Harris County v. White
| Decision Date | 14 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 6-91-040-CV,6-91-040-CV |
| Citation | 823 S.W.2d 385 |
| Parties | HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, Appellant, v. Georgina Conti WHITE, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Dolores Conti, Lisa M. Conti, and Raymond G. Conti, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Frank E. Sanders, Asst. County Atty., Harris County, Houston, for appellant.
Frederick P. Forlano, Houston, for appellee.
Before CORNELIUS, C.J., and BLEIL and GRANT, JJ.
In this wrongful death action, the principal questions are whether, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Harris County's liability is limited to $100,000.00 when only one person was killed as a result of its negligence but multiple beneficiaries suffered loss because of the death, and whether the county's liability should be further reduced by the amount of medical expenses it paid for treatment of the victim before she died. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
Dolores Conti died when a Harris County sheriff's department van carrying her from the Harris County jail to the Texas Department of Corrections blew a tire and overturned near Cameron, Texas, in July of 1985. Conti's estate and her husband and two daughters (Contis) brought suit against Harris County under the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.002, et seq. (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1992), and the wrongful death statute, TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 71.002, et seq. (Vernon 1986). They also alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981). Their suit was consolidated with the suits of other passengers not parties to this appeal.
The parties stipulated that Harris County employees were 100% negligent in the accident and that the county paid over $181,000.00 for the medical care and treatment of Dolores Conti before she died. After a trial on damages only, the jury returned a verdict for a total of $420,000.00. The court reduced the awards to individual plaintiffs to not more than $100,000.00 each. The final judgment totaled $270,000.00. The court struck the Contis' claims for damages for violations of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
The Texas Tort Claims Act limits a county's liability for damages for bodily injury or death to $100,000.00 for each person and $300,000.00 for each occurrence. The limitation provision reads as follows:
Except as provided by Subsection (c), liability of a unit of local government under this chapter is limited to money damages in a maximum amount of $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for each single occurrence for bodily injury or death and $100,000 for each single occurrence for injury to or destruction of property.
TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.023(b) (Vernon Supp.1992). The county contends that the phrase "each person" refers only to the person who is physically injured or killed, and that since the Contis all claim loss because of the death of one person, their recovery is limited to an aggregate of $100,000.00.
The Contis argue that since they each suffered losses because of Dolores Conti's death, such as mental anguish, emotional distress, and loss of consortium and services, they are persons injured within the meaning of the statute and each is entitled to damages up to $100,000.00, for a total recovery not to exceed $300,000.00.
The rule is stated in City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.1978), 1 where the Texas Supreme Court construed a nearly identical provision of an earlier version of the Texas Tort Claims Act and held that the State's liability was limited to $100,000.00, apportioned among the claimants pro rata. City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d at 388. The issue in Cooksey was whether the term "per person" in the statute referred to the person injured or those persons who suffered a loss as a result of an injury to someone else. The court saw the clear meaning of the statute as referring to the person or persons who sustained the bodily injury. City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d at 388. The court reasoned that because liability was limited to $100,000.00 when one person is injured and one plaintiff brought suit, there was no reason that the limit should change simply because there are two or more statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute. City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d at 387-88. The court pointed out that construing "per person" to mean "per claimant" would limit a sole surviving heir to the same recovery, whether he suffered a loss from the death of one, two or more persons in the same accident. City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d at 387; see also Williams v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit, Mich., 188 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.1951); McGovern v. Williams, 741 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.1987); Madisonville Independent School Dist. v. Kyle, 658 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.1983).
The Contis argue that Cooksey is distinguished because the court did not hold that the injury to the person had to result in death, bodily injury, or physical pain, nor did it hold that mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of consortium, or loss of household services were not compensable injuries under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The gist of this argument is that the Contis suffered individual injuries, rather than derivative losses, because of Dolores Conti's death. This contention is unsound.
The Contis cite City of Denton v. Page, 683 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds, City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.1986), as support for their contention that each suffered an individual injury and each may recover up to the $100,000.00 limit. It is true that the Court of Appeals in Page distinguished Cooksey on the grounds that in Cooksey the plaintiffs' claims were based on the wrongful death of the deceased and not on separate injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. City of Denton v. Page, 683 S.W.2d at 205-06. Nevertheless, in this case, the Contis' pleadings show that they base their claims on losses they sustained because of the wrongful death of Dolores Conti. Furthermore, Page was reversed, making its precedential value suspect, particularly considering the Supreme Court's express refusal to consider other points of error in light of its reversal. City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d at 835.
As stated by Professor Prosser,
The wrongful death action for the benefit of survivors is, like other actions based on injuries to others, derivative in nature, arising out of and dependent upon the wrong done to the injured person....
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 955 (W. Keeton 5th ed.1984); see also 77 TEX.JUR.3D Wrongful Death § 7 (1991).
Generally, mental anguish resulting from the loss of a loved one is not the basis for a separate cause of action, but is merely an element of damage flowing from the death, and is derivative. See Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986); Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co., 670 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 28 TEX.JUR.3D Damages § 142 (1983); O'Quinn, Common Elements of Recovery in Personal Injury Cases, 18 S.TEX.L.J. 179, 192-203 (1977); 4 J. EDGAR & J. SALES, TEXAS TORTS AND REMEDIES § 82.02 (1991). An exception applies where a person qualifies for recovery as a bystander, as when he witnesses the injury or death of a loved one and thus suffers his own, personal injury in the form of shock and mental anguish. In that case, his injury is not derivative but direct, and he may qualify as an injured person within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act. City of Austin v. Davis, 693 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Contis do not fit in that category, however. To qualify for bystander recovery, the claimant must have witnessed or contemporaneously perceived the accident and injury, as distinguished from learning about it from others after it occurred. Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
Loss of services and consortium resulting from the death of a loved one are also derivative, flowing from the other person's death rather than from a direct injury to the claimant.
Thus, the Contis' claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and loss of services and consortium are all derivative of the death of Dolores Conti, and she was the only person injured within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.
The jury awarded the estate of Dolores Conti $150,000.00, Raymond G. Conti $35,000.00, Lisa M. Conti $200,000.00, and Georgina Conti White $35,000.00. Therefore, the proportionate amount of each award is as follows:
The estate of Dolores Conti
$150,000 / $420,000 X $100,000 = $35,714.28
Raymond G. Conti
$35,000 / $420,000 X $100,000 = $ 8,333.34
Lisa Conti
$200,000 / $420,000 X $100,000 = $47,619.04
Georgina Conti White
$35,000 / $420,000 X $100,000 = $ 8,333.34
The county also contends that since it paid more than $100,000.00 in medical bills for Dolores Conti, its liability is extinguished.
TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4675, now TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 71.011 (Vernon 1986), prohibits offsetting the debts of the deceased against wrongful death recoveries. Consequently, it would not be proper to offset sums for which Dolores Conti may have been liable against the wrongful death recoveries of the other Contis. See Tarrant County Hospital Dist. v. Jones, 664 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
This statute, however, does not by its terms apply to survival actions; therefore, the award to the estate of Dolores Conti, in a survival action, could be subject to the medical expenses paid by the county. If it were, the award to the estate of Dolores Conti would be offset completely, since it is well below the amount the county paid for her medical expenses. However, there is a question in this case whether even Dolores Conti would have been responsible for those medical bills.
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