Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 05 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 99-0484.,1 CA-CV 99-0484. |
| Citation | 198 Ariz. 444,11 P.3d 403 |
| Parties | David HARRIS; Belton Hodges; Ted Hemphill and Jene Hemphill dba Neighbors Game Club; Arizona Game Fowl Breeders Association, Inc.,; Doyle Thompson dba Copper State Game Club, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross Appellants, v. STATE of Arizona; Janet Napolitano, in her Official Capacity as State Attorney General; Jane Hull, in her Official Capacity as Governor of Arizona, Defendants-Appellants, Cross Appellees, Citizens Against Cockfighting, Intervenors-Appellants. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Janet A. Napolitano, Attorney General By William C. Wilder, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, Cross Appellees.
Eleanor L. Miller, Phoenix, and John R. Cogorno, Westminster, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross Appellants.
Stephanie Nichols-Young, Phoenix, Attorney for Intervenors-Appellants.
¶ 1 In November 1998, Arizona voters passed an initiative banning cockfighting, which later was codified as Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") sections 13-2910.03 and 13-2910.04 (collectively, the "Cockfighting Statutes").1 This appeal arises from a challenge to those statutes.
¶ 2 Plaintiffs2 ("Harris") brought suit against the State and several of its officers, seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the Cockfighting Statutes are unconstitutional and a preliminary injunction enjoining their enforcement. The State filed its opposition, and Citizens Against Cockfighting ("CAC"), the public interest group that supported the initiative enacting the Cockfighting Statutes, moved to intervene pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
¶ 3 Before hearing evidence and oral argument regarding Harris' motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court ruled that CAC could not intervene as a matter of right and that, because its participation would not be helpful, it would not be allowed to intervene permissively. Following evidence and oral argument, the trial court ruled that section 13-2910.03(A)(2) and the portion of section 13-2910.03(A)(3) relating to section 13-2910.03(A)(2) were constitutional, but that section 13-2910.03(A)(1), section 13-2910.04 and the portion of section 13-2910.02(A)(3) relating to section 13-2910.03(A)(1) were not. The trial court subsequently enjoined the enforcement of those parts of the Cockfighting Statutes that it found to be unconstitutional, and refused to enjoin the enforcement of the rest.
¶ 4 All parties timely appealed. CAC appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to intervene.3 The State appealed that part of the trial court's order preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of section 13-2910.03(A)(1) and section 13-2910.04. Harris cross-appealed that part of the trial court's order refusing to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of section 13-2910.03(A)(2). We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. section 12-2101(F)(2). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
¶ 5 We are asked to decide the following issues:
1. Did the trial court err in denying CAC's motion to intervene?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of section 13-2910.03(A)(1) and section 13-2910.04?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to preliminarily enjoin section 13-2910.03(A)(2)?
¶ 6 CAC asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its motion to intervene. We, however, conclude otherwise. ¶ 7 CAC first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its motion to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). We review de novo the trial court's denial of intervention as a matter of right. See Purvis v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 179 Ariz. 254, 257, 877 P.2d 827, 830 (App.1994).
¶ 8 Rule 24(a) requires that a trial court allow a requested intervention as a matter of right when "the applicant claims an interest [in] the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." (Emphasis added.) CAC argues that, as the organization that supported the initiative to enact the Cockfighting Statutes, it is a party entitled to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a). We disagree.
¶ 9 Because no Arizona authority addresses this issue, CAC notes that our rules of civil procedure were adopted from the federal rules and that we give great weight to interpretations afforded similar federal rules. See Macpherson v. Taglione, 158 Ariz. 309, 311, 762 P.2d 596, 598 (App.1988). CAC then suggests that, because the Ninth Circuit recognizes the right of citizen initiative proponents to intervene under the analogous Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we should do likewise. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.1983); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trade.s Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.1982); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir.1980).
¶ 10 But even were we to apply the Ninth Circuit rule, CAC still would not qualify for intervention as a matter of right because the trial court found that the State could adequately defend the constitutionality of the Cockfighting Statutes. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a); Cedars-Sinai Med. Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 768 (9th Cir.1997) (). We will not reverse that finding unless the trial court abused its discretion. See Purvis, 179 Ariz. at 257, 877 P.2d at 830 ().
¶ 11 CAC then argues that the trial court abused its discretion because, given the opportunity, CAC would have "provide[d] information regarding the drafting of the initiative, the purpose behind it, the public policy reasons for [it, the] history of similar provisions in this country . . . [and] the cruel and inhumane practices that are inherently part of cockfighting." But the State provided all such information that was actually relevant to this matter. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State could adequately represent CAC's interests. Consequently, it did not err in refusing to grant CAC intervention as a matter of right.
¶ 12 In the alternative, CAC argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying it permissive intervention. The standard of review for the denial of permissive intervention is abuse of discretion. See Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 74, 722 P.2d 236, 242 (1986).
¶ 13 CAC maintains that the trial court failed to consider the factors set forth in Bechtel before denying its motion for intervention. The relevant factors noted in Bechtel include, but are not limited to, the nature and extent of the intervenor's interest; the intervenor's standing to raise legal issues; the legal position the intervenor seeks to assert; whether intervention would unduly prolong litigation; and whether the intervenor would "significantly contribute" to the proceedings. See id. at 72, 722 P.2d at 240. Significantly, Bechtel only requires that the trial court consider these relevant factors; it does not require written findings. See id.
¶ 14 Further, unlike the trial court in Bechtel, the trial court here not only considered the appropriate factors, it also made a record of its findings. The trial court found that CAC's interest in this case was political and therefore no different from the State's interest. More importantly, the trial court concluded that CAC's participation would not be helpful and indicated that it would unduly prolong the proceedings.4 Although not included in its minute entry, these findings satisfy Bechtel, and CAC has not argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making them. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of CAC's motion to intervene.
¶ 15 We review the grant or denial of an injunction for an abuse of discretion. See Financial Assoc. v. Hub Props., Inc., 143 Ariz. 543, 545, 694 P.2d 831, 833 (App.1984). However, a trial court abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law or clearly errs in finding the facts or applying them to the law. See Grant v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 455-56, 652 P.2d 507, 528-29 (1982).
¶ 16 "The constitutionality of a statute is a matter of law that we review de novo." City of Tucson v. Rineer, 193 Ariz. 160, 164, ¶ 12, 971 P.2d 207, 211 (App.1998). We begin with the strong presumption that the statute is constitutional, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of overcoming that presumption. See State v. Tocco, 156 Ariz. 116, 119, 750 P.2d 874, 877 (1988); see also Ruiz v. Hull, 191 Ariz. 441, 448, 957 P.2d 984, 991 (1998) ().
¶ 17 The State5 appeals the trial court's order preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of section 13-2910.03(A)(1), which the trial court found to be unconstitutionally vague. A statute is vague if it (1) fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that particular conduct is forbidden, or (2) fails to provide ascertainable standards by which it may be enforced, thereby impermissibly delegating basic policymaking decisions to police officers, judges or juries and allowing arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See Kolender v....
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