Harris v. Burnside
| Decision Date | 04 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 19688,19688 |
| Citation | 261 S.C. 190,199 S.E.2d 65 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Irene S. HARRIS, Respondent, v. Marion BURNSIDE and Harriett Burnside, d/b/a Marion Burnside, Appellants. |
Burnside & Roof, Columbia, for appellants.
Thomas H. Curlee, Jr., of Lourie, Draine & Curlee, Columbia, for respondent.
In this tort action arising out of a bailment transaction the plaintiff-respondent sought to recover actual and punitive damages from the defendants-appellants Burnside for alleged negligence and willfulness in the storage and repair of plaintiff's 1968 Chevrolet automobile. Plaintiff obtained a jury verdict for actual damages in the amount of $1,200.00, and punitive damages in the amount of $7,500.00. Defendants timely, but unsuccessfully, moved for a direct verdict; for a directed verdict as to punitive damages and for judgment non obstante veredicto, and now appeal.
It is, of course, elementary, that in considering defendant's motions for a directed verdict, all of the evidence and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom have to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. While there are, naturally, conflicts in the evidence, we proceed to review the evidence and state the facts in the light of such elementary proposition of law.
The plaintiff lived near Gadsden, South Carolina, and had for many years been employed at the laundry at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, some twenty-one miles distant from her home. On May 5, 1968, she acquired a new, fully equipped Impala Chevrolet automobile. The defendants, who will be collectively referred to as Burnside, operated a Plymouth automobile dealership agency on the outskirts of Columbia. On July 9, 1968, plaintiff's new automobile was badly damaged in a collision which occurred in the vicinity of Burnside's garage, plaintiff's automobile at the time being operated by her son. An unsolicited Burnside wrecker was the first of three to arrive at the scene of the collision and being first, plaintiff's son consented for the Burnside wrecker to tow his mother's car to Burnside's garage.
The following morning, July 10, plaintiff went to Burnside and asked to have her car released to Central Chevrolet Company for repair. Burnside's foreman admittedly urged plaintiff to leave the car with Burnside instead and assured her that although a Plymouth dealer, Burnside could do the repair work as well and as fast as Central Chevrolet, and that her car could be repaired by Burnside in approximately three weeks. As the result of his persuasion, plaintiff consented to leave her car with Burnside and authorized it to proceed with repairs. Burnside, however, being advised that plaintiff had collision insurance, did not proceed until after obtaining the authorization of her insurer in addition to the authorization of plaintiff.
The record would indicate the plaintiff to be a person of limited education and it is not at all clear that she was told, or if told, understood that Burnside was waiting for the insurer's authorization. It is admitted, however, that as an inducement to leave the car with Burnside she was told she would get it back repaired in about three weeks. Plaintiff promptly reported her loss to her insurer on July 10, but was not contacted by an adjuster for approximately a week, and it was not until August 5 that the insurer authorized Burnside to proceed with the repair. The delay was, at least in part, caused by haggling between Burnside and the adjuster as to the cost of the repairs, the plaintiff, at least inferentially, knowing nothing about what was going on between Burnside and the adjuster.
Burnside had none of the necessary parts and undertook to acquire them through a Chevrolet agency in Newberry, and some of them had to come from Atlanta or elsewhere. Strictly for its own benefit, Burnside elected not to proceed with any part of the repair work until all parts were on hand and immediately available. Plaintiff did not obtain her car back from Burnside, supposedly repaired, until on or about December 26, 1968. In the meantime, her car, over her protest, was left for a long time outside in the weather on Burnside's lot. She checked on it from time to time and was repeatedly assured that her car would be ready in a few days. After the car had been in Burnside's possession for quite some time, she made another effort to get her car away for the purpose of taking it to Central Chevrolet, but was told that they had already started to work on it and she could not move it. While stored upon Burnside's lot, the wheels and tires were stolen therefrom, replaced by Burnside and charged to plaintiff. Burnside's lot was fenced but upon a principal highway, with no police protection, save an occasional visit by a deputy sheriff, and no night watchman maintained, even though Burnside was aware of previous thefts in the area.
Plaintiff's car sustained weather damage to the interior decor and upholstery, as a result of being stored over a long period of time...
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...Aluminum Window Manufacturing Corp. v. Lehman Associates, Inc., 108 N.J.Super. 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1970); Harris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 196, 199 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1973)."18 These arguments along with case and source materials are more fully developed by Mallor & Roberts in Punitive Damages:......
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