Rowe v. Dunn
Decision Date | 03 March 2006 |
Docket Number | 2040447. |
Citation | 949 So.2d 146 |
Parties | Claris ROWE v. Clara DUNN. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Charles H. Pullen, Huntsville, for appellant.
Jeffrey McLaughlin of McLaughlin & Edmondson, LLC, Guntersville, for appellee.
Clara Dunn filed a motion to enforce a consent judgment against Claris Rowe on July 9, 2004, alleging that Rowe had failed to comply with the terms of that consent judgment. The trial court, after ore tenus proceedings, and after visiting the real property involved in this case, entered an order holding that Rowe had violated a portion of the consent judgment. Rowe timely appealed, whereupon this case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.
The facts relevant to this case are simple. In 1999 Dunn and her husband sued Rowe, their neighbor, seeking an injunction to alleviate several problems that the Dunns alleged stemmed from a chicken farm Rowe maintained on his property.1 The trial court entered a preliminary injunction, finding that the odor the Dunns complained about did not constitute a nuisance but that other aspects of the chicken farm's operation did. The court found, in its order granting the preliminary injunction, that the Dunns' chronic respiratory problems were caused by the operation of the chicken houses so close to their residence. Large exhaust fans used by Rowe to cool the chicken houses, the court determined, were blowing an inordinate amount of dust and chicken feathers onto the residential property of the Dunns, located across the street from Rowe's property. The trial judge noted in his order granting the preliminary injunction that a visit to the property in question revealed that there was "a great lack of ground cover in the areas where the exhaust fans are located and very poor foliage in the form of a buffer zone between the chicken houses and the road that separates the chicken houses from the [Dunns'] residence."
The trial judge noted in the order granting the preliminary injunction that he was raised working on a farm in rural Marshall County. He remarked in the order granting the preliminary injunction that he had several neighbors in his childhood community that raised chickens. Consequently, it appears that the trial judge in this case was particularly well suited to resolve the dispute. The trial court's preliminary injunction did not require Rowe to cease operations, but it did require the parties to submit a plan to the court that would describe how Rowe would abate the nuisance.
On January 10, 2002, the trial court entered a consent judgment incorporating the provisions of the preliminary injunction and implementing a permanent injunction. The portions of the consent judgment relevant to this case provide:
(Emphasis added.)
On July 9, 2004, Dunn moved the trial court to enforce the January 10, 2002, consent judgment. Dunn alleged that Rowe was not complying with various terms of the consent judgment. In particular Dunn claimed that the screens Rowe had constructed around the chicken houses were often down on the ground and thus were ineffective in preventing chicken feathers and dust from blowing onto her property.
The trial court conducted ore tenus proceedings on Dunn's motion and also visited the property. The trial court's order on Dunn's motion states in relevant part:
Although the trial court called Dunn's "motion to enforce consent judgment and/or other relief" a "post judgment" motion, in actuality the motion instigated a new, independent action and was assigned a new case number. On appeal, Rowe argues that the trial court's order enforcing its prior judgment and amending the permanent injunction to prohibit him from leaving the mesh barriers down for more than four days at a time adversely affected his rights and was unjust. Specifically, Rowe asserts that the court's judgment will cause him harm because repairing the screens around the chicken houses when chickens are present will "spook" his chickens, causing them to run to one side of the chicken houses, pile up inside, smother, and die. Rowe testified that the most chickens he has lost when they "pile up" has been 300. Rowe operates at least 4 chicken houses that hold 20,000 to 25,000 "broilers," i.e., chickens, each.
Ex parte Pielach, 681 So.2d 154, 154-55 (Ala.1996). However, to the extent our review concerns only legal issues and not factual determinations, we note that a permanent injunction is reviewed de...
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