Harris v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 02 February 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 10-3181-SAC
• Parties: MELVIN HARRIS, Petitioner, v. RAY ROBERTS, WARDEN, EL DORADO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; and DEREK SCHMIDT, KANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

MELVIN HARRIS, Petitioner, v. RAY ROBERTS, WARDEN EL DORADO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY and DEREK SCHMIDT, KANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents.

Case No. 10-3181-SAC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

Dated: February 2, 2012

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case comes before the court on a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, a prisoner at the El Dorado Correctional Facility, proceeds pro se, so the court liberally construes his pleadings. See Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008). Petitioner claims: (1) he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative judicial errors; (2) his sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; (3) his prior convictions were improperly considered in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey; and (4) he was denied his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to effective assistance of trial counsel. The Court notes its appreciation for Petitioner's well-organized, factually-accurate, and clearly-written memoranda, as well as for the specificity of his claims.

Procedural Background

Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3402, forgery in violation of 21-3710, criminal possession of a firearm in violation of K.S.A. 21-4204, and theft in violation of K.S.A. 21-3701. After Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Kansas Court of Appeals, State v. Harris, 130 P.3d 1247, 2006 WL 851228 (No. 91,321) (2006), (Harris I), the Kansas Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507, but the District Court of Wyandotte County denied it, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed that denial. Harris v. State, 223 P.3d 837, 2010 WL 597000 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion), (Harris II). The Kansas Supreme Court thereafter denied discretionary review. No claim of lack of exhaustion is made, and Petitioner's current petition is timely.

Underlying Facts

This court must presume that the state court's factual findings are correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1146 (2005). Petitioner has not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence the factual findings which the Kansas Supreme Court set forth in its opinion. Accordingly, the Court incorporates its factual statement, which follows:

On the night of January 19, 2002, police found the body of Shane Knudtson in an alley in Kansas City, Kansas, with sevengunshot wounds to the head, shoulder, and chest. Police observed that a trail of blood ran uphill from the body, indicating the body had been dragged downhill for a short distance. They also observed broken glass on and around the body, as well as car tire impressions in the snow nearby. The tire impressions were later determined to match the tires on Knudtson's car. Knudtson's residence was also burglarized later that night.

Police were on the lookout for the victim's car, a Dodge Stratus with a missing driver's side window, and spotted it the next day at a fast food restaurant. An officer saw Harris standing inside the restaurant and spoke with him, but he denied that he was driving the vehicle. Police towed the victim's car and collected blood swabs from the numerous spots on the inside of the car, as well as glass, fingerprints, a bullet from the driver's side door, and a CD case which contained a CD with "Melvin H" written on it. The fingerprints were later determined to match Harris' prints.

Police had no suspects in the case until Harris was arrested 4 days later trying to cash one of Knudtson's checks, which was made out to himself in the amount of $672. After his arrest, Harris was taken to the police station around 12:40 p.m. He waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk with police about the forged check. After changing his story three times, he ultimately admitted shooting Knudtson two to three times in the head and upper body with a .357 he had borrowed from Brown.

Police took a photograph of a shoe print in the snow outside Knudtson's residence which was later determined to match the shoes Harris was wearing that night. The victim's DNA was also recovered from blood found on Harris' shoe and from bloody towels found in a wastebasket in Harris' girlfriend's home. Telephone records from Harris' and Knudtson's phones showed numerous calls between the victim and Harris on the evening of the murder.

Harris was originally charged with one count each of first-degree premeditated murder, felony theft of Knudtson's car, and forgery. The State filed a motion to determine the voluntariness of Harris' statements to police, and the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined the statements were not coerced. The first trial ended in a mistrial when a juror was found to be sleeping through the evidence. Approximately 1 month before the rescheduled trial, the State moved to amend the information to add the charge of criminal possession of a firearm. After a hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion and set a preliminary hearing on the new charge.

A jury acquitted Harris of first-degree premeditated murder, but found him guilty of a lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder and of the three other counts. The trial courtdenied Harris' motion for a durational departure and sentenced him to a controlling sentence of 620 months in prison.

Harris I, 130 P.3d 1247, at 1-2.

AEDPA standard

A federal court does not sit as a super state appellate court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). It does not stand to correct errors of state law and is bound by a state court's interpretation of its own law. Id. Thus, this Court can grant relief only for a violation of federal law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13 (Nov. 8, 2010).

A petitioner's propositions of error, as raised by appellate counsel on direct appeal and adjudicated on the merits by the Kansas Supreme Court, are subject to review under the deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1106 (2005). "Under AEDPA, if the state-court decision was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed." Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 490, 495 (2011). This Court can grant federal habeas relief only if an applicant establishes that the state court "decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or ... was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). "The absence of clearly established federal law is dispositive under § 2254(d)(1)."House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 2008). AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted).

I. Jury Instructions

Petitioner first contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury two requested instructions: (1) an "accomplice instruction" regarding the testimony of Dana McConnell; and (2) a lesser included offense instruction for voluntary manslaughter.

On habeas review the question is whether the desired jury instruction violated "some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment" or "so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973); See Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 854 (10th Cir. 1979).

Accomplice Instruction

Dana McConnell, the girlfriend of Terrance Brown, was present at the scene of the murder and was a chief witness against Petitioner at his trial. The Kansas Court of Appeals found that because she was not an accomplice to any of the crimes charged, no accomplice instruction was warranted. Although she was present at the time and place of the crimes and could have been charged with aiding a felon for driving Harris and Brown awayfrom the crime scene, the Court found the facts failed to show that McConnell encouraged anyone to commit a crime.

In addressing this issue, the Kansas Court of Appeals applied state law that "[t]he failure to give an accomplice instruction is not reversible error if the defendant's guilt is plain, [citation omitted], or if the judge provided another instruction which cautioned the jury about the weight to be accorded testimonial evidence. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Crume, 271 Kan. 87, 94-95 (2001). The Court found both of these conditions met. Harris 1, at 3-4.

Specifically, the Court found that another jury instruction sufficiently cautioned the jury about the weight of testimonial evidence. Instead of an accomplice instruction, the trial court gave a general credibility instruction, stating: "It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use common knowledge and experience in regard to the matter about which a witness has testified." Harris I, at 4. The Court of Appeals found this instruction sufficient to enable the jury to view McConnell's testimony with caution. Id.

The Court also found "overwhelming" evidence of Petitioner's guilt, even without considering McConnell's testimony, stating:

[T]he evidence of Harris' guilt beyond the McConnell testimony was overwhelming, including Harris' confession to police, the victim's blood on Harris' shoe and on towels found in his home, his possession of the victim's car, and his attempt to cash the victim's check within days of the murder.

Id.

In light of the evidence...