joined by Justice DOGGETT, dissenting.

The majority holds that a volunteer reserve deputy sheriff whom the county appoints to carry out law enforcement duties, who carries all the devices and emblems of a law enforcement officer, and who answers calls in the same manner as any police officer is not an "employee" for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Today's decision means that a county is not liable for the negligent actions of a person who functions as its agent or employee but does not receive a paycheck, thereby creating a legal anomaly that holds government to a lower standard of responsibility than it has when it must pay for services. Because I believe that Texas law imposes liability in cases of such unpaid agents, I dissent.

The Texas Tort Claims Act imposes liability on the state for the negligent acts of an agent appointed to carry out the duties of a paid state employee. Smith v. University of Texas, 664 S.W.2d 180, 190 (Tex.App.--Austin, 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also RESTATEMENT (2D) OF AGENCY § 225 (1956) ("One who volunteers without the agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of one accepting such services"). Furthermore, a volunteer has the same status as an employee under the Texas Tort Claims Act if the employer retains the right to direct the duties of the volunteer, has an interest in the work to be accomplished, accepts direct or incidental benefit from the volunteer's work, and has the right to fire or replace a volunteer. Smith, 664 S.W.2d at 190, citing El Paso Laundry Co. v. Gonzales, 36 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1931, writ dismissed); see also 53 Am.Jur.2d § 413 (one of the tests for a master-servant relationship as a basis for holding the master liable for a servant's wrongful acts is the power of the alleged master to select and discharge the servant).

The evidence is clear that the Harris County Sheriff's Department had the right to direct Deputy Skeen's duties, had the right to fire him, and accepted the benefit of his services. Although a volunteer, Skeen performed the same duties as paid employees and served at the direction of the Sheriff's Department. Because of these facts, the court of appeals was correct in holding that the County waived its immunity under the Texas Torts Claim Act. 841 S.W.2d at 555-56.

The majority misconstrues Smith by interpreting it as a pure negligent failure to supervise case. But the Smith opinion expressly and unequivocally states: "a claim under the [Tort Claims] Act can arise through the negligence of an agent duly appointed to carry out the duties of the paid state employee." 664 S.W.2d at 190.

Today's decision allows governmental entities to immunize themselves from liability by appointing volunteers to perform governmental functions. In no situation will the consequences be more grave than in circumstances involving volunteer peace officers. It is, in fact, the height of governmental irresponsibility to, with impunity, authorize unpaid agents to carry weapons, issue them badges and credentials, allow them to utilize police radios and "Kojak" lights for their private vehicles, and then turn them loose on an unsuspecting public to carry out the duties of paid police officers. It is apparent, however, that no matter how grossly these agents may abuse their accoutrements of official authority, today's majority opinion insulates the government from liability for their actions. Because I believe that the court of appeals was correct in holding that the Tort Claims Act covers this situation, I would affirm.

Justice SPECTOR, dissenting.

Upon reading the majority opinion, one might conclude that the meaning of the Texas Tort Claims Act is clear; that a governmental unit can never be liable for the actions of a volunteer; and that the arguments presented by the Plaintiffs have no basis in existing law. None of these conclusions are true. In fact, until today's opinion, the arguments presented by the Plaintiffs had a reasonably strong footing in Texas law. Because rendering judgment against the Plaintiffs under these circumstances is unfair, and because the majority opinion sweeps too broadly in foreclosing recovery, I dissent.

The Texas Tort Claims Act provides that a governmental unit may be held responsible, in certain situations, for the conduct of "an employee acting within his scope of employment." TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.021(1). The Act defines "employee" consistently with the term's ordinary meaning: an employee is one who is "in the paid service of a governmental unit by competent authority." Id., § 101.001(1). A literal reading of the statute would thus prevent a volunteer from obtaining "employee" status.

Texas courts have previously held, however, that a volunteer worker, while not technically an "employee," has the same legal status as an employee whenever the employer has a right to direct the volunteer's duties, has an interest in the work to be accomplished, accepts the benefits of the volunteer's work, and has the...