Harris v. Kuba

Decision Date18 May 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05-3357.,05-3357.
Citation486 F.3d 1010
PartiesKeith HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis KUBA and Edward Muzzey, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John A. Baker (argued), Baker, Baker & Krajewski, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jerald S. Post (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

In 1979, a jury convicted Keith Harris of armed robbery and attempted murder, and an Illinois judge sentenced him to fifty years in prison. After spending more than twenty years in prison, then-Governor George Ryan granted Harris a full pardon based on innocence and expunged the conviction on January 10, 2003. Harris claims that he was falsely convicted based on the actions of two police officers, and he sued those officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional right to due process by not turning over three pieces of evidence to the prosecutors before trial and by making false statements to the prosecutor during post-trial motions. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, Harris appeals, and we affirm.

I.

In the early morning hours of December 4, 1978, Mark Resmann was tinkering with his car at the Caseyville Shell Station where he worked. Two men entered the store, one with a rifle and one with a handgun. They demanded money, and Resmann turned over about forty dollars from his pocket. The man with the rifle then directed Resmann to the back office of the store to search for more money. Resmann gave them about $150 from an envelope in the back room. The man with the handgun took the money, while the man with the rifle instructed Resmann to lie down on the floor. The man then took aim with his rifle and shot Resmann about six times. The two men then started to leave, and Resmann tried to get up. The man with the rifle returned to the back room, ordered Resmann to lie down, and shot Resmann again. The pair then departed and somehow Resmann managed to call the police.

Resmann described his assailants to the officer who found him in the back room. Relevant here, he described the individual with the rifle as a dark-skinned black male, 5'10", approximately 25-30 years old, and having a deep voice. He also gave a description of his clothes. Later in the day, he elaborated on the description to an officer at the hospital, stating that the man with the rifle had a thin build, and was 20-30 years old. Officer Dennis Kuba also came to the hospital and showed Resmann a set of photographs. In the first set, Resmann did not identify any individual as his assailant. A few days later, Officer Kuba returned with additional photographs, and Resmann picked out two photographs of individuals who looked similar to his assailants, but he did not make any identifications from those photographs. Almost a month after the shooting, another officer presented Resmann with a set of photographs, one of which was a photograph of plaintiff Harris. Resmann identified another photograph as the assailant with the pistol, but did not pick out Harris's photograph, or identify any individual as the assailant with the rifle. On February 1, 1979, Resmann went to the police station to view a line-up where each of the participants was required to speak. At the time of the line-up, Harris was eighteen years old, 5'9", and weighed 149 pounds. Resmann identified Harris as the assailant with the rifle.

Harris subsequently faced trial for attempted murder and armed robbery along with Bryan Lawrence. The prosecution relied solely on Resmann's identification of the assailants as evidence of guilt. By the time of trial, police officers had yet to recover the gun, fingerprints, clothing, or other evidence linking Harris to the crime. Harris's defense at trial relied solely on mistaken identity. He argued that he was light-skinned, not dark-skinned as Resmann had originally stated, and that his features became familiar to Resmann because his photograph was shown to Resmann before the line-up, even though Resmann did not initially identify him. Additionally, Harris had a twin brother who testified at trial that he was Harris's twin, a fact defense counsel argued cast doubt on Harris's identity as the perpetrator. Resmann testified at trial and repeated his identification in court, and explained that he "knew [Harris's] face, and as soon as he turned around, and I recognized the voice, the voice hit me . . . it rang something in my head, just right off the bat." A jury found Harris guilty of armed robbery and attempted murder, and on June 8, 1979, the court sentenced him to fifty years' imprisonment.

The shooting at the Caseyville Shell Station, however, may not have been an isolated crime. Ballistics testing on the bullets recovered from the Shell Station shooting linked the shooting to two other local crimes, a shooting and robbery at the Perfect Circle Donut Shop about an hour before the Shell Station crime, and a robbery and murder at the Mexico City Café about three weeks later. Harris's counsel received this ballistics evidence before trial. A victim of the Mexico City Café shooting had also identified Harris as the assailant from a photograph. Police, however, determined by visiting Harris's employer that he had an alibi for the Mexico City Café shooting because he had been at work during that shooting. This alibi evidence for the Mexico City Café shooting was not given to defense counsel. Harris was never charged in the other two crimes. Another individual, Randolph Chamberlain, supposedly confessed to the Mexico City Café shootings.

Adding a further complication, three other individuals confessed to the Caseyville Shell Station shooting after Harris and Lawrence were convicted. On September 9, 1979, Girvies Davis confessed to committing the crime (in addition to the shootings at the donut shop and café, as well as others) along with Ricky Holman. A few days later, Holman likewise confessed to committing the crime (also in addition to the shootings at the donut shop, café, and others). Davis was able to lead officers to an individual who had sold the rifle used in the shooting, and the police recovered the weapon. Fred Tiller also admitted to a prison guard that he committed the crime, but when interviewed by police, he terminated the interview. Notably, Harris, Davis, and Tiller were all incarcerated in the same prison and cell block at the same time. Officers Kuba and Muzzey, who were investigating the crimes, theorized that Harris and Lawrence had convinced these others to confess, since the others were already facing multiple murder charges.

Harris was released from prison in 2001, and in 2003 Governor George Ryan ultimately granted Harris a pardon and expungement of his record based on innocence. Harris received $154,000 from the State of Illinois as compensation, but this compensation did not settle any potential claims against Officers Kuba and Muzzey. Harris subsequently brought suit against the officers, claiming that they failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor and made false statements to the prosecutor regarding the case. Specifically, Harris points to three pieces of information that he claims Officer Kuba allegedly should have given to the prosecution, and in turn to defense counsel: (1) the fact that Harris had an alibi for the Mexico City Café shooting, (2) that a victim of the Mexico City Café shooting identified Harris as the perpetrator, and (3) that Chamberlain allegedly confessed to the Mexico City Café shooting. Harris also claims that while his motions for post-trial relief were pending, Officers Kuba and Muzzey told the prosecutors that Harris associated with and knew Davis, knowing this to be false. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers. Harris appeals.

II.

Harris's claim arises from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against "[e]very person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has "`repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability.'" Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (internal quotation omitted)). This liability "cannot be founded on negligence." Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir.2006) (citing, inter alia, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). To satisfy section 1983, Harris must demonstrate not only that Officers Kuba or Muzzey violated his constitutional rights, but also that the violation caused Harris injury or damages. See Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that plaintiff must "produce evidence that she sustained actual injury and that her injuries had a causal connection with the alleged due process violation" (citations omitted)).

Harris claims that Officers Kuba and Muzzey violated his constitutional rights under Brady v. Maryland and are therefore liable under section 1983. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the right to due process and a fair trial requires that the prosecutor turn over to the defense all potentially exculpatory evidence. That obligation extends to police officers, insofar as they must turn over potentially exculpatory evidence when they turn over investigative files to the prosecution. See Newsome v. McCabe, ...

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