Harrisburg School Dist. v. Hickok
| Decision Date | 22 May 2001 |
| Parties | HARRISBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT, Harrisburg School Board, Joseph C. Brown, Linda M. Cammack, Kenneth Lester, Judith C. Hill, Wanda R.D. Willlams, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Rauwshan Williams, Ricardo A. Davis, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Jeremiah Stephenson and Tiffany Davis, Clarice Chambers, Joy Ford, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Casel J. Ford, Susan Wilson, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Samantha Wilson, Grace Bryant, Glenise Cobb Wingfield, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Jhonatha Wingfield and Asia Wingfield, and Citizens Concerned for Children First, by Dowayne Blount and Dale Carter, Trustees Ad Litem, Appellants, v. Eugene HICKOK, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Stephen R. Reed, Mayor of Harrisburg, Jane/John Doe I, Jane/John Doe II, Jane/John Doe III, Jane/John Doe IV, Jane/John Doe V, Potential Members of the Board of Control for the Harrisburg School District, Appellees. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
AND NOW, this 22nd day of May, 2001, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
David J. Alexander, for Crystal Jones.
Timothy D. McNair, Erie, for Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association.
Joan A. Zubras, for Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.
John G. Knorr, Pittsburgh, for Corn.
Arlene O. Freiman, Philadelphia Housing Authority.
Terrance R. Henne, Colin Meneely, Pittsburgh, for Port Authority Allegheny County.
Michael I. Levin, Huntingdon Valley, for Pa. School Boards Association.
Steven E. Hoffman, Allentown, for Lehigh County Housing Authority.
Alfred W. Putnam, Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania Public Transportation Association.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and SAYLOR, JJ.
In this case, the appellee, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA"), moved for summary judgment under the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8521-8528 (the "Sovereign Immunity Act" or "Act"), asserting that it may not be held liable to the appellant, Crystal Jones ("Jones"), for the injuries she allegedly sustained when she slipped on rock salt on a SEPTA train platform and fell. Jones responded that the Act's real estate exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4), which serves to waive immunity, applies to her claim. We granted allocatur to clarify the parameters of § 8522(b)(4). We conclude that Jones' claim does not fall within the exception. Accordingly, we affirm the Commonwealth Court's order, affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of SEPTA.
On December 23, 1996, Jones was injured when she slipped and fell on a train platform at SEPTA's Fern Rock station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On May 27, 1997, Jones commenced an action in negligence against SEPTA. Jones alleged that the sole cause of her slip and fall was the rock salt that lay on the train platform, and that SEPTA was negligent in not warning the public of the salt and in failing to clear it. In its Answer and New Matter, SEPTA denied Jones' allegations of negligence, and as a Commonwealth party, raised sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense.
Ultimately, SEPTA filed a motion for summary judgment. SEPTA contended that as a matter of general rule, the Sovereign Immunity Act shields it from suit, and that Jones had no evidence to support her assertion that her claim was allowed by the Act's real estate exception found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4). SEPTA argued that § 8522(b)(4) requires proof that Jones' injuries resulted from a dangerous condition "of' the train platform itself, as opposed to the presence of a substance or an object "on" it, and that since Jones neither averred nor could show such a condition, the real estate exception did not apply. The trial court agreed, and granted SEPTA summary judgment.
Jones filed a timely appeal in the Commonwealth Court. A divided panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed in a published opinion, also finding merit in SEPTA's interpretation of the Sovereign Immunity Act's real estate exception and its characterization of Jones' position. Crystal Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. 748 A.2d 1271 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2000). Based on our opinion in Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 541 Pa. 596, 664 A.2d 1342 (1995), in which we interpreted the sidewalk exception to governmental immunity in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(7) (the "Tort Claims Act"), the majority determined that SEPTA's liability could only be premised on evidence that Jones' injuries resulted from a dangerous condition that was "of SEPTA's platform. As Jones sought to show that the dangerous condition was merely "on" the platform, the majority held that under Finn, Jones' suit necessarily failed. Jones, 748 A.2d at 1274. Further, the majority rejected Jones' contention that this court's opinions in Grieff v. Reisinger, 548 Pa. 13, 693 A.2d 195 (1997) and Kilgore v. City of Philadelphia, 553 Pa. 22, 717 A.2d 514 (1998), in which we interpreted the real estate exception in the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8642(b)(3), without referring to an "on" or "of' dichotomy, indicated that we had abdicated Finn's analysis. Jones, 748 A.2d at 1272-74. By contrast, the dissent believed that Grieff and Kilgore had overruled Finn, and that Jones' claim could proceed under Kilgore's teaching. Id. at 1274-75. This appeal followed.
Our discussion starts with the well-settled rules that govern our review. Summary judgment will be entered only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 547 Pa. 224, 690 A.2d 169, 171 (1997). Summary judgment is proper in cases in which "an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to a cause of action or defense in which a jury trial would require the issues be submitted to a jury." Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(2). We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Pennsylvania State University v. County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 615 A.2d 303, 304 (1992). Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, O'Donoghue v. Laurel Savings Ass'n, 556 Pa. 349, 728 A.2d 914, 916 (1999), and our standard of review is clear: the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 666 A.2d 245, 248 (1995).
Given the opposing positions taken in this case with regard to the immunity statutes and our prior holdings, we begin with a review of those statutes and cases.
The Sovereign Immunity Act was passed by the General Assembly in response to this court's decision in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), to abrogate the doctrine that the Commonwealth enjoys immunity from suit. In § 8521(a) of the Act, the legislature reinstated the doctrine as a general rule. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(a).1 In § 8522, however, the legislature waived the bar of suit on a limited basis. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. Subsection 8522(a) announces that immunity is waived in certain instances and authorizes the imposition of liability against the Commonwealth "for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a). Subsection 8522(b) then delineates the specific instances in which the defense of sovereign immunity may not be raised. The real estate exception that is directly before us states:
§ 8522. Exceptions to sovereign immunity
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(b) Acts which may impose liability. The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:
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(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks.-A dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks, including Commonwealth-owned real property, leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth agency and Commonwealth real property leased by a Commonwealth agency to private persons, and highways under the jurisdiction of a Commonwealth agency, except conditions described in paragraph (5).
42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4) (emphasis added).
The Tort Claims Act was also a legislative response to one of our decisions. The General Assembly enacted the Tort Claims Act when this court abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity in Ayala v. Philadelphia Ed. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). Like the Sovereign Immunity Act, the Tort Claims Act raises the bar of immunity, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, but not absolutely. Under § 8542, liability for damages on account of an injury to person or property will be imposed on a local agency if two conditions are met2 and if the injury occurred as a result of one of eight delineated acts. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542.
Two of the eight exceptions are relevant. The first is the sidewalk exception that we interpreted in Finn. It provides:
§ 8542. Exceptions to governmental immunity
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(b)Acts which may impose liability. — The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agency:
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(7) Sidewalks. — A dangerous condition of sidewalks within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the local agency, except that the claimant to...
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