Harris v. State, Docket No. 33794 (Idaho App. 12/3/2008)
| Decision Date | 03 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 33794. |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER LEROY HARRIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Ronald E. Bush, District Judge.
Orders partially denying request for appointed counsel and denying post-conviction relief, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Christopher Leroy Harris appeals from the district court's order denying post-conviction relief. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for appointed counsel as to several of his claims and that the court erred in summarily dismissing all but one of his claims. We affirm.
A Pocatello police officer observed a man he knew to be Harris driving a vehicle. The officer ran a records check and discovered Harris's license was suspended. After Harris had exited the vehicle and was standing outside a residence, the officer arrested him for driving without privileges and searched the vehicle incident to the arrest. A substance suspected to be methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia and other contraband were discovered. A field test indicated the substance was methamphetamine.
Harris was charged with possession of methamphetamine, Idaho Code section 37-2732(c)(1), and with being a persistent violator. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harris pleaded guilty to the possession charge and the State dismissed the persistent violator charge. Harris was sentenced to a unified term of six years, with four years determinate and the district court suspended the sentence and placed Harris on probation with the condition that he successfully complete a drug program. Harris subsequently violated the terms of his probation by being discharged from the drug treatment program. The district court then revoked his probation and sua sponte reduced his sentence to a unified term of six years, with three years determinate.
Harris filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief alleging, among other claims, that he had been denied due process and received ineffective assistance of counsel. He presented nine claims that can be summarized as follows:
(1) he was denied due process because the prosecution failed to respond to his request for discovery;
(2) he was denied due process because the prosecution "broke the chain of custody" of the suspected methamphetamine and failed to have it tested in a laboratory;
(3) he was denied due process because he was not given an opportunity to independently test the alleged methamphetamine;
(4) he was denied his right to be free from unreasonable searches because the search of his vehicle was illegal;
(5) his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to compel the prosecution to respond to the discovery request;
(6) his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the vehicle;
(7) his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a motion to exclude the methamphetamine because the chain of custody might have been broken;
(8) his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an independent test of the methamphetamine (9) his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because it was the product of duress and undue influence by his attorney.
Harris's petition was accompanied by a motion for appointment of counsel.
The State responded by filing a motion for summary dismissal of the petition. After Harris filed a response, the district court determined that all but one of the claims for relief were frivolous and declined to appoint counsel on those claims. The district court also filed a notice of intent to dismiss those claims, to which Harris did not respond. However, the district court determined that claim 6, Harris's claim that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion, merited the appointment of counsel and that this claim was not subject to summary dismissal. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief on this claim and summarily dismissed the remaining claims. Harris appeals.
Harris contends that the district court erred by denying counsel on eight of his nine claims because Idaho law does not allow a trial court to deny counsel on a claim-by-claim basis and because the eight claims warranted appointment of counsel. In addition, Harris contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing four of his ineffective assistance claims because the court's legal reasoning was flawed.1
A post-conviction relief action is a civil proceeding in which the applicant bears the burden to prove the allegations upon which the request for relief is based. Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990); Pierce v. State, 109 Idaho 1018, 1019, 712 P.2d 719, 720 (Ct. App. 1985). An order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief application under I.C. § 19-4906(c) is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, summary dismissal of a post-conviction application is appropriate only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 315, 912 P.2d 679, 683 (Ct. App. 1996). If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). On review of a summary dismissal, we must examine the record to determine whether the trial court correctly found that there existed no genuine issue of material fact and that the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684-85, 978 P.2d 241, 244-45 (Ct. App. 1999); Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). However, we do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence. Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985); State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 915, 935 P.2d 174, 178 (Ct. App. 1996); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an applicant must demonstrate both that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To show deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Roman, 125 Idaho at 648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-903. If a defendant succeeds in establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. The standards articulated above, although more frequently applied to conduct at trial, have equal applicability to the entry of a guilty plea. Where, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, "the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1992). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53, 55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct. App. 1991). When it is asserted that a guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance, to prove the prejudice prong the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376, 385 (2004).
A trial court should appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner if the petition "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 653, 152 P.3d 12, 14 (2007). In applying this standard, "the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims." Id. at 654, 152 P.3d at 15. As our Supreme Court observed in Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), a pro se petitioner may fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for post-conviction relief because he or she does not know the essential elements of the claim, and therefore the mere omission of an element does not necessarily justify the denial of counsel.
Here, although the district court correctly articulated the standard applicable to review of a request for appointed counsel, it is not clear that the court actually applied that standard in rejecting Harris's request for counsel on eight of his claims. Nevertheless, based on the full record presented here, we conclude that any error in the denial of counsel on these...
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