Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 20 October 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 70983,70983 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 622 Byron Anthony HARRIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit; and David P. Gauldin, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
This is a petition to review Harris v. State, 509 So.2d 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), in which the district court approved an upward departure sentence for unarmed robbery, kidnapping, and two counts of sexual battery on the basis of an extraordinary amount of emotional trauma. The district court certified the following question of great public importance:
Whether a defendant's infliction of an extraordinary amount of emotional trauma can be a valid reason for departure where the defendant has committed robbery, kidnapping and sexual battery upon the victim.
Id. at 1302. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. We hold that an upward departure is proper where the victim suffered extraordinary emotional trauma and sufficient physical manifestation of injury existed.
The relevant facts demonstrate that the victim was the sole night clerk at an Orange Park convenience store when Harris entered, forced her at gunpoint to place the store's cash in a bag, and then forced her to drive to a secluded location. There he forced her to undress, fondled and mouthed her breasts, digitally penetrated her vagina, forced her to perform fellatio requiring her to swallow his ejaculate, and threatened to rape her anally. Throughout the encounter, Harris repeatedly threatened to blow the victim's head off, and, before fleeing, he warned her that if she reported him, he would find and kill her.
Harris was later apprehended, identified by the victim, and convicted of unarmed robbery, kidnapping, and two counts of sexual battery. The trial judge obtained a presentence investigation report and, at Harris' request, a psychiatric report. At the sentencing hearing, the victim testified that as a result of this incident she was unable to work, was receiving workers' compensation, and was undergoing psychological treatment. While the sentencing guidelines prescribe seventeen to twenty-two years incarceration for these offenses, the trial judge imposed four consecutive fifteen-year sentences in state prison and justified the departure as follows:
"The victim suffered extreme psychological trauma at the hands of this Defendant during the commission of these offenses. Injury is so great that she has been receiving and approved for Workman's Compensation. She is unable in any way to carry on a normal social activity and has sexual dysfunctional problems with her husband.
The Defendant's prior criminal history shows an escalation of the type crimes that he committed from the year 1978 through now which included misdemeanors and felonies and he is now convicted of a life felony.
The Court finds that this Defendant's period of separation from society must be more than that allowed by the guidelines or it will continue to escalate.
The Defendant is a career criminal as shown by his prior history and is incapable of being rehabilitated."
On appeal, the First District affirmed the trial court's departure, concluding:
We are of the view that the threshold of emotional trauma necessary under the rationale of Austin v. State, [507 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) ] supra, in order to justify upward departure was substantially exceeded in this case. We are also of the view that departure because of psychological trauma was justified under the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Rousseau, supra, in that the victim has a "discernible physical manifestation resulting from the psychological trauma."
We have recently addressed the question of psychological trauma as a ground for departure in three separate opinions. In Lerma v. State, 497 So.2d 736, 739 (Fla.1986), we held that "emotional hardship can never constitute a clear and convincing reason to depart in a sexual battery case because nearly all sexual battery cases inflict emotional hardship on...
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