Harris v. State

Decision Date08 April 2021
Docket NumberNO. 2018-KA-01621-SCT,2018-KA-01621-SCT
Citation321 So.3d 556
Parties Jeremy HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART, LISA L. BLOUNT, Jackson

BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ.

RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jeremy Harris was convicted of attempted burglary of a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny and was sentenced to a term of ten years, with five years suspended. Harris argues that the trial court erred by granting a mistrial in his first trial. As the record from the first trial was not made part of the record on appeal, the Court ordered that the record be supplemented. The parties were directed to file supplemental briefing if they so chose, and each filed a supplemental brief.

¶2. On the entire record presented, we reverse the conviction and sentence, finding that the mistrial in Harris's first trial was not manifestly necessary. In the absence of manifest necessity, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prohibited a second trial for the same crime.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. Jeremy Harris was indicted for attempted burglary of a dwelling. The State sought alibi-defense discovery if Harris intended to rely on an alibi defense. No alibi-defense discovery was offered by Harris. Harris's theory of defense was that there was no attempt to commit a criminal act because he was suffering from an epileptic seizure.

¶4. The first trial commenced on June 14, 2018. The State called Officer Mitchell, an officer of the Tunica County Sheriff's Department. Mitchell testified that he responded to an attempted burglary call at the property of Patricia Gidden. Gidden provided a description of the man who attempted to break into her home. Mitchell testified that, during the time he transported Harris to the Tunica County Jail, Harris repeatedly sang a song. Mitchell did not find it necessary to seek medical attention for Harris and did not find any medication on Harris when he was searched.

¶5. During Mitchell's testimony, the State asked to approach the bench, arguing that Harris's attorney had not properly disclosed an alibi defense.

Your Honor, I'm a little concerned as it relates to the Defense and the direction that Mr. Johnson is going in because the proper disclosures were done, and we requested a demand for alibi, and if he's gonna use medical reasons, we feel like we should have been made aware of that so we could prepare for it, and furthermore, I think he's trying to get out through other witnesses about this medical concern, and if he's concerned about medical, he should have probably did [sic] a mental evaluation on the guy.

The court replied that a request for an alibi defense involving medical reasons did not require a response. The court overruled the State's objection,1 observing that it was not Harris's attorney's fault that the witness chose to respond to things about which he was not questioned.

¶6. The State next called Captain Bernadette Logan. Logan testified that, on her way to the scene, she first stopped at the location where Harris had been apprehended. Logan testified that Harris did not appear to require medical attention. When she arrived at Gidden's property, Logan observed damage to the front door. A window was broken, and scratch, scrape, and kick marks were observed on the front door. Logan testified that, when she initially questioned Harris, he was "acting inappropriately" and was singing. Logan recalled hearing during a preliminary hearing that Harris mentioned taking Dilantin for seizures.

¶7. The State next called Major Jammie Lewis, who apprehended Harris. Lewis testified that Harris was not compliant and refused to abide by orders of law enforcement. Lewis stated that, to his knowledge, Harris was not in the need of any medical assistance at the time of his apprehension and appeared to know what he was doing.

¶8. Gidden testified that she heard a "thud" and saw a man attempting to break into her house. She saw a man running into and kicking her door. She yelled at him to stop, but instead, he placed his face against the glass and picked up a large urn by the front door. Gidden testified that she ran to her room and retrieved her shotgun. Gidden testified that Harris immediately stopped once the gun was brandished and walked away. Gidden testified that Harris did not appear to be in medical distress. After Gidden testified, the State rested.

¶9. In his defense, Harris offered the following. He claimed that he had been diagnosed with epilepsy and averaged ten to twelve seizures a year. He first began having seizures around the age of seventeen. He had been treated for seizures by a doctor at Memphis Neurology Center and had been taking Phenobarbital and Dilantin since 2000. He testified that sometime later he was no longer able to get his medications. Harris recalled waking up on the day in question and taking a walk to get ice for his wife. The next thing he recalled was waking up the next day at the sheriff's department.

