Harris v. Bowles

• Decision Date: 26 October 1922
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 393.
• Citation: 94 So. 757,208 Ala. 545
• Parties: HARRIS ET AL. v. BOWLES ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

94 So. 757

208 Ala. 545

HARRIS ET AL. v. BOWLES ET AL.

8 Div. 393.

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 26, 1922

Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; Robert C. Brickel Judge.

Bill by James J. Harris against Argie C. Bowles and others to cancel deeds, and cross-bill by R. N. Harris, Jr. From a decree dismissing the original and cross bills, original complainant and cross-complainant appeal. Affirmed.

E. W Godbey, of Decatur, and Kirk & Rather, of Tuscumbia, for appellants.

Eyster & Eyster, of Albany, Callahan & Harris, of Decatur, and Charles M. Sherrod, of Moulton, for appellees.

GARDNER J.

By this proceeding the heirs of Mrs. Mary H. Sherrod, a resident of Lawrence county, Ala., who died in March, 1920, seek the annulment of certain deeds, the first of which was executed by Mrs. Mary H. Sherrod and her son Harris Sherrod in 1908 and the second by Mrs. Sherrod alone on October 15, 1915. The respondent Mrs. Argie C. Bowles was the grantee in each of these conveyances; and, while some of the heirs of Mrs. Sherrod are made parties respondent, yet their interest is antagonistic to that of Mrs. Bowles, and they are respondents in name only. For convenience, therefore, Mrs. Bowles will be referred to as the respondent to this cause.

The issues are presented by original bill as well as cross-bill, but these pleadings seek the same end and present like issues of fact, resting the annulment of these conveyances upon the ground of mental incapacity on the part of the grantor and undue influence. The trial court denied the relief sought, and from the decree dismissing the original and cross bills the complainant and cross-complainant have prosecuted this appeal.

No complicated or novel questions are presented, and cases of this character are to be determined upon their own peculiar facts and circumstances. As there are two transactions involved separated by a period of seven years, in view of the nature of the case, the evidence naturally takes in a wide range, and the record is very voluminous, being submitted to this court in five separate volumes. Anything like a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the evidence is not considered practicable and would extend this opinion to undue length. Indeed, in cases resting for determination upon mere issues of fact it has not been the policy of this court, especially since the passage of the act of 1915, to enter into an analysis or discussion of the evidence in detail (Acts 1915, p. 594; Underwood v. Underwood, 200 Ala. 690, 77 So. 233), nor would it serve any useful purpose in the present case. The parties to this litigation therefore will rest content with a very general observation and statement of our conclusions.

The deed of 1908 was executed on August 15th under the following circumstances: The respondent Mrs. Argie C. Bowles, when about 23 years of age, married Frank E. Sherrod, the oldest son of Mrs. Mary H. Sherrod, he being several years her senior. They lived about one mile from Mrs. Mary H. Sherrod on an adjoining plantation for something like 2 1/2 years, when, on June 27, 1908, Frank Sherrod died without issue leaving surviving his widow, Argie C. Sherrod (now Mrs. Bowles), his mother, Mrs. Mary Sherrod, and his brother, J. Harris Sherrod, as his sole heirs at law. He left an estate consisting of considerable lands and some personalty. Mrs. Bowles at that time was something over 25 years of age, and entirely unacquainted with business affairs. Remaining a week after her husband's death, she went on a visit to her sister in Nashville, but her brother, who was a business man living in Decatur at the time, undertook to look after her interest in the estate and employed Judge C. M. Sherrod as attorney. She was appointed administratrix. As to the real estate Mrs. Bowles was entitled to dower of one-half interest therein; and negotiations were had between the parties in interest looking to a division of the real estate and a settlement of the question of dower without a resort to the court for that purpose.

We are inclined to the view that a proposal for such a settlement first came from Harris Sherrod, who was a bachelor more than 40 years of age, residing with his mother at the time, and, it seems, looking after her plantation interests in connection with his own. Frank Sherrod at the time of his death was also engaged in the mercantile business, and furnished supplies to the plantation tenants. On the books there was charged to Harris Sherrod about $5,900, and a personal account against Mrs. Mary Sherrod of $21. Hon. James Jackson, an attorney of considerable experience, was employed by Harris Sherrod to represent the interest of himself and his mother in the matter of this estate.

