Harris v. Mitchell
Decision Date | 18 August 2006 |
Docket Number | 2050073. |
Citation | 958 So.2d 884 |
Parties | Carl HARRIS v. Crystal MITCHELL. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Joel E. Dillard of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin, McKnight & Barclift, Birmingham, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and Sharon E. Ficquette and Jennifer M. Bush, asst. attys. gen., for appellee Department of Human Resources.
Crystal Mitchell was born to Annette Mitchell on January 12, 1984. Crystal's parents were not married. On February 9, 1984, the State of Alabama, on behalf of Annette Mitchell, filed a paternity action against Carl Harris in the Marengo Juvenile Court. Crystal was not a party to the paternity action. On July 6, 1984, the Marengo Juvenile Court determined that Harris was not Crystal's father and entered a judgment to that effect. There was no appeal from the judgment, and neither party filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., for relief from the judgment.
On December 23, 1996, when Crystal was 12 years old, Annette, as Crystal's mother and next friend, filed in the Jefferson Family Court a complaint for paternity and child support, alleging that Harris was Crystal's father. Harris answered and moved for a dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the action was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as laches. On June 28, 2000, the family court determined that Harris was Crystal's father and ordered him to pay $269.70 per month in child support.
Harris appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court, moved to have the proceedings transferred to the Marengo Circuit Court, and demanded a jury trial.1 Ultimately, the case was transferred to the Marengo Circuit Court, where a jury determined, on June 28, 2005, that Harris was Crystal's father. The trial court ordered Harris to pay Crystal's mother $33,541.61 in accrued child support.
Harris appeals, raising three issues: (1) that the trial court erred by determining that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the 1996 paternity complaint against Harris; (2) that the trial court erred by concluding that Crystal was not required, in order to attack the 1984 paternity judgment, to file a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; and (3) that the trial court erred by awarding $33,541.61 in past-due child support to Annette, who was not a party to the 1996 paternity proceeding.
The trial court correctly determined that the 1996 paternity action against Harris was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. When a mother has previously filed a paternity action against the alleged father, and the child is neither a party to nor represented in that action, as in this case, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the child from subsequently asserting a claim against the same man under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, § 26-17-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the AUPA"), because the mother and the child are not the same parties and are not in privity. See Ex parte Snow, 508 So.2d 266 (Ala.1987); T.K.S. v. State ex rel. M.S.B., 673 So.2d 429 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); and State ex rel. T.G. v. B.L.J., 627 So.2d 449 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). The reverse is also true, i.e., the fact that there was a judgment in favor of the alleged father in a paternity action brought by a child does not bar a subsequent paternity action brought by the mother against the same man under the doctrine of res judicata. See E.J.B. v. State ex rel. A.C., 669 So.2d 992 (Ala.Civ.App.1995).
Harris argues that because the interests of Crystal, Annette, and the State were all effectively represented by the district attorney in the 1984 paternity case, Crystal should be bound by the judgment in the earlier case. We reject that argument because the district attorney who prosecuted the 1984 paternity action could not have "represented" Crystal. On February 9, 1984, when the first paternity action was instituted, the provisions of §§ 26-12-1 through -9 (repealed on May 7, 1984), which was known as the deGraffenried Act, did not authorize a child to be made a party to a paternity proceeding. See Ex parte Snow, 508 So.2d at 267.
Harris also argues that the Alabama Supreme Court recently relaxed the requirement of "mutuality of estoppel" in Ex parte Flexible Products Co., 915 So.2d 34 (Ala.2005), and held that a party in a second action was bound by the judgment in an earlier action, notwithstanding the fact that he was not a party to the first action, because the party was "in privity of blood, estate, or law" with a party to the first action. Harris claims that Crystal is in privity of "blood, estate, and law" with her mother Annette.
Aside from the other distinctions between this case and Ex parte Flexible Products Co., supra ( ), the most obvious distinction between the cases is that Ex parte Flexible Products Co. was not a paternity case. The discussion of privity by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Flexible Products Co. is academic in light of that court's discussion of privity in Ex parte Snow, specifically as it relates to claims asserted by a mother and a child as to the child's paternity:
The trial court correctly determined that Crystal was not required to file a Rule 60(b) motion in order to attack the 1984 paternity judgment. "The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to `relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment. . . .'" Rowe v. Dunn, 949 So.2d 146, 149 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (quoting Rule 60(b)) (emphasis added).
Because Crystal was not a party to and was not bound by the 1984 paternity judgment, she had no reason to seek relief from that judgment.
The trial court awarded $33,541.61 in past-due child support to Crystal's mother, Annette. Harris argues that the court erred by awarding the past-due sum to Crystal's mother, who was bound by the 1984 paternity determination in his favor but who was not a party to the 1996 paternity proceeding.
A final judgment in a paternity case must include an order of child support. See § 26-17-14(a), Ala.Code 1975; and Washington v. State ex rel. King, 537 So.2d 967 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). Section 26-17-14(e) provides, in pertinent part, that "[s]upport orders may be in a lump sum amount if awarded against the appropriate party as a judgment representing an accrued arrearage. . . ." The statute does not specify or limit the parties to whom lump-sum payments for the past care and support of the child should be made.
We conclude that Harris does not have standing to object to the trial court's designation of the person to whom payment should be made. A party lacks standing to invoke the power of the court in his behalf in the absence of "a concrete stake in the outcome of the court's decision." Brown Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 932, 937 (Ala.1983) (quoted in Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771, 772-73 (Ala.1990)). Any error regarding the recipient of the child-support award is a matter for correction between Crystal and her mother Annette. Cf. Topline Retreads of Decatur, Inc. v. Moore, 484 So.2d 1090, 1091 (Ala.Civ.App.1985)...
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