Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1915 |
| Docket Number | 116. |
| Citation | 84 S.E. 519,168 N.C. 382 |
| Parties | HARRISON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Northampton County; Bond, Judge.
Action by L. A. Harrison against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. New trial.
Where the statutes and the highest court decisions of another state are the only evidence as to its law, the question is for the court and not the jury.
This is a civil action, tried upon these issues:
1. Was C. H. Harrison killed by the negligent running of the defendant's engine, as alleged in the complaint? Answer Yes.
2. Was there contributory negligence on his part? Answer: Yes.
3. After said C. H. Harrison put himself in peril, might the killing have been avoided by the exercise of proper care and prudence on the part of the defendant company's engineer? Answer: Yes.
4. What damage, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of defendant? Answer: $1,000.
W. A Townes, of Wilmington, F. S. Spruill, of Rocky Mount, and Mason, Worrell & Long, of Jackson, for appellant.
Peebles & Harris and Gay & Midyette, all of Jackson, for appellee.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff's intestate was killed by the negligence of defendant's engineer on the trestle crossing Fountain creek in the state of Virginia; that the intestate was in a helpless condition on the track crossing the said creek; that a north-bound train was approaching, and the engineer failed to keep a proper lookout, so that the engine ran against or over the intestate and killed him. The defendant denied that its train struck or killed Harrison and set up that the injury, if it occurred, was in the state of Virginia, and to be governed by the law of Virginia, and that if plaintiff's intestate was struck and killed, it was the result of his contributory negligence in trespassing upon the track of the defendant.
1. It is contended that under the laws of Virginia the complaint fails to state a cause of action in that it fails to allege that the engineer actually discovered the intestate's condition and could have prevented the injury by the exercise of due care. The complaint alleges a cause of action under the law of North Carolina, and the point that no cause of action is averred under the laws of Virginia cannot be raised by demurrer ore tenus. The law of Virginia is properly pleaded in the answer, and an issue is raised to be determined as issues of fact are determined under the practice of our courts.
2. For a similar reason, the contention that under the rulings of the courts of Virginia there is no sufficient evidence that the intestate was struck and killed by the train cannot be sustained. This fact must be determined by the rules of evidence obtaining in this state, and under our decisions there are circumstances in evidence which justified the court in submitting that disputed fact to the jury. Henderson v. Railroad, 159 N.C. 581, 75 S.E. 1092; Kyles v. Railroad, 147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278.
3. It being alleged in the complaint that the intestate was killed in the state of Virginia, and the law of that state being pleaded in bar of a recovery, it is well settled that the measure of duty the defendant owed to the intestate and the liability of the defendant for negligence must be determined according to the law of that state. Hancock v. Telegraph Co., 142 N.C. 163, 55 S.E. 82; Harrill v. Railroad, 132 N.C. 656, 44 S.E. 109.
When the law of another state is pleaded in bar of recovery, an issue of fact is raised to be determined generally by the jury. It is usual to prove the law of another state by introducing witnesses learned in the laws of that state, or their depositions. Where there is a conflict of opinion of such witnesses, it is for the jury to determine the matter as to whom they believe. But on this trial no witnesses as to the law of Virginia were introduced. By consent the decisions and opinions of the Court of Appeals, the court of last resort in the state of Virginia, were introduced in evidence and read to the court and jury. No other evidence as to the law of Virginia was introduced by either party. When the statute law of another state is material to the decision of a controversy and the statute is in evidence, it is for the court and not the jury to construe it. So when the decisions and opinions of the highest court of another state are in evidence, and constitute the only evidence, as in this case of the law of another state, it is for the court and not the jury to interpret them. Upon the same principle, where a deed or written contract is admitted in evidence, it is for the court and not the jury to construe and expound its meaning. It is manifest from the form...
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