Harrison v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | M2020-01140-COA-R3-CV |
| Citation | 643 S.W.3d 376 |
| Parties | Pamela Estelle HARRISON et al. v. Shannon Nicole HARRISON |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
B. Nathan Hunt and Cole Prescott Corder, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joseph Bryan Compton.
Katie Bell Klinghard, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shannon Nicole Harrison.
Gregory D. Smith and Crystal Dawn Wilkerson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Pamela Estelle Harrison.
This case involves a same-sex divorce and the resultant child custody issues regarding two children born during the marriage through artificial insemination. The sperm donor intervened in the divorce proceeding requesting the court establish him as the children's legal father and award him parenting time. The trial court denied his request to be named the children's legal father based on its interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-306, Tennessee's artificial insemination statute. The sperm donor appeals, challenging the court's refusal to name him as a parent or award him visitation. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
Pamela Estelle Harrison and Shannon Nicole Hickman were married on February 25, 2011.1 Shannon took Pamela's last name of Harrison.2 The women were married in Iowa, because Tennessee did not recognize same-sex unions at the time of their marriage. Pamela had a son from a prior relationship, but the couple wished to have children of their own, so Shannon conceived via artificial insemination. Specifically, Joseph Compton provided semen in a urine specimen cup, with which Shannon was inseminated. Pamela and Shannon were acquainted with Mr. Compton because he was Pamela's son's football coach. Mr. Compton was married at the time of the artificial inseminations.
Two children were conceived through Shannon's artificial inseminations—a daughter Chevelle Harrison (born in Tennessee in March 2014) and a daughter Stacei Harrison (also born in Tennessee in October 2015). Pamela's name was not included on Chevelle's birth certificate; however, Pamela's name was included on Stacei's birth certificate.3 The children call Pamela "Mommy," and they call Shannon "Mama." After the children were born, Mr. Compton did not take on the role of father in any way.
Pamela filed for divorce on January 24, 2018 in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on the ground of irreconcilable differences. She also requested that her name be added to Chevelle's birth certificate. On February 2, 2018, Shannon answered and filed a counter-complaint for divorce requesting that Pamela's name be removed from Stacei's birth certificate. Shannon denied that Pamela "has any parental rights to the children" because she is not their biological parent. Pamela filed a motion for a temporary parenting plan on February 16, 2018 and answered Shannon's counter-complaint for divorce on February 20, 2018.
On March 21, 2018, Shannon filed a brief in the trial court asserting that Pamela did not have parental rights to the children because she had not taken the necessary steps to adopt them. She further argued that Tennessee's artificial insemination statute did not govern the case. On March 23, 2018, Shannon filed an affidavit signed by Mr. Compton stating, in relevant part:
On January 25, 2019, Mr. Compton filed a motion to intervene in the Montgomery County Circuit Court "for the purpose of protecting his rights regarding the minor children." Attached to his motion was an order entered by the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County on January 18, 2019, establishing Mr. Compton as the biological parent of Chevelle and Stacei.4 On January 29, 2019, Pamela filed 1) a response to the motion to intervene requesting an ex parte restraining order and 2) a motion for injunctive relief. In both motions, Pamela urged the circuit court to enjoin Shannon from allowing the children to visit Mr. Compton, who she asserted was "nothing more than a sperm donor." On January 31, 2019, Mr. Compton filed a response to Pamela's motion for injunctive relief and a response to Pamela's request for an ex-parte restraining order requesting the court to enter an order establishing him as the legal father of the children and to grant him parenting time. On February 22, 2019, the circuit court entered an Order granting Pamela visitation with the children. The court refused to order visitation with Mr. Compton; however, Shannon was allowed to "give [Mr. Compton] time with the minor children, just as she could a grandparent or babysitter during her time." By order entered February 26, 2019, the trial court allowed Mr. Compton to intervene as a party to the divorce proceeding.
Following a hearing on March 5, 2019, the trial court entered an order on March 13, 2019, providing visitation for Pamela and setting the case for "[a] review hearing for argument of the case law" on "March 15, 201[9]." On May 24, 2019 the circuit court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order stating:
This cause came to be heard upon the Complaint for Absolute Divorce , filed by Pamela Estelle Harrison on January 24, 2018. Based on the testimony of the parties as well as Sheri Scott, Pamela Harrison's Mother, and Bobbi Hickman, Shannon Harrison's Mother and arguments of counsel and briefs provided by both counsel and argument and brief provided by intervening petitioner, Joseph Bryan Compton the Court finds as follows ...
The court then made thirty numbered findings of fact including the following:
The court ultimately held:
Tennessee's artificial insemination statute as written applies to the parties and that the evidence shows that the parties intended to artificially inseminate Ms. Shannon Harrison and raise the children as a family. The Court finds that Mr. Compton was merely a sperm donor in the process with no intent to be a legal parent.
The record contains no transcript from the hearing and no statement of the evidence.
The trial court entered a second amended order on August 25, 2020 stating that it held a hearing on September 9, 2019, at which it considered "argument of counsel ... testimony of the parties and witnesses[,] ... exhibits submitted into evidence and the entire record." The court awarded an absolute divorce to Shannon and Pamela on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. When determining parenting time, the court considered the best interest factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 and designated Shannon as the primary residential parent with 233 days of parenting time per year, and provided Pamela with 132 days of parenting time per year. The court reiterated that Mr. Compton is "not the legal father of the children ... and has no right to visitation with said children."
Only Mr. Compton appeals, asserting that Tennessee's artificial insemination statute does not apply in this case and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-301(5) applies to establish him as the children's legal parent.5 He also asserts the juvenile court was the more appropriate court to examine the case.
The resolution of this case depends on the proper construction of Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306. "Construction of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo , with no presumption of correctness." Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Roseman v. Roseman , 890 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1994) ); see also Larsen-Ball v. Ball , 301 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tenn. 2010). Regarding our role in construing statutes, our Supreme Court has instructed as follows:
When interpreting statutes, our primary function is to carry out legislative intent without broadening the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc. , 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). When a statute is clear, courts simply apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson , 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). "When a statute is ambiguous, however, we may reference the...
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