Harrison v. Prince William County Police Dept.
| Decision Date | 10 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:08cv677 (JCC).,1:08cv677 (JCC). |
| Citation | 640 F.Supp.2d 688 |
| Parties | Robert HARRISON, Plaintiff, v. PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
John Gordon Humphrey, The Humphrey Law Firm, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.
M. Alice Rowan, Prince William, VA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Two matters related to Defendants' motion are also before the Court: first, Defendants' motion to exceed the page limit for their reply brief, and second, Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) request in support of its opposition to Defendants' alternative motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to exceed the page limit, grant Plaintiff's request to construe Defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss, and grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.
This case arises out of an alleged instance of police brutality. The plaintiff, Robert Harrison ("Plaintiff"), an African-American male, claims that the police unreasonably seized him and used excessive force to restrain him. The use of excessive force and subsequent denial of medical care, he claims, led to a seizure requiring emergency medical treatment. He further alleges that various members of the police department conspired to cover up the constitutional violations he suffered.
On July 1, 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the "Complaint") against the Prince William County Police Department (the "PWCPD"), Charlie Deane, the Chief of the PWCPD ("Chief Deane"), officers John Mora ("Officer Mora") and Michael Sullivan ("Officer Sullivan"), and ten unidentified John Doe defendants, all PWCPD officers. The Complaint contains eight claims for constitutional violations and related torts under federal civil rights law (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988) and Virginia common law. The allegations in the Complaint are as follows.
On the evening of October 4, 2005, Plaintiff and Marquis Christopher ("Christopher") were on their way to Plaintiff's apartment in Woodbridge, Virginia. Christopher drove, and Plaintiff rode in the passenger seat. The PWCPD had recently executed an arrest warrant at an apartment close to Plaintiff's dwelling and had blocked the road. Christopher stopped and asked a female police officer in plain clothes who was standing nearby if he and Plaintiff could proceed. The officer, Detective Jennifer Evans, identified herself and showed her badge. Officer Mora then approached the vehicle, asked Detective Evans what had happened, and began to yell at Plaintiff and Christopher. Plaintiff did not respond; Christopher drove them into the apartment complex's parking lot.
At this point, Officer Mora moved toward the vehicle and called for assistance. He then opened the passenger door, grabbed Plaintiff's arm, pulled him out of the car, and threw him against it. Officer Mora refused to answer Plaintiff's repeated questions about why he was being arrested. Two other officers—John Doe One and John Doe Two—arrived. They picked Plaintiff up bodily while Officer Mora put him into a headlock. Officer Mora then dropped to the ground, causing Plaintiff's head to hit the pavement. Officer Mora ground Plaintiff's head into the pavement and told him that he "would learn to shut his mouth, warned [Plaintiff] that if [he] ever saw the female officer again he should not ever say anything to her," and then punctuated the warning by calling Plaintiff a "fucking nigger." Compl. at ¶ 14.
One of the officers who had tackled Plaintiff told other police officers standing nearby to arrest Christopher as well. They did so; they did not respond to Christopher's questions about what crime he had committed. The police officers, including Officer Mora and John Does Three, Four, and Five, then conferred about what charges to bring against Plaintiff and Christopher. During this meeting, Officer Mora repeated the slur that he had used earlier against Plaintiff. The group decided to charge Plaintiff with "swear and abuse" and both Plaintiff and Christopher with disorderly conduct.1 Id. at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff noticed that he was seeing double and asked Officer Mora for medical attention. The police officers at the scene, including Officer Mora and John Does One and Two, refused to provide Plaintiff with medical care. The officer who drove Plaintiff to the PWCPD's Garfield substation in Woodbridge told him that he would be treated at the substation. Once there, Plaintiff again requested medical care. While completing his intake paperwork, John Doe Six responded to Plaintiff's request for medical attention by telling him to wash his face. This same John Doe defendant attempted to hide papers related to Plaintiff's receipt of medical care from Plaintiff.
Plaintiff and Christopher posted bail and then went to the house of Christopher's mother early in the morning of October 5th. Shortly after arriving, Plaintiff collapsed and began to have a seizure. His girlfriend called 911 twice, each time telling the operator that Plaintiff was unconscious and had been beaten by the police earlier that day. Approximately nine minutes after he began to experience the seizure, PWCPD officers John Does Seven, Eight, and Nine arrived. John Doe Seven began interrogating Plaintiff, asking him whether he had been drinking or using drugs. Plaintiff could not respond.
About one minute later, an ambulance arrived. Other emergency medical units pulled up shortly thereafter. Police officers told emergency medical personnel not to enter the house because it was not secure. About eight minutes after that, medical personnel were allowed to enter the house and take Plaintiff to the hospital by ambulance. One PWCPD officer, John Doe Ten, told one of the individuals accompanying Plaintiff not to "act all ghetto" at the hospital. Id. at ¶ 32. After Plaintiff's family and friends arrived, PWCPD officers prevented them from entering the hospital. Officer Sullivan went into Plaintiff's hospital room and began asking him about what had happened. His questions were focused on finding an explanation for Plaintiff's collapse other than the alleged police brutality.
The Complaint contains eight claims: (I) racially-motivated false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, against Officer Mora; (II) racially-motivated illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, against Officer Mora; (III) racially-motivated use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, against Officer Mora, John Doe One, and John Doe Two; (IV) deliberate denial of medical care, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, against all Defendants; (V) conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's civil rights, against all Defendants; (VI) equal protection violations, against all Defendants; (VII) racially-motivated assault and battery, against Officer Mora, John Doe One, and John Doe Two; and (VIII) racially-motivated intentional infliction of emotional distress, against all Defendants. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages, injunctive relief, costs, attorney's fees, and expenses.
On November 17th, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Defendants included medical records and an affidavit by one of the police officers involved in the contested incidents. Plaintiff then filed an opposition to the motions, supported by his affidavit. Defendants submitted a reply brief and additional exhibits.
As noted above, two other motions are germane to Defendants' alternative motion for dismissal or summary judgment. First, Defendants submitted with their reply brief a motion to exceed the page limit for such briefs; Plaintiff did not oppose this motion. Second, Plaintiff filed a request, pursuant to Rule 56(f), that the Court either refuse to construe Defendants' alternative motion as a motion for summary judgment or grant a continuance to allow Plaintiff to conduct appropriate discovery in order to respond to the summary judgment motion. Defendants opposed the Rule 56(f) request. These Motions are before the Court.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, see Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1994) (citation omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, "the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted." Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969) (citation omitted). Moreover, "the complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff." Id. A motion to dismiss must be assessed in light of Rule 8's liberal pleading standards, which require only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. While Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations," a plaintiff must still provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted).
Where "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court," a 12(b)(6) motion may be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). In such an instance, the court is required to give all parties "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); see also Plante v. Shivar, 540 F.2d 1233, 1235 (4th Cir.1976). According to the Fourth Circuit, "reasonable opportunity includes...
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...evidence that each member of the alleged conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective.’ " Harrison v. Prince William Cty. Police Dep't , 640 F. Supp. 2d 688, 707 (E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting Hinkle , 81 F.3d at 421 ). As such, conclusory allegations of a conspiracy will not suffice. Smal......
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