Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt.
| Decision Date | 06 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 17-cv-01371 (APM) |
| Parties | ISAAC HARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Defendant Medical Transportation Management, Inc. (“MTM”) is a private company that contracts with the District of Columbia to “manage and administer” non-emergency medical transportation (“NEMT”) services for the District's Medicaid recipients. MTM does not employ drivers directly to deliver NEMT services; rather, it contracts with dozens of transportation service providers (“TSPs”) that employ the drivers. Plaintiffs Isaac Harris, Darnell Frye, and Leo Franklin are three such drivers. They bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against MTM to recover unpaid wages under (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 29 U.S.C § 201 et seq.; (2) the D.C. Minimum Wage Act, D.C. Code § 32-1001 et seq.; (3) the D.C. Living Wage Act, D.C. Code § 2-220.01 et seq.; and (4) the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law D.C. Code § 32-1301. Plaintiffs allege that because MTM is both their joint employer and the general contractor of the TSPs, MTM is liable for their unpaid wages under federal and District of Columbia wage laws.
On July 17, 2018, this court ordered that Plaintiffs' FLSA minimum wage and overtime claims be conditionally certified as a collective action and that notice be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs. See Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt Inc. (Harris II), 317 F.Supp.3d 421, 424 (D.D.C. 2018). Since then, 155 current and former NEMT drivers have filed consent forms to join the collective action, each alleging wage and overtime claims against MTM under the FLSA. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sought certification of a class of approximately 800 drivers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for their District of Columbia wage claims. The court denied class certification on the ground that Plaintiffs had failed to meet the predominance requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). See Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc. (Harris III), No. 17-cv-1371 (APM), 2020 WL 5702085, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2020). The court left open the possibility, however, of certifying an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4) and invited supplemental briefing on the issue. See Id. at *13.
Now before the court are two motions: (1) MTM's Motion to Decertify the FLSA Collective Action; and (2) Plaintiffs' supplemental motion to certify claims pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) and for clarification that the limitations period remains tolled. For the reasons that follow, the Court (1) will not decertify the FLSA collective action and (2) will certify an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4) on the questions of whether MTM is a joint employer or a general contractor. The court also confirms that the statute of limitations for the putative class members' claims remained tolled during the pendency of these motions.
The FLSA requires that employers pay covered employees both a statutory minimum wage and overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. “‘Congress passed the FLSA with broad remedial intent' to address ‘unfair method[s] of competition in commerce' that cause ‘labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.'” Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (first quoting Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 2015), and then quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). In keeping with this remedial intent, when an employer fails to comply with the statute's requirements, under section 216(b) of the FLSA, employees can pursue an action against an employer in a representative capacity on behalf of “other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This type of action, known as a “collective action, ” allows employees who are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs to file a written consent to opt into the case. See id.
The purpose of collective action under the FLSA is to give “plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources, ” and to benefit the judicial system “by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged . . . activity.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989). “The Supreme Court has characterized § 216(b) as a ‘joinder process.'” Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 954 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 n.1 (2013)). Importantly, “[r]ather than providing for a mere procedural mechanism, as is the case with [class actions under] Rule 23, section 216(b) establishes a ‘right . . . to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and [a] right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action,' so long as certain preconditions are met.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see also Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 173 (); Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018) .
For an action to proceed collectively, section 216(b) sets two basic requirements: (1) members must be “similarly situated” and (2) members must affirmatively consent to join the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Although the statute does not prescribe a process for certifying a collective proceeding, the “near-universal practice” among courts involves a two-step process. Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1100 (citing 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:16 (14th ed. 2017)); see also Ayala v. Tito Contractors, 12 F.Supp.3d 167, 170 (D.D.C. 2014) (). At the first stage-what is often called “preliminary” or “conditional” certification-“the court mak[es] an initial determination to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated' to the named plaintiffs with respect to whether a FLSA violation has occurred.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see also Dinkel v. MedStar Health, Inc., 880 F.Supp.2d 49, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases). This stage requires only “a ‘modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that [named] and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.'” Castillo v. P & R Enters., 517 F.Supp.2d 440, 445 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Chase v. AIMCO Props., L.P., 374 F.Supp.2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2005)). “[T]he district court's analysis is typically focused on a review of the pleadings but may sometimes be supplemented by declarations or limited other evidence.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109. “The level of consideration is ‘lenient' . . . [and] loosely akin to a plausibility standard.” Id. (quoting Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2013)).
The second step of the process is triggered when defendants move to decertify the conditional collective action following the conclusion of discovery. See id. During this stage of the analysis, the court employs a stricter standard for determining whether plaintiffs are “similarly situated, ” as there is more information on which to base its decision. Id. Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are similarly situated to the remainder of the proposed collective action members. See Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 537 (3d Cir. 2012); see also O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The lead plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the lead plaintiffs.”); cf. Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1118 (applying summary judgment standard to decertification). If the court concludes that plaintiffs are similarly situated, the case proceeds to trial as a collective action; if plaintiffs fail to meet their burden, the court decertifies the conditional collective action.
This case is at the second stage, and therefore the question for the court is whether Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing that the named and opt-in plaintiffs are “similarly situated.”
The term “similarly situated” is not defined under the FLSA, and the D.C. Circuit has not yet spoken on this issue. See Ayala, 12 F.Supp.3d at 170. The Circuits that have weighed in have not settled on a single approach and there have been recent developments on the topic. For years, the majority approach-and the only approach adopted at the Circuit level-was the so-called “ad hoc” approach. Under this flexible approach, courts employ a three-prong test to determine whether party plaintiffs[2] are similarly situated, considering the “(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) defenses available to defendants which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural considerations counseling for or against collective action treatment.” Scott, 954 F.3d at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536 (); Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1262-64 (11th Cir. 2008) (same); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding the district court's application of the ad hoc...
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