Harrison v. State Bd. Of Educ.

• Citation: 134 N.J.L. 502,48 A.2d 579
• Decision Date: 31 July 1946
• Docket Number: No. 244.,244.
• Parties: HARRISON v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

134 N.J.L. 502

48 A.2d 579

HARRISON

v.STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.

No. 244.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 31, 1946.

Certiorari proceeding by Eunice S. Harrison against the State Board of Education of the State of New Jersey and others, to review a judgment of the State Board of Education affirming the judgment of the local Board of Education of the Vocational Schools of Middlesex County, dismissing Eunice S. Harrison as principal of the Girls' Vocational School at Woodbridge.

Judgment of State Board of Education affirmed.

Before DONGES, HEHER and COLIE, JJ.

Harry V. Osborne, of Newark, for prosecutrix.

William F. McCloskey, of New Brunswick (David T. Wilentz, of Perth Amboy, of counsel), for defendants.

HEHER, Justice.

Prosecutrix complains of her dismissal as principal of the Girls Vocational School at Woodbridge. After a hearing upon written charges of misconduct, the defendant Board of Education of Vocational Schools of Middlesex County found her ‘guilty of acts of insubordination, of conduct unbecoming a principal and a teacher and of exceeding her authority as principal’ of the named school.

The charges, thirty-four in number, fall into three general categories, viz: insubordination; conduct unbecoming a principal; and conduct in excess of authority.

The State Commissioner of Education reversed the judgment. He found that ‘some’ of the charges ‘are so trivial’ as not to warrant the order of dismissal, even though well-founded in fact; that ‘other charges' are not sustained by the evidence, ‘and still other charges are not supported by sufficient evidence,’ and there was not ‘a rational and reasonable basis for appellant's dismissal.’ The State Board of Education took a different view. It determined that, while ‘some of the charges are trivial and by themselves of little moment,’ there was a series of acts of insubordination and conduct ‘subversive of the discipline and morale of the school system’ which constituted a sufficient basis for the judgment of dismissal.

Prosecutrix is removable from her position only for good and sufficient cause, and after a hearing upon written charges. She has the tenure of office prescribed by R.S. 18:13-16 et seq., N.J.S.A. This by virtue of Chap. 150 of the Laws of 1941. Pamph.L. p. 494, N.J.S.A. 18:15-58.1.

Citing Martin v. Smith, 100 N.J.L. 50, 125 A. 142, the State Board seems to have considered the inquiry to be whether the finding of guilt has substantial support in the evidence. Such was the rule followed in Redcay v. State Board of Education, 130 N.J.L. 369, 33 A.2d 120, affirmed 131 N.J.L. 326, 36 A.2d 428. But prosecutrix held what would seem to be a county position; and under R.S. 2:81-8, N.J.S.A., this court is under a duty to weigh the evidence, and make its own independent determination of the facts, where certiorari issues to review the dismissal ‘of a person holding an office or position, state, county or municipal, from which he is removable only for cause and after trial, * * *.’ Of course, where, as here, the factual review is upon the record, we must perforce consider the distinct advantage had by the trial...