Harris v. Warden, Lieber Corr. Inst.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-0906-TMC |
| Parties | Tito F. Harris, Petitioner, v. Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Petitioner Tito F. Harris ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 3, 2020. (ECF No. 1). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., this matter was referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial handling. On July 27, 2020, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF Nos. 25, 26), and Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's motion, (ECF No. 33). Before the court is the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation ("Report"), which recommends that the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that the Petition be denied. (ECF No. 35). Petitioner filed objections to the Report on October 19, 2020. (ECF No. 38).
The recommendations set forth in the Report have no presumptive weight, and this court remains responsible for making a final determination in this matter. Wimmer v. Cook, 774 F.2d 68, 72 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976)). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, the court need only review for clear error "those portions which are not objected to—including those portions to which only 'general and conclusory' objections have been made[.]" Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 654, 662 (D.S.C. 2017). "An objection is specific if it 'enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'" Id. at 662 n.6 (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., With Bldgs., Appurtenances, Improvements, & Contents, Known As: 2121 E. 30th St., Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). On the other hand, objections which merely restate arguments already presented to and ruled on by the magistrate judge or the court do not constitute specific objections. See, e.g., Howard v. Saul, 408 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (D.S.C. 2019) (); Ashworth v. Cartledge, Civ. A. No. 6:11-cv-01472-JMC, 2012 WL 931084, at *1 (D.S.C. March 19, 2012) (). Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation. Greenspan v. Brothers Prop. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (D.S.C. 2015) (citing Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983)).
Additionally, since Petitioner is proceeding pro se, this court is charged with construing his Petition and filings liberally in order to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (). This does not mean, however, that the court can ignore a pro se party's failure to allege or prove facts that establish a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed. App'x 278, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985) ().
Petitioner is currently serving life sentence at the Lieber Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. (ECF Nos. 1 at 1; 25 at 1, 8). Petitioner filed the instant action to challenge his conviction for murder based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1 at 1, 7; 1-1 at 8-15).
In February 2010, Petitioner was indicted for murder based on the State's allegations that he had shot and killed his wife, Shantay Harris ("Shantay"). (ECF Nos. 25 at 1; 25-2 at 35-36). The case proceeded to trial on March 14, 2011, at which Petitioner was represented by attorney Guy Vitetta ("Trial Counsel"). (ECF Nos. 25 at 2; 25-1 at 3). The State presented evidence that, prior to the murder, Shantay had taken steps towards ending her marriage with Petitioner, including separating from Petitioner and taking her two sons, and scheduling an appointment with a divorce lawyer. (ECF No. 25 at 2). At the time of the murder, Shantay was living in Moncks Corner, South Carolina with her two sons, her sister, and her sister's four children, while Petitioner resided in North Carolina. Id. Shantay's sister testified that Petitioner had repeatedly called Shantay in the days leading up to the murder because he was angry that Shantay had allowed their children to staywith Petitioner's uncle while Shantay was at work. Id. On the night of the murder, Petitioner called Shantay twenty-four times between 11:37 p.m. and 12:06 a.m. Id.
Shantay's eleven-year-old son testified at trial that on the night of the murder he was asleep in his mother's room when he heard a loud sound downstairs followed by footsteps coming up the stairs and towards the bedroom. Id. at 3. He testified that Petitioner came into the room and demanded that Shantay come outside with him. Id. Shantay refused and indicated that their son was in the room with her. Id. Petitioner then threw Shantay to the ground and slapped her, at which point her son immediately rushed over to her. Id. Petitioner then picked up Shantay's phone and began to look through it. Id. Her son testified that when Petitioner found his uncle's contact information in Shantay's phone he "went berserk" and accused Shantay of having an affair with his uncle. Id. Shantay was on the floor crying and holding her son in her lap while he tried to intervene and explain to Petitioner that Shantay was working all the time. Id. Petitioner then pulled out a gun and pointed it at Shantay, who was just able to push her son out of the way before Petitioner shot her in the head. Id. Her son testified that Petitioner was "smirking" and "laughing" after shooting Shantay. Id.
Shantay's sister also testified regarding the night of the murder. Id. at 2-3. Around 5:00 a.m., she was awakened by a loud noise inside the house. Id. at 2.She looked out the window and, upon seeing Petitioner's car parked in the front yard, immediately called 911. Id. She then heard Shantay scream and rushed to Shantay's room. Id. As she approached the bedroom, Petitioner walked by with a "normal" demeanor and said, "She's gone." Id. at 3. She hurried into the bedroom and found Shantay, lying on the floor with blood pouring out of the back of her head, and Shantay's son, crying. Id. She immediately began to perform CPR on Shantay while Shantay's second son called 911. Id.
Shantay's second son, who was thirteen at the time, testified that he had been asleep in a different room when he awoke to the sound of his mother screaming. Id. at 4. He got out of bed and walked down the hall and could hear his mother screaming and Petitioner yelling "shut up." Id. He testified that when Petitioner walked out of the bedroom he appeared "happy," said "she's gone," and went downstairs. Id. When he went into the bedroom, he saw his aunt performing CPR on his mother and immediately called 911. Id.
When the paramedics arrived, Shantay had no pulse, was not breathing, and appeared ashen due to significant blood loss. Id. They pronounced her dead at the scene. Id. An autopsy confirmed that her cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the head, and a forensic pathologist estimated that, based on the stippling around the entrance wound, the weapon was fired from a distance of three feet or less. Id.
The police arrived on scene in time to witness Petitioner get into his car and leave, and he was pulled over about a quarter of a mile away from the house. Id. at 5. The officer found a .22 caliber revolver with one round missing in Petitioner's pocket, and a forensics expert later matched the gun to the bullet used to kill Shantay. Id.
After the State rested, Trial Counsel argued the facts warranted a charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 6. Specifically, Trial Counsel asserted the younger son's testimony that Petitioner "went berserk" upon seeing his uncle's contact information in Shantay's phone evidenced that Petitioner acted in the heat of passion without malice. Id. The State disagreed and argued there was no evidence Petitioner acted in the heat of passion. Id. at 6-7. The court considered the issue during an overnight recess and decided to charge voluntary manslaughter "out of an abundance of caution." Id. at 8. In addition, the court also instructed the jury that malice could be inferred from Petitioner's use of a deadly weapon. Id. Trial Counsel did not object to any of the jury instructions. The jury found Petitioner guilty of murder and he was sentenced to life in prison. Id.
Petitioner appealed both his conviction and his sentence, arguing the trial court should have...
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