Harrison v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kash
| Citation | 305 Ky. 379 |
| Parties | Harrison v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kash. |
| Decision Date | 26 September 1947 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Attorney and Client. — It is immaterial who raises the question of an attorney's qualifications once the machinery of investigation is set in motion, since the court itself has the power to institute the investigation and it is the court and not the complainant that controls the course of disciplinary proceedings. Civil Code of Practice, sec. 484.
2. Attorney and Client. — Bill of information charging that law license held by respondent was a forgery, that it was forged by him, and that he was actively engaged in the practice of law without having been legally admitted to practice, was sufficient
to call the matter to the court's attention, since the proceeding was not an adversary proceeding but an inquiry into the qualifications of the respondent to continue the practice of law.
3. Attorney and Client. — Where the charge was that law license held by respondent was a forgery and was forged by him, the statute of limitations that if any license is procured by fraud the Court of Appeals may revoke it at any time within two years of the date it was issued, did not apply. KRS 1944, 30.080.
4. Attorney and Client. — An attorney is an officer of the court which has inherent power to investigate and punish a member of the bar who has been found guilty of unprofessional conduct meriting censure, suspension, or disbarment, and there can be no limitation on such power and duty of the court.
5. Attorney and Client. — Evidence supported finding that license to practice law was forged, and judgment disbarring respondent from practice of law was proper.
Appeal from Owsley Circuit Court.
Shumate and Shumate for appellant.
W.L. Kash, S.H. Rice, J.R. Llewellyn and Hector Johnson for appellee.
Before E.B. Beatty, Judge.
Affirming.
This appeal is from a judgment disbarring Allen Harrison from the practice of law. The proceeding was instituted in the circuit court by a bill of information filed by the Commonwealth's Attorney. Special and general demurrers to the bill were overruled following which an answer was filed which traversed the allegations of the bill and pleaded the statute of limitations.
For reversal of the judgment it is contended:
1. The special demurrer should have been sustained.
2. The general demurrer should have been sustained.
3. Incompetent evidence was admitted.
4. The judgment was contrary to law and the evidence.
1. The basis for the special demurrer is that under section 484 of the Civil Code of Practice the Commonwealth's Attorney may only institute actions in the nature of quo warranto proceedings which govern the right of county officials to hold office, and all other such proceedings, including this one, must be instituted by the Attorney General. Obviously there is no merit in this contention because, as we said in the case of In re Gilbert, 274 Ky. 187, 118 S.W. 2d 535, it is immaterial who raises the question as to an attorney's qualifications once the machinery of investigation is set in motion. The court itself had the power to institute the investigation, and courts have done so on more than one occasion. It is the court, and not the complainant, that controls the course of the proceeding once it has commenced.
2. It is argued that the bill of information does not charge that Harrison was not admitted to the practice of law. The bill charges that the law license held by Harrison is a forgery, was forged by him, and that he is actively engaged in the practice of law without having been legally admitted to the practice. Certainly this is sufficient to call the court's attention to the charge. Actually this is not an adversary proceeding, but is an inquiry into the qualifications of Harrison to continue the practice of law. In re Gilbert, supra, and the authorities therein cited.
3. It is claimed that none of the testimony in the record is material to the issue because of the plea of the statute of limitations. KRS 30.080, which was repealed by the legislature, Acts 1946, chapter 207, section 4, provided that if any license is procured by fraud, the Court of Appeals may revoke it at any time within two years of the date it was issued. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to merely point out that the charge here is that the license was forged. If this be true there was never any license to be revoked, and the argument of appellant is therefore untenable. However, since an attorney is an officer of the court, the court has the inherent power to investigate and punish a member of the bar who has been found to be guilty of unprofessional conduct meriting censure, suspension or disbarment. There can be no limitation on this right and duty of the courts.
4. Harrison testified that he was admitted to the practice of law following an examination in the Owsley Circuit Court in March 1918, and that he was examined on that occasion by E.E. Hogg, H.C. Eversole, members of that bar, and J.C. Eversole who was then judge of that court. He said that following this examination he received a certificate showing that he was duly licensed to practice law and that the certificate was signed by John C. Eversole, E.E. Hogg, and H.C. Eversole.
Apparently Harrison was only seventeen or eighteen years old in 1918, but he said he procured a certificate from the County Judge of Jackson County stating that he was twenty-one years old, which certificate was dated March 17, 1918. He did not engage in the practice of law until some time after 1930, unless, as he says, he practiced for a short period in 1926. He enrolled as a student in the Law Department of LaSalle Extension University in 1927, and was issued a certificate by that organization in 1930. He has held public office, having been elected justice of the peace and tax commissioner of Jackson County, and since 1933 or 1934 has actively engaged in the practice of law at McKee, where he has built up a substantial practice. He claims that this proceeding was instituted because of his connection with a local political faction, and as a direct result of the personal animosity between him and Hector Johnson, who is also an attorney at McKee and who appears to be the main witness and moving force behind the present proceeding.
There is ample evidence to show that there is a political fight between two factions over the election of the councilmen of McKee, with Harrison participating on one side and Johnson on the other. There is also evidence to indicate the hostility of Johnson and many of the other witnesses who testified against Harrison. Much of the evidence in the record was produced for the purpose of showing that this situation existed, and the reasons for...
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