Harston v. Candido, FBTCV166058066S

• Decision Date: 30 January 2017
• Docket Number: FBTCV166058066S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Val Jean Harston v. Wilker Candido

Val Jean Harston v. Wilker Candido

No. FBTCV166058066S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

January 30, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE

Edward T. Krumeich, J.

Defendants Wilker Candido and Eliene Nascimento have moved to strike the Second Count of the Complaint dated June 21, 2016, filed by plaintiff Val Hairston, that asserts a recklessness claim under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. This motion squarely raises the issue of whether a plaintiff needs to allege facts that would constitute reckless conduct or whether merely alleging conclusory violations of the statutory predicate for liability under C.G.S. § 14-295 here a violation of § 14-218, would suffice. For the reasons stated below, I am granting the motion to strike for failure to allege facts that would constitute reckless conduct.

The Standards for Deciding a Motion to Strike

" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, " [a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).

The Split in Authority on Pleading Multiple Damages Under C.G.S. § 14-295

There is a split in authority among the Superior Court Judges as to pleading requirements to state a claim under C.G.S. § 14-295. See generally Reddick v. Guirguis, 2016 WL 3266120 **2-3 (CT.Sup.Ct. New Haven 2016) (Wilson, J.). The " majority view" holds that it is not necessary to allege facts that would show common-law recklessness but merely to follow " the plain meaning of statutory language in § 14-295 [which] requires only that a plaintiff plead a violation of one or more of the enumerated statutes named therein, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." Liedke v. Paquette, 2010 WL 3447840 *2 (CT.Sup.Ct. New Britain 2010) (Swienton, J.). Accord Sears v. Brooks, 2015 WL 9871320 **4-5 (CT.Sup.Ct. Hartford 2015) (Noble, J.). The contrary view, sometimes referred to as the minority view, " is based on the necessity of fact-pleading rules under P.B. § 10-1 and holds " the plaintiff must plead particularized facts that when taken as true would show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard. The facts must show that the defendant consciously chose a course of action despite the fact that the defendant did know, or reasonably should have known, that the action posed serious danger to others." Reddick, 2016 WL 3266120 *3 (citations omitted).

The Complaint Does Not Allege Facts Showing Recklessness

I have not taken sides on the different views about pleading requirements under C.G.S. § 14-295 because the complaints before me had always alleged conduct, incorporated into the statutory recklessness count, that satisfactorily described reckless conduct, i.e. conduct that would demonstrate intentional, willful or reckless indifference to the safety of others. Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App 451, 455, 495 A.2d 1084 (2009).^[1] Compare State v. Miller, 122 Conn.App. 631, 635, 999 A.2d 844 (2010); State v. Sandra Q., 51 Conn.App. 463, 467-68, 724 A.2d 1127 (1999) (" [w]hile speed alone may be insufficient to warrant a conviction for reckless driving, it may be taken into consideration to show a reckless disregard of consequences"). See generally, Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 614-15, 539 A.2d 108 (1988).^[2]

This complaint does not allege facts that would constitute reckless conduct under the common-law definition. The allegations in the Second Count merely repeat the identical allegations in the negligence count and adds conclusory allegations that the conduct was " deliberate" and " reckless"; the only statutory predicate for Section 14-295 is little more than a boilerplate recitation of the statute's description of the conduct volative of C.G.S. § 14-218a, ^[3] without any subsidiary facts about what actually is alleged to have happened or as to defendant's culpability beyond negligence.

I agree with the minority view explained by Judge Sferrazza in Stelma v. Comarella, 2014 WL 4637548 (Conn.Super. 2014), who concluded that the 1988 amendment to C.G.S. § 14-295 incorporated the common-law definition of recklessness and should be held to the normal fact-pleading standard under Practice Book § 10-1:

Section 14-295 now explicitly confines the availability of multiple damages to cases where a plaintiff " has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [certain statutory provisions] . . ." (emphasis added). The court refuses to regard this phrase as creating a shibboleth that is satisfied by the mere utterance of the word " reckless" in the pleadings. Instead, the

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