Harrison v. Board of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 27 January 1975
• Citation: 118 Cal.Rptr. 828,44 Cal.App.3d 852
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Herbert H. HARRISON et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants and Respondents, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al., Defendants, Respondents and Appellants. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 33100.

Page 828

118 Cal.Rptr. 828

44 Cal.App.3d 852

Herbert H. HARRISON et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants and Respondents, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al., Defendants, Respondents and Appellants.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 33100.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Jan. 27, 1975.

Wilson, Jones, Morton & Lynch, and Robert G. Auwbrey, San Mateo, for defendants and appellants.

Ropers, Majeski, Kohn, Bentley & Wagner, Michael J. Brady, Daniel J. Lanahan, Redwood City, for plaintiff and respondent.

Keogh, Marer & Flicker, Palo Alto, for plaintiffs and appellants.

HAROLD C. BROWN, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment enjoining the County of San Mateo from the collection of special assessments levied against certain property owners (plaintiffs) within the East Palo Alto-Belle Haven Storm Drain Assessment District, designated as Units I and II, and ordering a refund of assessments already collected.

The storm sewer special assessment was levied by the San Mateo Board of Supervisors (defendants) under the provisions of the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913, as amended (Sts. & Hy. Code § 10000 et seq.) The amount of the assessment was calculated upon a rainfall runoff coefficient based wholly upon the zoning of the units in question. Two suits were consolidated, that of plaintiff Southern Pacific Transportation Company and a class action brought in behalf of property owners who had filed timely written protests to their individual assessments.

The trial court declared void those assessments on the real property of members of the class on the ground that there was no substantial evidence that the property would obtain a special benefit from the proposed improvements. He further ruled that an invalid method of spreading the assessment was used and that the use of a flat zoning coefficient to measure special benefit without regard to the present use of the property is invalid as a matter of law. It is concluded that the defendants' challenge of these findings is without merit.

The scope of the judgment is also attacked both by defendants and plaintiffs. The defendants argue that this is not a proper class action and that the court may only review the assessments of those people who filed written protests and also appeared to offer evidence at the hearing and must limit itself to grounds specified in the written protests. Plaintiffs argue that the judgment should declare void all assessments in the storm drain district. It is concluded that the plaintiffs' solution must be accepted for reasons of equity.

1] We first turn to a contention raised by plaintiffs that the defendants' appeal is now moot. On June 20, 1974, Judge Cohn in an action entitled The City of Menlo Park v. The County of San Mateo, No. 17479, ruled that the City of Menlo Park is entitled to withdraw from the storm drain district upon certain conditions. As defendants' attorney points out by letter, Judge Cohn's decision relates only to Unit II and requires the City of Menlo Park to pay the county approximately $500,000 as a condition of withdrawing consent. Furthermore, defendants challenge the decision on its merits. The decision thus clearly does not render the appeal moot.

There is no disagreement between the parties that the power to specially assess property to pay for public improvements is based upon existence of a special benefit to the assessed property. The Supreme Court explained the basis of this principle in Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1915), 170 Cal. 24 at page 30, 148 P. 217 at page 219: '. . . That the return to the property owner by way of benefit is, under our system of government, the basic foundation upon which this right (to specially assess) rests, becomes apparent from the consideration that if we are not able to say that the owner for the specific charge imposed is compensated by the increased value of the property, then most manifestly we have a special tax upon a minority of the property owners, which tax is for the benefit of the public and which tax is special, unequal and ununiform.

'Therefore the compensating benefit to the property owner is the warrant, and the sole warrant, for the Legislature itself to impose the burdens of the special assessments.' (See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sinclair (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 778, 29 Cal.Rptr. 769; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 637, 644, 339 P.2d 933.) The Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 under which these assessment proceedings were conducted defines the assessment district in terms of land to be benefited (Sts. & Hy.Code §§ 10008, 10204).

