Harrison v. Cachelin

• Decision Date: 31 March 1856
• Citation: 23 Mo. 117
• Parties: HARRISON, Appellant, v. CACHELIN et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

23 Mo. 117

HARRISON, Appellant,

v.CACHELIN et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1856.

1. Adverse possession, to constitute a bar under the statute of limitations, must be uninterrupted.

2. The Supreme Court will reverse judgments of the lower courts and award new trials, without regard to the number of new trials previously granted, wherever erroneous instructions have been given to the jury.

3. A., by mistake, conveyed to B. whiteacre instead of blackacre; held, that a bona fide purchaser for value, from B., without notice of the mistake, would acquire a good title as against A. and those claiming under him. A purchaser, without notice of the mistake, at a sheriff's sale on execution under a judgment against B., would be protected under this rule.

Appeal from St. Louis Land Court.

This was an action in the nature of an action of ejectment, commenced in the St. Louis Land Court, on the 30th day of January, 1854, for the possession of the south-west quarter of block No. 18, in Eiler's survey of the former town (now city) of Carondelet, against Constant Cachelin, a tenant of the other defendants. After the commencement of the suit, the other defendants, on their own motion, were made parties.

The defendants, in their answer, deny the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the property; and state that they, and those under whom they claim, were in the adverse possession of the premises for twenty years prior to the commencement of the suit; that on the 2d day of June, 1834, the board of trustees of the town (now city) of Carondelet, claiming to own the legal title to said premises, did, by ordinance of that date, passed by authority of an act of the legislature, approved February 13th, 1833, ordain, “that every person who shall have been in possession of any lot in said town, and shall have cultivated the same, being an inhabitant, and having so been possessed prior to 1832, shall be entitled to a deed in fee simple for the same;” said ordinance making it the duty of the chairman of said board to execute such deed as the respective claimants should be entitled to; that the defendants, Leon Levy and Nicholas Levy, and those under whom they claim, were included in the provisions of said ordinance; that on the 4th day of May, 1835, the board, by their chairman, did execute to William Carr Lane a deed, purporting to convey to him, among other property, the premises set out in the petition, which, at the time of such conveyance, the defendants charge were the property of the defendants, and those under whom they claim, and for which the defendants were then entitled to a deed by virtue of said ordinance; that on the 22d of August, 1840, the board, by resolution of that date, after reciting that “in 1835 the board of trustees deeded to said Lane the property aforesaid, and that it now appeared that one Leon Levy was entitled to the same property by right of settlement, and that in consequence of the claim of the representatives of said Levy, the said Lane had offered to reconvey said property to said town,” authorized the chairman to make a deed to said Lane for the north-east quarter of block lettered C, in exchange for said property; that in pursuance of this resolution, the chairman, on the 22d day of January, 1841, did convey to said Lane the said north-east quarter of block lettered C, and in exchange for the property set up in plaintiff's petition; that on the 22d day of April, 1841, said Lane, in pursuance of the resolution, did convey to the said town (now city) the north-west quarter of block 18, which adjoins the premises sued for; that the property intended to be conveyed in said last mentioned deed by Lane, was and is the south-west quarter of the block, being the premises sued for; that the description of said north-west quarter, in said deed, was and is a mistake, and was intended to describe the said south-west quarter mentioned in the petition; that the plaintiff had notice of the aforesaid facts before and at the time he acquired any title or claim to the same; that on the 2d day of March, 1854, the city of Carondelet, in pursuance of an ordinance, approved February 15th, 1854, did convey, by quit claim deed, all of the right and title of said city in the premises described in the petition, to Leon Levy and Nicholas Levy, two of the defendants, and that the title to said premises is in the said Leon Levy and Nicholas Levy.

On trial, it was admitted by the parties that the premises in controversy are a part of the common of Carondelet, confirmed by the act of congress of the 13th of June, 1812; and that the defendants were in possession of the premises in controversy at the time of the commencement of this suit, and still are in the possession of the same.

