Harrison v. Broadway Motor Co.

• Citation: 128 Miss. 766,91 So. 453
• Decision Date: 08 May 1922
• Docket Number: 22549
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Parties: HARRISON v. BROADWAY MOTOR CO

91 So. 453

128 Miss. 766

HARRISON v. BROADWAY MOTOR CO

No. 22549

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 8, 1922

SALES. Seller of automobile in another state may recover possession in this state as against innocent purchaser for value without notice; doctrine of caveat emptor applies.

A Tennessee seller of an automobile with retained title may recover possession of the car in this state as against a subsequent innocent purchaser for value without notice except where seller authorizes, express or implied, a resale of car by vendee; caveat emptor applies.

HON. C P. LONG, Judge.

Appeal from circuit court of Itawamba county, HON. C. P. LONG Judge.

Suit by the Broadway Motor Company against C. C. Harrison. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

I. L Sheffield and I. L. & J. E. Rankin, for appellant.

It seems to me that the case at bar falls within the doctrine announced by our court in the case of Columbus Buggy Co. v. Turley, 73 Miss. 529; the car was bought by Karo-Holmes Motor Co. to be resold; hence the subsequent owners thereof who bought without notice and for value received, should be and are protected from any and all claims of previous sellers. It is true that the contract in the case at bar did not permit expressly the first purchaser, C. E. Mooney, to sell the car but the law is that where goods are bought to be resold, as Karo-Holmes must have thought, it would be an imposition upon the public to permit some remote vendor to recover the same by having an unrecorded retain-title note as the Broadway Motor Co. had in this case. Burdick on Sales (2 Ed.), pages 187 to 189. Also 1 Benjamin on Sales, sections 448, 449, 4th Am. Ed. Each of the authorities also holds that a party intrusted with the possession of goods and the indicia of ownership or of authority to sell or otherwise dispose of them, in violation of his duty to the owner, sells to an innocent purchaser, the sale will prevail against the right of the owner. See in support, also 58 Ala. 165.

The first sellers, appellants, made the sale to C. E. Mooney in Nashville, Tenn., and took a retain-title note for the balance due on the purchase price. The car was owned by other parties in Tennessee and finally came into the hands of an automobile dealer in Memphis in Tennessee and then it crossed the state line. Our courts have held in a number of cases where cotton was shipped by boat from this state to points in other states, that all liens, though valid in this state and of record where necessary, ceased when the property crossed the state line. 75 Miss. 150; 70 Miss. 649 and 587. No extra-territorial effect was given our statute, and for the same reason it seems that no effect should be given the statute of Tennessee, especially after the property has passed through the hands of a dealer in that commodity.

It seems to me also that the party who made it possible for injury to result to the public by placing this man, Mooney, in the possession of the car, thereby giving him the indicia of ownership in case of damage or injury, should be the party to suffer. He made it possible for Mooney to perpetrate the fraud, I think.

It would seem that in the interest of the commercial world a man who buys goods which have been delivered to and sold by a dealer in that specific thing, that man so buying should be protected. Otherwise a man will never know when he will be protected, and the commercial world will suffer as a result.

I think the judgment should be reversed and judgment rendered for appellant, C. C. Harrison.

Paul D. P. Spearman, for appellee.

Appellant insists that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed in keeping with the ruling in Columbus Buggy Co. v. Turley et al., 75 Miss. 529, but appellee is convinced that this holding is not the law which is to govern this case. In this ruling the court had under consideration the retention of title where the goods were sold with the express intention that they were to be resold. Appellee did not sell the car in question in this suit for resale, therefore the case of Columbus Buggy Co. v. Turley, et al., supra, cannot be authority for a reversal of the judgment of the court below. It seems that this ruling from its construction and the logical reasoning from a final conclusion is reached as authority for an affirmation of the instant case, since from implication it is readily seen that the court held as it did purely and simply because the goods were sold for resale, which question does not arise in this suit.

Appellant cites authority that extra-territorial effect is not given in regard to liens. This, appellee admits is the law. We, however, are dealing with something that is much more than a lien on property in this appeal. There can be no comparison as between a lien on property and the title in and to same. Title is paramount and far superior to a lien. The supreme court of Alabama said in Cable Piano Co. v. Estes, 89 So. 372; "Reservation of title in the seller is more than a lien and prevents title vesting in the purchaser till purchase price is paid in full." This rule is the law of this state and is applicable to the appeal herein.

It is well settled and never disputed that no one can convey a greater or better title than he possesses. This being true, the logical and only way of arriving at appellant's contention is to say, appellee never parted with title to C. E. Mooney; Mooney having no title vested in him, could not convey title to Karo-Holmes Co., and they for the same reason could not and did not convey title to Calloway Wilson. This is not only supported by reasoning, but also by the conditional sales law of Tennessee, since all these transactions occurred in that state. Did Calloway Wilson, who had no title in Tennessee, have title vested in him by removing the car into this state? Appellee is convinced that an unlawful act will not give title as this removal is in direct violation of the law of Tennessee Shannon's Tenn. Code, section 3670a2, and the supreme court of Tennessee has even gone farther than this in holding that fraudulent intent is not even an element of the offense, but the simple removal constitutes the offense, putting the burden on one removing to investigate the question of retained title. See Papas v. State, 8 Thompson (Tenn.) 409.

Whether Wilson had actual or constructive notice of the retention of title or not, he was guilty of violating the penal code of the state of...