Harris v. Sannella
Decision Date | 07 July 1987 |
Citation | 509 N.E.2d 916,400 Mass. 392 |
Parties | Joan E. HARRIS v. Eugene L. SANNELLA. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Roger J. Brunelle, Worcester, for plaintiff.
Alfred A. Macchi, Framingham, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
Joan E. Harris (wife) appealed from a probate judge's denial of two motions to vacate judgments entered in connection with her divorce from Eugene L. Sannella (husband). Their marriage had been dissolved by a judgment of divorce nisi granted to the wife on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. Incorporated into, and made a part of, the judgment was a stipulation signed by the parties regarding division of the marital assets. The stipulation provided, inter alia, that (1) the marital home be sold "as soon as practicable" at not less than fair market value; (2) the proceeds from the sale would be used to satisfy certain creditors of the parties, including the plaintiff's parents who were allegedly owed $20,000, the remainder divided equally between the husband and wife; and (3) in the interim, the wife would be responsible for mortgage payments. Entered on March 26, 1982, the judgment became final on September 26, 1982.
In March, 1983, the wife filed a complaint for contempt. She alleged that the husband had refused to sign an offer to purchase the marital home at a fair market price. The husband's answer denied the allegation. He also brought two counterclaims against the wife. In the first, he sought to have the wife adjudicated in contempt because she had violated the order of the court by failing to make the requisite mortgage payments and by failing to return various articles of his personal property. In the second counterclaim, he sought additional orders including modifications pertaining to possession of the marital home and the allocation of the equity in it.
On May 26, 1983, after hearing, a probate judge entered a judgment of contempt which granted the husband possession of the home and all proceeds exceeding $68,000 from its sale. Proceeds of the sale were to be held by the husband subject to the court's approval of their disbursement. The wife's contempt complaint was continued for further hearing on September 15, 1983.
On August 19, 1983, the wife executed three letters addressed "To Whom it May Concern," stating that (1) she was surrendering all her rights in the marital home to the husband; (2) the alleged debt of $20,000 owed to her parents was not a loan to the husband and wife, as previously claimed; and (3) she was dismissing her attorney of record. On August 31, 1983, the wife advised the husband's attorney by letter that she was turning over to the husband all her rights under the divorce decree. She also stated that, as of August 19, 1983, she would not appear in court for any reason relating to her divorce. 1
On September 15, 1983, a hearing was held on the contempt complaints and counterclaims. The wife failed to appear in court; nor did counsel appear for her. The judge, "acting in reliance on the [wife's] letter to [the husband's attorney] and [on] her failure to attend said hearing, ordered that the divorce judgment be modified" as follows: The judge issued his order in the form of a judgment of modification. The wife did not appeal, or move to alter or amend, either this judgment or the judgment of contempt. Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 59 (e).
In August, 1985, new counsel appeared for the wife. He filed motions to vacate the judgment of modification and to vacate the judgment of contempt, both pursuant to Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 60(b)(4). The judge found "no evidence of any change of circumstance" and, after hearing, denied both motions.
The sole issue before us is whether the probate judge erred in his denial of the wife's motion to vacate the judgment of modification. 2 Although she took no appeal, she now claims that it was error to deny her motion to vacate because the probate judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the division of the parties' marital assets pursuant to the original judgment of divorce. Thus, she asserts that the judgment of modification was void. See Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 60(b)(4).
(Citations omitted.) Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1986). The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the allowance of a motion to vacate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), has stated that Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir.1972).
A judgment is void if the court from which it issues lacked jurisdiction over the parties, lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failed to provide due process of law. United States v. 119.67 Acres of Land, 663 F.2d 1328, 1331 (5th Cir.1981). See 11 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862, at 198-200 (1973). Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., supra. See Nemaizer v. Baker, supra at 65. "An error in interpreting a statutory grant of jurisdiction is not ... equivalent to acting with total want of jurisdiction and does not render the judgment a complete nullity." Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 950 (6th Cir.1985), quoting Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.1984). See also Honneus v. Donovan, 691 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.1982) (per curiam) ( ); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (, )cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 363, 66 L.Ed.2d 220 (1980).
In the present case, there can be no serious argument...
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