The plaintiff then read in evidence a deed from the corporate authorities of the former town of Carondelet, to William Carr Lane, dated May 4th, 1835, and recorded January 20th, 1836, conveying to said Lane the premises in controversy.

The plaintiff then read in evidence a transcript of the record containing the judgment, execution, return thereon, and proceedings, of the Circuit Court of St. Louis county, in a case wherein Charles Ames was plaintiff, and William Carr Lane was defendant. The judgment is dated November 3d, 1844, and the execution is dated November 13th, 1849. The plaintiff then read in evidence a deed for the premises in controversy from William Carr Lane, by the sheriff of St. Louis county, to the plaintiff, dated December 13th, 1849, and recorded December 21st, 1849. This last deed was by virtue of a sale under said execution, which took place on the 12th day of December, 1849.

It was admitted by the parties that the former town of Carondelet was incorporated by the county court of St. Louis county, on the 2d day of August, 1832, and that the legislature did, on the 13th day of February, 1833, pass a law authorizing the corporate authorities of said town to sell the premises in question among other real estate therein named. The plaintiff only claimed nominal damages, and here rested his case.

The defendants then proposed evidence to sustain that part of the answer which relates to the alleged mistakes in conveying the premises in controversy to said Lane, and the plaintiffs objected to the introduction of any evidence of the kind proposed by the defendants as aforesaid; which objection was overruled; exceptions were duly taken by the plaintiff.

William Carr Lane was then called by the defendants as a witness, who says: “I bought at the first sale of Carondelet commons, a lot outside of the limits of the town--three quarters of block 18; ground selected for me by Eiler. I bought a large amount; some time afterwards the town notified me that they had conveyed to me one-fourth of a block that belonged to some one else. I said there would be no difficulty; a deed was sent to me. I bought north-west, south-east and south-west quarters of block 18. I do not recollect what was the description of the quarter they said they had conveyed to me by mistake; they stated that it belonged to some one besides myself. I do not recollect who it was. They may have stated which quarter, but I do not remember which it was. I do not remember whether I saw any member of the board. It was a written communication, and I answered it. They then sent a deed for the quarter in block C, in exchange for what I conveyed. I executed the deed they sent, without seeing whether it corresponded or not. I do not know from whom I received it; but it was sent by authority of Carondelet.” The plaintiff objected to the admission of this testimony; the objection was overruled. Plaintiff duly excepted.

The defendants then read in evidence the various ordinances, resolutions, deeds, conveyances and other instruments referred to in their answer, which were all objected to by the plaintiff, and the objection overruled by the court, and the decision of the court excepted to by the plaintiff. The deed from William Carr Lane, (conveying the north-west quarter of block 18,) dated April 22d, 1841, to the town--or rather to Joseph Le Blond, chairman--was not recorded until March 11th, 1852; the deed from the town to Lane, dated January 2d, 1841, was recorded December 15th, 1849; the deed from Carondelet to Leon Levy and Nicholas Levy, of March 4th, 1854, was recorded on the same day.

The defendants then introduced evidence tending to show that the premises had been in their possession, and those under whom they claim, from about the year 1832 to the year 1844, (excepting a few short intervals,) and also tending to show that there was once a house on the lot, but it fell to pieces and was carried away before 1844; and the flood of 1844 washed away all of the fences and other improvements; and no one ever made any improvements on, or took possession of the lot, until some time in the year 1851, when a small house was erected on the lot, and Constant Cachelin occupied it as tenant for the Levy family; but that the lot was usually called the Levy lot, in the neighborhood, and the Levy family always said it was their lot.

The defendants then read in evidence a deed from one Simon Busha and wife, to Leon Levy, sr., dated April 7th, 1837, and recorded April 29th, 1837, conveying to Levy said lot. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of this deed; the objection was overruled; plaintiffs duly excepted.

The court gave the following instructions:

“1. Unless the defendants show a deed to their property executed by the city of Carondelet, for the piece of land sued for, he has no paper title that can avail him as against the plaintiff.”

“2. If the jury believe from the evidence in this cause, that the deed offered in evidence by the plaintiff, dated the 4th day of May, 1835, and purporting to have been executed by Peter J....