The negotiations resulted in a contract reduced to writing and duly signed by the parties in interest and witnessed by disinterested persons wherein it was agreed that three commissioners should be selected for the purpose of making division of the real estate of Frank Sherrod into two equal parts, and a payment on the part of this respondent of a stipulated sum to Mrs. Sherrod and her son Harris for their remainder interest in that portion of the real estate which should fall to this respondent in the division, so that the parties would own the fee-simple title to the separate tracts of land. There was also provision as to arbitration upon the question of rents which were to fall due a short time thereafter.

The commissioners were selected and the real estate by them divided into two equal parts as soon as practicable, but they agreed upon a payment by this respondent of an amount something less than $700 to equalize the division. Judge Sherrod testified that he discussed with Harris Sherrod and his mother the terms of this agreement, all of which were fully understood, and that their attorney, Mr. Jackson, participated in the preparation of some of the paragraphs of the contract. The amount stipulated to be paid by this respondent was paid by her partly in cash, but the greater portion in a release of the indebtedness of $5,900 charged on the books to Harris Sherrod, and $21, the personal account of Mrs. Sherrod. On August 15, 1908, pursuant to this agreement and in consummation thereof, this respondent executed a deed to Mrs. Sherrod and her son Harris, jointly, to that portion of the lands allotted to them by the commissioners, and they in turn executed their deed to her for her portion. This deed is sought to be set aside first on the ground of mental incapacity on the part of Mrs. Sherrod as well as Harris Sherrod.

At the time of the death of Frank Sherrod, Mrs. Sherrod was on a visit at his home, and he fell dead at her feet, by which she was greatly grieved and shocked.

There seems to be some confusion as to her exact age at this time, the testimony of the respondent tending to show she was 74 years of age, while that for complainant that she was 78. Mrs. Brewer, a sister of Mrs. Sherrod, testified, however, that in October, 1915, the latter was 85 years of age, but appeared to be 78.

Mrs. Sherrod lost her husband soon after the Civil War, and was left two sons, whom she reared to manhood and educated. She seems to have managed well her affairs, and was successful in the control of her landed estate. Depending upon the price of cotton, at the time of her death her income varied from $5,000 to $10,000 per year. We are convinced from the proof that she was a woman above the average, and, as natural, her interest centered in her two sons. Frank, the older, she looked upon as her staff upon which she could lean in her old age. Harris was some few years younger, a cripple (but to what extent does not appear), and given to strong drink. At the time of this transaction he was a greatly dissipated man, and evidently caused his mother much grief.

It is the contention of counsel for appellants that Mrs. Sherrod was so overcome by the loss of her favorite son and so shocked by the manner of his death, in connection with the thought of being left to lean upon Harris, who was so dissipated, that she became mentally unbalanced, indulged in the use of morphine, and was incapable of understandingly entering into the contract here sought to be impeached.

Upon the question of mental capacity, in Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 546, 49 So. 223, it is said:

"The law presumes every one to be sane until the contrary is proved; and it is unsoundness and incapacity to understand the business transacted, as contradistinguished from mere weakness, which must be proved, in order to avoid a conveyance."

The same language was stated in somewhat varying terms in Frederic v. Wilkins, 182 Ala. 343, 62 So. 518, wherein it was said the law requires nothing more than that the grantor should have sufficient mental capacity to fairly understand the nature and consequences of the act in question.

We have carefully studied the evidence offered by the respective parties upon this question, and we are persuaded that Mrs. Sherrod fully understood the nature and consequences of the deed in question, and that her mental capacity more than measured up to the foregoing rule. She recognized the division of the lands and expressed satisfaction therewith afterwards, and, we think, gave a very good reason for the agreement before it was finally consummated.

Much stress is laid upon the fact that the account which was released was in the name of Harris Sherrod, and therefore his mother received practically no benefit. True, the account upon the books was in the name of Harris Sherrod alone; but we are inclined to the view, as insisted by respondent, that this account really represented that of both Harris and his mother for plantation supplies to the tenants of each, as he...