Harris v. American Ry. Express Co.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1926
• Docket Number: No. 4308.,4308.
• Citation: 12 F.2d 487
• Parties: HARRIS v. AMERICAN RY. EXPRESS CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

12 F.2d 487 (1926)

HARRIS v. AMERICAN RY. EXPRESS CO.

No. 4308.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted February 3, 1926.

Decided April 5, 1926.

Petition for Rehearing Denied April 24, 1926.

E. L. Hunter, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error.

B. S. Minor, H. P. Gatley, H. B. Rowland, and A. P. Drury, all of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

Clinton Harris brought suit in the municipal court of the District of Columbia against the American Railway Express Company for damages in the sum of $57.50, because of defendant's negligence in the transportation of 10 hampers of beans, which were delivered by plaintiff to defendant at Wabasso, Fla., on November 26, 1924, consigned to Clarence A. Carter, at Detroit, Mich.

Summons was served upon the defendant company as a foreign corporation doing business in the District of Columbia, by copies left with its chief clerk in the District. The company filed a motion to quash the service upon the ground that to require it to submit to this suit in the District of Columbia would unreasonably obstruct and unduly burden interstate commerce, and would deprive the company of due process of law. In support of this motion the company filed a statement verified by its superintendent, to the following effect, to wit:

That defendant is a Delaware corporation, engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier of freight for hire, having offices in the District of Columbia, also at Wabasso, Fla., Detroit, Mich., and elsewhere throughout the United States. That in the conduct of this business it handles approximately 750,000 shipments per day, the claims for loss, damage, or delay to shipments average 500,000 per year, and the amounts paid by it in the settlement of such claims average in excess of $3,500,000 per year. That the shipment involved in this suit was picked up at Wabasso, Fla., and carried to Jacksonville, Fla., where it was transferred to a car destined to Detroit, and if routed by the shortest distance it was carried through Louisville, Cincinnati, and Toledo, to Detroit. That in order to properly defend this suit the company would require the testimony of its agent at Wabasso, and of one or more employees at Jacksonville and Detroit, and one or more messengers in charge of the trains in which the shipment was transported from the point of origin to its destination. That the shipment did not pass through the District of Columbia, and there are no employees of defendant in the District who were in anyway connected with handling it, and therefore, in order properly to defend this case, defendant would be obliged to withdraw its said agents and employees from their respective duties and transport them to the District of Columbia at great inconvenience and expense, or to take their testimony in the form of depositions upon written interrogatories, which would not enable defendant to meet facts which might be developed at the trial of the case. That there are now pending in the municipal court of the District of Columbia about 110 cases similar to this, all brought by the same attorney, such cases being solicited from nonresidents of the District and involving shipments with points of origin and destination outside of the District. That the practice of soliciting and filing such cases as aforesaid causes defendant unnecessary expense and interruption, and the assumption of jurisdiction in such cases by the courts of the District would result in an unreasonable restraint of and undue burden upon interstate commerce.

The municipal court sustained defendant's motion, and quashed the service of summons in the case. This proceeding is brought to review that order.

We think that the ruling of the municipal court was erroneous. The cause of action sued upon is transitory in...