Harris v. Sec'y Development
| Decision Date | 11 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-01769 JAM AC PS,2:14-cv-01769 JAM AC PS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | CHRIS HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL., Defendants. |
On October 1, 2014, the court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss brought by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development ("defendant") and on the motion to remand brought by plaintiff Chris Harris ("plaintiff"). Plaintiff appeared pro se and counsel Gregory Broderick appeared for defendant. Also before the court is plaintiff's October 1, 2014 request to amend his complaint. On review of the motions, the documents filed in support and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of plaintiff and counsel and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 25, 2014, this action was removed by defendant under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1442. ECF No. 1 at 1. On August 19, 2014, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 6.
On August 27, 2014, plaintiff, through counsel, filed a motion to remand this action to Placer County Superior Court. ECF No. 7.
On September 3, 2014, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to withdraw. ECF No. 8. On September 8, 2014, plaintiff signed and filed a motion for temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary injunction, ECF Nos. 9, 11, and filed an opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12. On September 8, 2014, the district judge vacated the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as improperly filed. ECF No. 17.
On September 12, 2014, the court granted plaintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel and referred the matter to the undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21). ECF No. 17. Also on September 12, 2014, defendant re-noticed its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18, and plaintiff filed a declaration in support of his motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 19. On September 17, 2014, defendant opposed plaintiff's motion to remand. ECF No. 20.
On September 19, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order. ECF No. 21. On September 22, 2014, defendant responded to the motion for temporary restraining order. ECF No. 23. On September 23, 2014, the district judge denied the motion, finding plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. ECF No. 25 at 2.
On September 24, 2014, defendant filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff did not file a reply in support of his motion to remand.
On October 1, 2014, following the court's hearing on the instant motions, plaintiff filed a document styled as a response to defendant's reply to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 28. In his response, plaintiff addresses some of the issues raised during the hearing and seeks leave to amend his complaint. Id.
The removal statute provides that "any civil action brought in a [s]tate court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction" may be removed by a defendant to a federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A motion to remand based on any defect other thansubject matter jurisdiction must be made within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal, but the court may consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case at any time. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "[J]urisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal without reference to subsequent amendments." Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1488 (10th Cir. 1991)).
The Ninth Circuit "strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988); Takeda v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985)). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). There is a "strong presumption" against removal jurisdiction, which "means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Accordingly, "the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court." Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to raise the defense, by motion, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an entire action or of specific claims alleged in the action. "A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a 'speaking motion' attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact." Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
When a party brings a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction, that party contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion of this type, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made. See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1994); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, district courts "may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment" when resolving a facial attack. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039.
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations. Thornhill Publ'g Co., 594 F.2d at 733. "[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction." McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill Publ'g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges as follows. In May 2013 plaintiff entered into a residential lease with an option to purchase with defendant Thao Pham, an individual residing in Placer County. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7, ECF No. 1 Ex. A. Plaintiff did not know or suspect that defendant Pham did not own the subject property. Id. ¶ 9. In July 2013 Bank of America foreclosed on the subject property. Id. Defendant, through its sub-agency the Federal Housing Administration, "insured the mortgage loan issued by Bank of America" to defendant Pham. Id. ¶ 10.
In May 2013, plaintiff moved into and began renovation of the subject property. Id. ¶ 11. "The home required extensive repairs, particularly in the bathrooms and kitchen areas, most ofwhich were undertaken by Plaintiff between May 9, 2013 and early June 2013." Id. Plaintiff spent approximately $51,000 on improvements to the subject property. Id. Plaintiff completed repairs such as replacing missing toilets, replacing inoperative appliances, repairing holes in ceilings and walls, and replacing a non-functional HVAC system and a faulty electrical system. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff continued to make regular rent payments to defendant Pham. Id. ¶ 13.
"In mid-July 2013, Plaintiff was contacted by a representative of 'Sentinel Field Services' who advised Plaintiff that his company was scheduled to perform repairs on behalf of [defendant]." Id. ¶ 14. It was at this time that plaintiff learned that defendant acquired the property through foreclosure in September 2012. Id. Plaintiff was served with a "Notice to Quit" in late November 2013 by defendant's counsel. Id. ¶ 17. "From December 2013 through mid-March 2014, Plaintiff tried various departments at Defendant HUD and related agencies to obtain information about purchasing the Subject Real Property." Id. ¶ 18. On March 17, 2014, plaintiff spoke with Tom Rose, a representative of defendant. Id. ¶ 19. After plaintiff explained his circumstances, Mr. Rose "expressly promised to Plaintiff that HUD would sell the Subject Real Property for a price based upon the home's appraised value with an adjustment (reduction) based upon Plaintiff's documented repairs." Id. Thereafter, plaintiff retained a real estate agent employed by defendant Mid Valley Mortgage Services, Inc. Id. ¶ 20.
On March 6, 2014, defendant filed an unlawful detainer action against plaintiff in Placer County Superior Court seeking to evict plaintiff from the subject property. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff obtained an appraisal of the subject property based on Mr. Rose's March 17, 2014 representations. Id. ¶ 23. On April 4, 2014,...
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