Harris v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2014
• Citation: 985 N.Y.S.2d 711,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 03486,117 A.D.3d 790
• Parties: Nicholas A. HARRIS, etc., et al., respondents, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., appellants, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

117 A.D.3d 790

985 N.Y.S.2d 711

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 03486

Nicholas A. HARRIS, etc., et al., respondents,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., appellants, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 14, 2014.

Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna, Snyder, Swart & Farrrell, LLP, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Scott G. Christesen of counsel), for appellants.

Abraham & Abraham, South Ozone Park, N.Y. (Irwin D. Abraham of counsel), for respondents.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, PLUMMER E. LOTT, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants City of New York, New York City Department of Education, and Victory Schools, Inc., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lebowitz, J.), entered April 10, 2013, as denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the motion of the defendants City of New York, New York City Department of Education, and Victory Schools, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint is granted.

A court may, inter alia, issue an order “prohibiting the disobedient party ... from producing in evidence ... items of testimony” or “striking out pleadings” as a sanction against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126[2], [3] ). Before a court invokes the drastic remedy of striking a pleading or the alternative remedy of precluding evidence, there must be a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious ( see Arpino v. F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 A.D.3d 201, 210, 959 N.Y.S.2d 74;Zakhidov v. Boulevard Tenants Corp., 96 A.D.3d 737, 739, 945 N.Y.S.2d 756;Commisso v. Orshan, 85 A.D.3d 845, 925 N.Y.S.2d 612). While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter generally left to the discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Romeo v. Barrella, 82 A.D.3d 1071, 1075, 921 N.Y.S.2d 83;Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal, 79 A.D.3d 798, 800, 914 N.Y.S.2d 196;Isaacs v. Isaacs, 71 A.D.3d 951, 952, 897 N.Y.S.2d 225), the Appellate Division is vested with its own discretion and corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court, even in the absence of abuse ( see Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Occidental Gems, Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 843, 845, 873 N.Y.S.2d 239, 901 N.E.2d 732;Andon v. 302–304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 N.Y.2d 740, 745, 709 N.Y.S.2d 873, 731 N.E.2d 589;Lewis v. John, 87 A.D.3d 564, 565, 928 N.Y.S.2d 78;Byam v. City of New York, 68 A.D.3d 798, 800, 890 N.Y.S.2d 612).

Here, in opposition to the appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiffs' counsel asserted that the infant plaintiff resides in Georgia and was unable to travel to New York on his own. The plaintiffs' counsel did not proffer any excuse as to why the remaining plaintiffs could not appear for court-ordered depositions. The willful and contumacious character of the plaintiffs' conduct can be inferred from their failures to comply with several court orders over a...