Harris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 12 March 1942 |
| Docket Number | 29360. |
| Citation | 19 S.E.2d 199,66 Ga.App. 761 |
| Parties | HARRIS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Thos L. Slappey and G. H. Howard, Sr., both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Smith Smith & Bloodworth, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
Mrs Bessie Harris brought suit against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, alleging that she was the beneficiary under two policies of life insurance issued to her husband Ford B. Harris, which provided for payment of a double indemnity if his death occurred as a result of accidental means; that is, resulting wholly and exclusively from bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means, that at the time of the death of the insured the policies were in full force, all premiums having been fully paid; that on September 21, 1940, the insured died as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means from the injury caused by an automobile in which the insured was driving being struck by a street car on September 17, 1940; that the injuries sustained in the collision with the street car were the direct and proximate cause of his death; that the defendant had paid to the plaintiff $592.86, the principal of the policies, but had denied liability for and refused to pay the amount due under the double indemnity features of the policies. Other allegations in the petition are not now material. The defendant filed an answer admitting certain allegations of the petition, but denying that it received any proper proof that the insured had died under such conditions as would bring the death within the accidental death benefits of the policies, and denying liability therefor. In an amendment the defendant alleged that the contract of insurance sued on contained the following provisions, "No accidental death benefit will be paid if the death of the insured is the result of self-destruction, whether sane or insane, nor if the death is caused or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partially by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity," and further alleged that at the time of his death the insured was and had been for some eighteen months or two years previously thereto suffering from coronary disease, or angina pectoris, which caused or contributed to his death, and that therefore there could be no recovery of the accidental death benefit sued for.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence the two policies sued on, both of which contained the provisions set up in the amendment to the answer. The plaintiff also introduced a certificate of death from the office of the registrar of vital statistics, in which the "primary cause of death" was given as "coronary disease, one year," and "contributory causes" were given as "automobile accident, September 16, 1940"; the physician who signed the report of death being W. P. Pentecost. The plaintiff also introduced as part of the proofs of death a certificate of Dr. Pentecost in which it was stated that the cause of death was coronary disease for one year and six months, and the contributory or secondary cause was automobile accident. The plaintiff also introduced the proofs of death furnished by her to the company, in which she stated that the cause of death was angina pectoris and the duration of the last sickness was one year and five months.
Dr. Pentecost testified that he was called on or about the middle of September, 1940, to treat the insured who had been in
an automobile accident, and was having a great deal of pain complaining of a great deal of pain in his left side in the region below the heart, and it hurt him to breathe; that the witness strapped him up and gave him something to ease him; that he had been treating the insured for angina pectoris for about a year and a half before his death; that the witness thought accident possibly shortened the life of the insured, and as to whether the accident could have been the immediate cause of death, taking into consideration that the insured was in a weakened condition from heart trouble it was reasonable to suppose that it contributed to...
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