Harris v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2016
• Docket Number: S231489
• Parties: Morris Glen HARRIS, Jr., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

1 Cal.5th 984

383 P.3d 648

209 Cal.Rptr.3d 584

Morris Glen HARRIS, Jr., Petitioner,

v.The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

The People, Real Party in Interest.

S231489

Supreme Court of California

Filed November 10, 2016

Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Rourke Stacy and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

Linda Lye, Micaela Davis ; Peter Eliasberg ; and David Loy for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, Inc., and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Laura Beth Arnold and William A. Meronek for Public Defenders Association and Law Offices of the Public Defender for the County of Riverside as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No Appearance for Respondent.

Jacki Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama, Matthew Brown and John Pomeroy, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

Chin

, J.

Charged with robbery, petitioner Morris Glen Harris, Jr. (hereafter defendant), pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to grand theft from the person, a felony, and admitted a prior robbery conviction, on condition that he receive a six-year prison sentence. In return, the People dismissed the robbery charge and allegations of other felony convictions. The court imposed the six-year sentence. Later, the electorate enacted Proposition 47, which reduced the grand theft offense to a misdemeanor. Under Proposition 47's provisions, defendant petitioned the court to have his sentence recalled and to be resentenced as a misdemeanant. In response, the People argued that reducing the sentence would deprive them of the benefit of their plea bargain, and thus they should be permitted to rescind the plea and reinstate the original robbery charge. The trial court agreed with the People, as did a divided Court of Appeal.

We must decide whether the People are entitled to have the plea agreement set aside if defendant seeks to have his sentence recalled under Proposition 47. We conclude that they are not entitled to have the plea agreement set aside. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court of Appeal opinion summarized the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing: “On February 11, 2013, Francisco Pascual Diego was walking down the street when a person he later identified as defendant approached him from behind, hit him on the face, and took his cell phone. Diego chased defendant and flagged down two police officers. Diego pointed out defendant, who was running down the street, and told the officers that defendant had stolen his cell phone. There was no one else running down the street. The officers chased defendant and detained him. Diego's cell phone was found on the ground about one foot away from defendant's left foot.”

The prosecution charged defendant with one count of robbery. The information also alleged that defendant had six prior felony convictions, one of them for robbery. On April 17, 2013, the parties reached a plea agreement. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to grand theft from the person under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c)

, to admit the prior robbery conviction, and to be sentenced to prison for six years. As part of the plea agreement, the People dismissed the robbery charge and the other allegations. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for six years pursuant to the agreement.

In November 2014, the electorate enacted Proposition 47. Except for specified ineligible persons, Proposition 47 reduced certain nonviolent crimes, including the grand theft from the person conviction in this case, from felonies to misdemeanors. (See People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 404, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592

.) Defendant filed a petition in the trial court for a recall of sentence, asking the court to reclassify the grand theft conviction as a misdemeanor and resentence him as a misdemeanant. The People moved to withdraw from the plea agreement and to reinstate the dismissed robbery charge and allegations of prior felony convictions on the basis that the resentencing would deprive them of the benefit of their bargain. After a hearing, the court issued an order granting both defendant's petition for recall of sentence and the People's motion to withdraw from the plea agreement and reinstate the dismissed charges.

Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the order granting the People's motion to withdraw the plea agreement. After the Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, this court granted review and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause. That court did so and ultimately issued an opinion denying the petition.

Relying on People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026

(Collins ), the majority concluded that, because a six-year prison sentence was a material part of the plea agreement, permitting defendant to seek recall of sentence under Proposition 47 as well as receive the benefit of the plea agreement would result in “a windfall to defendant that neither party contemplated at the time they entered their plea agreement.” It held that, at his option, defendant could either choose to abide by the plea agreement by not petitioning for resentencing under Proposition 47, or “effectively repudiate[ ] the plea agreement” by petitioning for resentencing. If defendant chooses the latter, “the plea agreement is deemed to be rescinded, and the parties are returned to the status quo ante.”

Justice Mosk dissented. He agreed with defendant that “when a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser felony charge pursuant to a plea bargain, and that charge is later reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the trial court cannot rescind the plea, recall the sentence, and reinstate the original charge or charges.” Citing Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 302 P.3d 598

, he argued that the parties to a plea agreement are generally deemed to know and understand that later changes in the law may affect the consequences of the original plea agreement. “Thus, a plea agreement is not breached or revocable just because a change in the law disadvantages one party or the other.”

We granted defendant's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

In addition to reducing certain felonies to misdemeanors, including the grand theft conviction of this case, Proposition 47 added section 1170.18 to the Penal Code

(section 1170.18 ). That section permits a “person currently serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section (‘this act’) had this act been in effect at the time of the offense” to petition the trial court that entered the earlier judgment of conviction for a recall of the sentence and to be resentenced as a misdemeanant. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)

The parties agree that section 1170.18

applies to defendant, and that he may petition to have the conviction reduced to a misdemeanor and to be resentenced as a misdemeanant under Proposition 47. The question before us is whether, if that occurs, the People should be permitted to withdraw from the plea agreement. The majority below cited Collins , supra , 21 Cal.3d 208, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026, in concluding the People may withdraw from the plea agreement. In arguing to the contrary, Justice Mosk cited Doe v. Harris , supra , 57 Cal.4th 64, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 302 P.3d 598.

In Collins , supra , 21 Cal.3d 208, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026

, the defendant was charged with 15 felonies, including burglary, attempted burglary, forcible rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and forcible oral copulation. “Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of oral copulation; in return, the allegations of commission of that crime by means of force and of a prior felony conviction were stricken, and the other 14 counts were dismissed.” (Id . at p. 211, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026.) After the plea, the Legislature decriminalized nonforcible oral copulation, the crime to which the defendant had pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, the trial court sentenced him to state prison. On appeal, because the conduct to which the defendant pleaded guilty was no longer criminal, this court reversed the conviction. (Id . at pp. 212–214, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026.) As we summarized, “A conviction cannot stand on appeal when it rests upon conduct that is no longer sanctioned.” (Id . at p. 214, 145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026.)

We then considered the effect of the reversal on the dismissed counts. We stated the issue as being “whether the prosecution has been deprived of the benefit of its bargain by the relief granted herein. We conclude that it has and hence the dismissed counts may be restored. [¶] The state, in entering a plea bargain, generally contemplates a certain ultimate result; integral to its bargain is the defendant's vulnerability to a term of punishment.... When a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain. Whether the defendant formally seeks to withdraw his guilty plea or not is immaterial; it is his escape from vulnerability to sentence that fundamentally alters the character of the bargain.

“Defendant seeks to gain relief from the sentence imposed but otherwise leave the plea bargain intact. This is bounty in excess of that to which he is entitled. The intervening act of the Legislature in decriminalizing the conduct for which he was convicted justifies a reversal of defendant's conviction and a direction that his conduct may not support further criminal proceedings on that subject; but it also destroys a...