Harris v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 September 1911
• Citation: 65 Wash. 27,117 P. 601
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: HARRIS et ux. v. SEATTLE, R. & S. RY. CO.

117 P. 601

65 Wash. 27

HARRIS et ux. v. SEATTLE, R. & S. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 7, 1911

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John F. Main Judge.

Action by M. C. Harris and wife against the Seattle, Renton &amp Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs defendant appeals. Affirmed.

In a street car passenger's action for personal injuries by stepping from an unlighted platform in the street, any error in instructing that it was a common carrier's duty to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation of the business in view of the means of conveyance used was not prejudicial to defendant where the court immediately thereafter instructed that the company's duty with reference to platforms and landing places was to keep them in a reasonably safe condition, which was repeated.

Will H. Thompson and Morris B. Sachs, for appellant.

Roney & Loveless, for respondents.

ELLIS J.

The appellant at the time of the accident owned and operated a line of electrical railway between Seattle and Renton in King county, and for some distance upon Rainier avenue, in the city of Seattle. Angeline street rune easterly and westerly and connects with Rainier avenue, which runs northerly and southerly. Angeline street terminates at the easterly line of Rainier avenue. On the westerly side of Rainier avenue, opposite Angeline street, the appellant's line was double tracked. On the west side of Rainier avenue opposite the end of Angeline street is a hill or bluff, with steps to mount it. Appellant's tracks at this point were laid in the rock and gravel, and between the tracks was a ditch. The west part of Rainier avenue and the part occupied by the appellant's tracks was in an unfinished condition, not graded or improved for the use of teams or traffic of any kind. Appellant's tracks are a little higher than the easterly or graded portion of the avenue. The appellant maintained and used two board platforms or landing places for taking on and discharging passengers at the point opposite the end of Angeline street on the avenue, one on the westerly side of its westerly track and the other on the easterly side of its easterly track. They were almost opposite to each other, and were connected by a plank walk laid on the ties of the tracks and across the intervening space. This walk was 3 1/2 or 4 feet wide, and furnished the only convenient means of passing from one platform to the other across the appellant's tracks. The platforms were each about 4 feet wide and 32 feet long, and with the connecting walk were the only convenient means of reaching the graded portion of the street by passengers. These platforms had been maintained for 14 or 15 years, and were constructed before the graded part of the avenue was planked. The westerly platform was only a few inches higher than the track, but the easterly platform was several inches higher and some 16 or 18 inches above the graded portion of the avenue. There were steps at each end descending to the street. There was no railing or guard of any kind on either platform. The westerly track was used out-bound cars and the easterly for in-bound cars. There was no connection between either of these platforms and the sidewalks on Rainier avenue or Angeline street. The evidence shows that these platforms were maintained by the appellant for the use and convenience of its passengers, and that it would have been difficult to board or alight from the cars on the easterly track without the aid of the platform. The appellant's roadbed does not reach the level of the street for a distance of one block to the south and several blocks to the north of the platforms. There is no street crossing on the avenue at Angeline street.

Mrs. Harris was a passenger on one of the appellant's out-bound was on August 24, 1909, at about 9 o'clock in the evening; her destination being the point on Rainier avenue opposite Angeline street. She alighted upon the westerly platform, and, after the car had passed on, she crossed over the tracks upon the connecting board walk to the easterly platform, intending to proceed across Rainier avenue in a southeasterly direction to the sidewalk on Angeline street, and thence on that street to her home. On reaching the east platform she took a few steps away from the track, and stepped off in the darkness, falling and spraining her ankle badly, and fracturing the ends of the ankle bones, so that she has ever since been lame, and claims that her injuries are permanent. It was very dark at the time, and she claims she fell because she could not see and did not know that the platform was above the street, that she had received no warning from any one, and there was no railing or guard of any kind to warn her or prevent her from stepping off in the darkness. There was no light of any kind maintained by the appellant upon or near either platform. The nearest city light was a block away, and did not light the platform. The negligence charged is that the appellant failed to provide any means of lighting the platforms, and failed to have any guide rails or balustrade on the east platform to warn or protect its passengers landed there in the dark. The jury assessed the damages at $2,750, which the court reduced to $2,250, and judgment was entered accordingly.

It seems to be conceded that at the time the platforms were built the ground upon which they stand was owned by the predecessors of the appellant as a part of the right of way. Prior to the accident this right of way was deeded by the appellant to the city of Seattle, and was at that time owned by the city as a part of Rainier avenue. The appellant contends that, inasmuch as the place where the accident occurred was in a public street, the duty to light was not upon the appellant, but upon the city. The refusal of the court to so instruct is assigned as error.

The duty to keep the platforms safe for the use of its passengers was upon the appellant, regardless of any neglect on the part of the city. The failure of the city to light the street at that point was one of the known conditions of the place. The fact that the appellant was permitted by the city to maintain its platforms in the street did not absolve it from the duly to protect its passengers discharged there from injury on account of the darkness or defects in the platforms. While there was no obligation upon the appellant to light the street as such, for the protection of the respondent it was under the legal obligation to light its platforms for a reasonable time within which to allow her to leave it in safety. The platforms being without guide rail or guard, the failure to light them was negligence. Wallace v. Wilmington & N. R. Co., 8 Houst. (Del.) 529, 18 A. 818; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Lucas, 119 Ind. 583, 21 N.E. 968, 6 L. R. A. 193; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 104 F. 663, 44 C. C. A. 118; Hiatt v. Des Moines, N. & W. Ry. Co., 96 Iowa, 169, 64 N.W. 766; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Thornsberry (Tex.) 17 S.W. 521.

But the appellant contends that the relation of carier and passenger had ceased to exist at the time the accident happened. It is assigned as error that the court refused to so instruct the jury. It is true that carriers by street car discharging passengers upon a public street are not responsible for defects in the street. But that rule has no application to the facts here presented. The respondent was not discharged upon the street, but upon the platform. The platforms, though technically in the street, as were the tracks, were no part of the thoroughfare, but were maintained and used in aid of appellant's business as a carrier. There is no difference either in reason or in law between such a situation and that of a railroad company maintaining a depot or station. The authorities are practically uniform that the relation of carrier and passenger continues with corresponding duties and liabilities for such reasonable time after the passenger has alighted from the carrier's vehicle at his destination as to enable him to leave the carrier's...