¶10. Harris offered no other testimony. The State called no rebuttal witnesses and made no objections during his testimony.

¶11. During the lunch break, the trial court noted that it was not aware of any state law that stated epilepsy was a defense. When the court inquired as to why there had been testimony regarding Harris's epilepsy, Harris's attorney stated that it was not used as a defense but to show that Harris did not have the required intent to commit the crime. The trial court inquired as to why the State had failed to object to the testimony on the ground of relevance. The State offered only that it had objected to the defense's failure to provide a proper alibi defense. The court allowed the parties the lunch hour to research and provide it with any relevant law as to epilepsy as a defense.

¶12. The State offered cases in which epilepsy had been compared to insanity. The State argued it had not been put on notice. In response to the court's asking what it should do, the State replied that

because of the amount of testimony that the Defense attempted to pull out and did pull out as it relates to the defendant's medical condition, I feel like at this point the waters are really mirky [sic], and I believe that a mistrial should be granted.

Yet the State did not formally move for a mistrial, despite the trial court's inquiring as to whether a motion for mistrial was being made.

THE COURT: Are you so moving?
MS. McCRAY: I am not moving at this point, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, now, don't bring up mistrial if you're not gonna move for one.
MS. McCRAY: I'm not moving for it at this point, your Honor.

¶13. Harris's attorney argued that he was not pleading an insanity defense and was not requesting an insanity instruction from the court. When the court informed the attorneys that it would deny Harris's request for an instruction on a directed verdict and would then instruct the jury with its standard instructions, the State finally moved for a mistrial. The court denied the mistrial and stated that it would allow the jury to decide intent. During the discussion of instructions, Harris's attorney requested a plea offer from the State. After further discussions, the request was denied by the State.

¶14. Later, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court made the following statement before granting a mistrial:

This case, as the attorneys well know, has raised some interesting issues. The first issue of concern is the defendant is claiming ... that he could not form the requisite intent that is required ... that the crime is defined as breaking and entering a building or house with the intent to commit some crime therein. Without -- if you don't have the intent to commit some crime therein, it doesn't constitute burglary. I mean it's two elements. Those elements have to be met. The Defense is arguing that because the defendant suffered from an epileptic seizure ... they're arguing that he lacked the ability to form the requisite intent to commit the crime therein. Therefore, it can't be a burglary because he didn't have that intent. The State ... takes exception to that argument ... and I know the attorneys also have tried to research this fairly extensively.
The only cases that I can find from the Mississippi Supreme Court that deal with a defendant claiming epilepsy are couched in terms of the insanity defense, which makes sense, because in Mississippi, the insanity defense is the only defense available for mental disease or defect, and ... it requires that the defendant not know the difference between right and wrong. Also, there's a procedural requirement if someone is gonna claim the insanity defense, that the State has to be put on notice of that defense prior to trial by a written notice, notice of insanity, and that's required under the rules. That did not occur here. They were not provided any notice that the defendant was claiming insanity.
Now, the Defense would argue they're not claiming insanity. They're claiming that due to the epilepsy, he was not able to form that intent. Well, that has not been the position yet of the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court, as I have read, ... has discussed epilepsy within the context of insanity, and, therefore, as far as this Court is concerned, that's where it sits. It sits within the context of insanity.
The State was caught somewhat off guard by that defense, because they did not have any notice of that defense prior to coming into the courtroom today. The State has requested a mistrial on that basis, because they were caught off guard, surprised, so to speak, by the defense of epilepsy, and feel that they should have been given notice of that defense prior to trial under the insanity rules.
....
In any event, the bottom line of all of this is I agree that I think the epilepsy constitutes - as I
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1 cases
  • Wilson v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 28, 2022
    ...be made by the trial judge fulfilling his somber responsibility as to when justice requires him to declare a mistrial. Harris v. State , 321 So. 3d 556, 561 (Miss. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Jenkins , 759 So. 2d at 1235 ). "The fact that there is no explicit finding on part of the tria......

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