Harris v. Board of Educ. of the City of Atlanta

• Decision Date: 23 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-8111,95-8111
• Citation: 105 F.3d 591
• Parties: 115 Ed. Law Rep. 360, 97 FCDR 769, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 666 J. Jerome HARRIS, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ATLANTA; A School District of the State of Georgia, Defendant-Counter-Claimant, Joseph G. Martin, Jr., Individually and in his Official Capacity as President of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Mary Anne Bellinger, Rev., Individually and in her Official Capacity as Vice-President of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; John F. Elger, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Carolyn D. Yancey, Individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; D.F. Glover, Dr., Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Robert Waymer, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Midge Sweet, Individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Ina Evans, Individually and in her Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Preston W. Williams, Dr., Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta, Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. Eleventh Circuit
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 591

105 F.3d 591

115 Ed. Law Rep. 360, 97 FCDR 769, 10

Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 666

J. Jerome HARRIS, Ph.D., Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ATLANTA; A School

District of the State of Georgia, Defendant-Counter-Claimant,

Joseph G. Martin, Jr., Individually and in his Official

Capacity as President of the Board of Education of the City

of Atlanta; Mary Anne Bellinger, Rev., Individually and in

her Official Capacity as Vice-President of the Board of

Education of the City of Atlanta; John F. Elger,

Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the

Board of Education of the City of Atlanta; Carolyn D.

Yancey, Individually and in her Official Capacity as a

Member of the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta;

D.F. Glover, Dr., Individually and in his Official Capacity

as a Member of the Board of Education of the City of

Atlanta; Robert Waymer, Individually and in his Official

Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City

of Atlanta; Midge Sweet, Individually and in her Official

Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City

of Atlanta; Ina Evans, Individually and in her Official

Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of the City

of Atlanta; Preston W. Williams, Dr., Individually and in

his Official Capacity as a Member of the Board of Education

of the City of Atlanta,

Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

No. 95-8111.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 23, 1997.

Bradley S. Wolff, W. Ray Persons, Michael D. Watson, Swift Currie McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

Gary S. Freed, Freed Lester & Klorfein, Atlanta, GA, Aubrey V. McCutcheon, Jr., Ypsilanti, MI, for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLS ^*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

J. Jerome Harris filed this civil rights action against the Board of Education of the City of Atlanta ("Board") and the individual members thereof claiming that he was improperly relieved of his duties as Superintendent of the Atlanta Public Schools prior to the expiration of his employment contract with that governmental body. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied Harris's motion and granted the defendants' motion in part and denied it in part. The Board members in their individual capacities filed this appeal from the district court's rejection of their qualified immunity defense in part, and the parties requested the court to exercise its pendent appellate jurisdiction over other issues decided by the district court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's denial of the individual Board members' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismiss the remaining appeal without reaching the merits.

Facts.

In 1987, the Board entered into a contract with Harris to serve as Superintendent of the Atlanta Public Schools for a four-year period running from August 1, 1988 to July 31, 1992. After Harris assumed his duties as Superintendent his relations with the Board apparently deteriorated. Following several weeks of private discussions among its members, the Board adopted a resolution on July 9, 1990, relieving Harris of his duties as Superintendent, concluding that his further service was not in the best interests of the school system. The Board voted, however, to continue paying Harris's salary and other benefits as provided by his employment agreement with the Board. Harris did not request a hearing before the Board or seek any administrative or judicial relief which might have been available to him under Georgia law.

In April 1991, Harris filed the present action against the Board and its members in both their official and individual capacities. In a five-count complaint, the plaintiff alleged the deprivation of property rights without due process (Count I); the deprivation of his liberty interest in reputation without due process (Count II); a violation of his First Amendment rights (Count III); a state cause of action for breach of contract and violation of the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act (Count IV); and an entitlement to punitive damages (Count V). The defendants answered the complaint, denying its essential allegations and asserting a number of defenses. Specifically, the Board members in their individual capacities maintained that they were entitled to qualified immunity on all of Harris's claims against them.

Harris filed a motion for partial summary judgment and the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint. On September 16, 1994, the district court entered an order denying Harris's motion and granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion. The court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's deprivation of property without due process, First Amendment and Georgia Fair Dismissal Act claims but not for deprivation of liberty interest or breach of contract. In addition, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants for qualified immunity on all of Harris's constitutional claims.

Harris subsequently filed a motion seeking certification of that order for immediate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court denied that motion but vacated some of the rulings previously made in its September 16, 1994 order. The court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment for deprivation of property without due process and the state action based on the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act. In addition, the court reversed itself and held that the individual Board members were not entitled to qualified immunity for the deprivation of a property right. The Board members filed this appeal from the rejection of their qualified immunity defense for deprivation of property. The defendants also requested the court to exercise its pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on other issues. In turn, Harris filed a cross-appeal seeking review of the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Jurisdictional Issues.

Because no final order has been entered in this case, the scope of this appeal is very narrow. The district court's rejection in part of the individual Board members' qualified immunity defense is a final decision under the collateral order doctrine over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Heggs v. Grant, 73 F.3d 317 (11th Cir.1996). As stated earlier, the defendants also seek to have this court exercise its pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on other grounds in the case. See, e.g., Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir.1994).

The Supreme Court recently explicitly held, however, that pendent appellate jurisdiction is limited to questions that are "inextricably interwoven" with an issue properly before the appellate court. See Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 60, 75 (1995). In that case, two owners, an employee and a patron of a nightclub raided by police sued the sheriff and several other law enforcement officials, the City of Wadley Alabama ("City") and the Chambers County, Alabama, Commission ("County") for civil rights violations. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, with the individual defendants asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' causes of action. The district court granted the motions in part and denied them in part.

The individual defendants appealed the denial of their qualified immunity defense in part, and the City and the County asked the court to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over their appeals from the denial in part of their motions for summary judgment on the merits. A panel of this court affirmed the district court's rejection of the individual defendants' qualified immunity defense in part and reversed the court in part. Because of a gap in the evidentiary record, the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the City's appeal. With respect to the County's appeal, however, the court concluded that it had pendent appellate jurisdiction over that appeal and reversed the district court's denial of the County's motion for summary judgment. See Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 5 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir.1993), modified, 11 F.3d 1030 (1994). The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for review, which reversed this court's judgment on the County's appeal. According to the Court, the County's appeal did "not fit within the 'collateral order' doctrine, nor is there 'pendent party' appellate authority to take up the [County's] case." Swint, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1206, 131 L.Ed.2d at 67. On remand, this court summarily concluded that "[t]here is no pendent party appellate jurisdiction." Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988, 1002 (11th Cir.1995).

In more recent decisions, the court has also concluded that "we have no pendent party appellate jurisdiction." See Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir.1995); see also Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1102 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1826, 134 L.Ed.2d 931 (1996). For that reason, we lack jurisdiction to review the Board's appeal on any issue. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Swint, another panel of this court dismissed Harris's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction in an order entered January 16, 1996.

We have...