Harriss v. State

• Decision Date: 29 April 1895
• Citation: 72 Miss. 960,18 So. 387
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: R. N. HARRIS, SHERIFF, v. STATE, EX REL., ETC

18 So. 387

72 Miss. 960

R. N. HARRIS, SHERIFF, v. STATE, EX REL., ETC

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 29, 1895

FROM the circuit court of the second district of Coahoma county HON. R. W. WILLIAMSON, Judge.

Mandamus to compel appellant, the sheriff of Coahoma county, to issue to one Dolan a license to retail intoxicating liquors. The sole question presented is as to the validity of a local option election, held in said county in July, 1893, resulting against the sale, and which election, relator contends, was void, because the petition therefor was considered, and the order for such election was passed, by the board of supervisors at a meeting held at the office of the chancery clerk at Friar's Point, which office is in a building separate and apart from the courthouse.

The county of Coahoma was the owner of a lot in Friar's Point, held and owned for courthouse purposes, and on this lot had constructed a courthouse, without offices therein for any of the county officers. It had also constructed on the lot a jail building, in which was situated the offices of the sheriff, circuit clerk and chancery clerk, and this building was used until its destruction by fire in 1887. The chancery clerk's office had been in said building for many years and the board of supervisors had regularly met therein until it was destroyed by fire in 1887, as stated. It then became necessary for the board of supervisors to supply other offices, and, accordingly, in 1888, it purchased a lot adjoining the courthouse lot on the south, and erected thereon a two-story building, in the lower story of which was situated offices of the sheriff, chancery clerk and circuit clerk, the upper story being used as a jail. The original courthouse lot was inclosed, and the courthouse was within one hundred feet of its southern boundary. The sheriff's office had a door opening into the courthouse yard, but the door of the chancery clerk's office was outside of the yard, twenty feet from the gate leading to it. There was no door between the sheriff's office and the clerks' offices.

Section 278, code 1892, provides that the boards of supervisors shall hold regular meetings at the courthouse of their respective counties, etc. It is admitted that the petition for a local option election was considered, and the order therefor made at a session of the board of supervisors held in said chancery clerk's office. The circuit court held that the election was void, and rendered judgment for the relator whereupon the sheriff appeals.

Affirmed.

Rucks Yerger, for appellant.

1. The meeting in the chancery clerk's office was a compliance with § 278, code 1892. The board is not required to meet "in" or "within" the courthouse building. The two buildings were the property of the county, closely adjacent to each other, all in the same inclosure, and together constituted the seat of justice, embracing the courtroom and all the county offices. They are on one curtilage or lot, and, whether a strict or liberal interpretation be followed, the jail building is at the courthouse.

The word "at," as defined by the lexicographers, is "near to," "close by," "adjacent to." The idea is nearness, close proximity to. For cases in which the word has been so construed, see 22 N.H. 63; 17 Wall., 624; 1 Scam. (Ill.), 329; 50 Ala. 172; 38 N. J. L., 299; 5 T. B. Monroe (Ky.), 374.

2. The decision of this question involves considerations of the gravest character affecting the public interests. All the meetings of the board for many years have been in the clerk's office. It will affect the validity of all the orders of the board, all the sales for taxes, as well as the power of the county to collect its revenue for the current year. To apply a liberal construction, and hold the order valid, will violate no right, public or private, and work no prejudice to the interests of the public.

J. W. & W. D. Cutrer, for appellee.

1. Meetings of the board, held at times and places other than those fixed by law, are void. Stockett v. Nicholson, Walker (Miss.), 75; Jones v. Burford, 26 Miss. 194; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Ib., 26; Johnson v. Futch, 57 Ib., 73; Wolfe v. Murphy, 60 Ib., 1; Bank v. Lewis, 64 Ib., 727; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 374, 376, 386, note 6. Courts have universally construed the word "courthouse," to be the building appropriated and occupied for holding courts, 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 446.

2. The argument ab inconvenienti will not be allowed to override the positive requirement of the statute.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, J.

We have given this case that careful consideration which its importance demands. We have examined all the authorities cited by learned counsel for appellant, and others. The authorities relied on are inapplicable. The subject-matters under treatment in these cases furnish the key to the import of the word "at" in the various connections in which it occurs. The case of State v Camden, 38 N.J.L. 299, is the case of an act providing that a railroad company should hold exempt from taxation a tract of land at the terminus of the road. It is to be noted that, in the various acts considered in the case, the words "at or near" are constantly used--"terminating at or near," etc. The West Jersey Railroad Company was, "through some agreement with the Camden & Amboy Company, to take its cars over the tracks of that company to a suitable landing within the limits covered by its charter," and, accordingly, the question in the case was whether "the terminus" of the West Jersey road was the point where it intersected the Camden & Amboy Railroad some "twentyfive hundred feet west of said intersection." The West Jersey Railroad had built its offices in the city of Camden, and not at the point of intersection, but ran, under the agreement, its cars into Camden over the track of the other road. The court held the terminus was where the buildings were erected at which freight was delivered, etc., under the agreement, a...