,3] It is also clear that only a 'special benefit' to the property assessed will justify an assessment, not merely 'general benefit' inuring to the public as a whole. (Roberts v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 7 Cal.2d 477, 491, 61 P.2d 323; Lloyd v. City of Redondo Beach (1932) 124 Cal.App. 541, 546--547, 12 P.2d 1087.) When the special benefit exists, the formula on which the assessments are made must be based on the benefit received. (Honegger v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1619 (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 684, 692, 12 Cal.Rptr. 76.)

The trial court based its holding that the assessments were void on its conclusion that there was no substantial evidence of a special benefit to the protesting property owners and, further, that the formula upon which the assessments were based was an invalid method as a matter of law. The findings are related in that the validity of the formula will of necessity depend upon just what the special benefit is. To be specific, plaintiffs argue that when the public improvement to be built is a drainage project, uphill property may not be assessed at all or, at least, at a lower rate than the lower land. The several cases cited in support of this argument, however, all involve cases where the benefit was the prevention of flooding on the assessed land. (See, e.g., Honegger v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1619, supra, 190 Cal.App.2d 684, 692, 12 Cal.Rptr. 76; Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist. (1915) 239 U.S. 478, 482--483, 36 S.Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392.) When this is the special benefit, it seems obvious that higher land might not be flooded at all or, at least, to a lesser degree than low land. However, if the water from all the properties drained into public property, such as a street, and the pooled water caused odors, mosquitos or a health problem of some nature, all property owners might well be benefited equally regardless of the elevation of their land.

In analyzing the propriety of the court's decision, it is necessary first to identify the benefit which the public improvement will render; next, to determine if the property owners will receive a benefit different from that of the general public; and, finally, to ascertain if the formula on which the assessments are made is based on the benefit received.

The benefit to be derived from the drainage system in the case at hand is the prevention of street flooding which occurs during the rainy season in certain spots of the area. There was no testimony of floodings on the private properties themselves and much testimony from people who claimed there was no excess water problem at all in their immediate vicinity even in the streets.

,5] The theory on which the benefit was presented at the administrative hearings was that the general area would benefit by relief of the traffic problems and that those who contribute to the problem should contribute to the solution. It is concluded in agreement with the trial court that this is not a showing of a special benefit to the assessed property. The facilitation of traffic is of general benefit to the community and, thus, if repair and maintenance expenses alone are involved, these are not charged to abutting property owners. (See Roberts v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 7 Cal.2d 477, 491, 61 P.2d 323.) The fact that the traffic problems are seen as caused, not by the rain, but by the property from which the rainwaters drain, is not a basis for levying a special assessment according to the special benefit rule. It is possible, of course, that property abutting a street with a flooding problem would receive a special benefit from draining, for example, in facilitation of ingress and egress from the property or parking. Appellants point to no evidence of such special benefits, and if they exist, they would hardly warrant assessment of all properties in the area regardless of whether they were benefited.

'6] It is possible that it will suffice if, from the nature of the work, the property can be Presumed to have received an especial benefit.' (Federal Construction Co. v. Ensign (1922) 59 Cal.App. 200, 210, 210 P. 536, 540.) It is this type of presumption upon which respondents relied in assuming that the property values of all land would rise because of the drainage of the area. This assumes two things--first, that property values will go up and, second, that increase in property values is the type of benefit which alone will warrant special assessments. If increase in property value alone would amount to a 'special benefit,' then payment of ordinary road maintenance and repair could be upheld on that basis, reasoning that increase in value can be assumed for property which abuts a well-maintained road. This is too tenuous a connection, particularly in the absence of any cost-benefit analysis or evidence. Even more tenuous is the assumption that all property will increase in value regardless of its location in the assessment district. For example, the question arises whether property on high ground several blocks from any streets which flood in the rainy season will enjoy an increase in market value because the distant street was drained. Obviously, a point will be reached where no increase may be assumed. Defendants,...